COMPARATIVE STUDIES

IN

SOCIETY

AND

HISTORY

An International Quarterly

Articles

Short Notices

Subscription

REPRESENTATION AND THE NATURE OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS*

I. INTRODUCTION

The study of comparative politics is currently invigorated by a world-wide perspective. There is now a lively concern with the politics of societies hitherto little regarded or left comfortably to specialists, and these societies often challenge familiar assumptions based on Western experience. Efforts to understand unfamiliar institutions or why formally similar political institutions perform differently in different societies inevitably forces attention outward from the political focus into wider reaches of each society.

The present paper is sociological and it attempts to show how the political institutions of a society appear from this viewpoint. The discussion begins in generality, stressing the element of *representation* in any social system and coming to political science through the notion of representative agencies over territories. This approach displays political institutions in a matrix of social institutions, particularly social stratification, that may be suggestive for research. The embedding of political institutions in society suggests that a classification of types of societies is a natural basis for a division of labor in comparative politics. In the concluding section of the paper, a scheme of comparative politics for "agricultural" and "industrial" societies is sketched.

II. REPRESENTATION, STRATIFICATION, AND AUTHORITY

Early in the development of modern sociology, Maine and Weber emphasized that social systems may possess structures and symbols that permit the whole system to be *represented* over against its individual members and sub-groups, or outside groups and individuals.[1] This feature of social systems has an obvious importance for political science.

[1] I have found Maine's discussion of primogeniture in his *Ancient Law* particularly instructive on the ideas developed here. Weber used the notion of a *Verband* extensively in his work. In their translation of the first part of Weber's systematic treatise, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, Parsons and Henderson have translated *Verband* as "corporate group", *Theory of Economic and Social Organization* (New York, 1947), pp. 145–148.

Obviously, not all social structures are made up of corporate groups. All social structures can be viewed as *classifications, reticulations,* or *collectivities.*[2] There are some institutionalized classifications of individuals that carry no direct implications of solidarity or common purposes: sex, age and education provide familiar examples. Kinship gives a major example of reticulations among roles that cut across solidary groupings. There are, of course, many social structures with definite boundaries and within which the members have a sense of solidarity, common values and purposes. These are the structures that have been called collectivities.[3]

The lines between these categories tend, of course, to be fluid. One important problem of social integration is found in the tendency of classifications to generate collectivities. We are familiar in the modern world with norms and ideologies directed at controlling these tendencies – e.g., the "Americanization" movement in our own society was a movement against emphasis on ethnic status and we also have universalistic restraints that inhibit organized expressions of class status.[4] In modern industrial societies there are persistent efforts to form representative agencies for social classifications that have some plausible common interests or solidary sentiments; the ease of building "associational" structures is no doubt responsible, and this process is one reason for the peculiarly dynamic character of modern industrial societies. Obviously, not all would-be representative agencies make classifications into corporate groups.

The need for some discrimination of *representative* and *autonomous* activities of individuals in a collectivity should be evident. In the "foreign relations" of any collectivity it is important that the actions and intentions of the collectivity as such be discriminated from the "private" actions and intentions of its component members. Thus if business firms are to incur obligations as firms there must be means of defining just how these are legitimately incurred. Similarly, in a great variety of internal matters it is often essential to know whether or not the shared values and goals of the collectivity are in question or whether matters are the autonomous concern of individuals or sub-systems. An appropriate set of symbols and role differentiations must thus exist to provide regularized channels and contexts of representation. In most societies these symbols and structures have a religious character, for reasons familiar since Durkheim's classic analysis in *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*.

The study of corporate groups and representation is a general topic in

---

[2]   Radcliffe-Brown has used precisely this classification (with different terminology). *Structure and Function in Primitive Society* (Glencoe, Illinois, 1952), p. 191.
[3]   Cf. Parsons and Shils, *Toward a General Theory of Action* (Harvard University Press, 1952), pp. 192–195.
[4]   I shall assume some familiarity with the concepts of universalism and particularism, ascription and achievement, as developed by Parsons and Linton respectively. I shall also make use of the idea of an "association" as a very general term for social structures like business firms, hospitals, governmental agencies, etc., which have delimited functions and are largely ruled by norms of universalism and achievement.

sociology, underlying such diverse fields as kinship, business organization, and government. I shall take the view here that our special concerns are with a particular kind of representative agency, viz., those arising from the fact that territorial relations have a special character and importance in societies. Territorial claims are obviously a fundamental part of social structure, not only in the familiar legal forms of property but in a much broader sense. These claims associated with location must be recognized and maintained by the members of effectively interacting groups. But they are also intrinsically subject to invasion by outsiders who do not share the norms of the resident group. The potential use of force is of special importance in these matters and there is a familiar connection between territorial organizations and the control of the use of force. The fact that human beings have a territorial locus means that the diverse social systems in which they participate tend to have an intimate spatial juxtaposition; diverse social systems thus tend to share common location and integrative problems are intimately linked to the fact of territoriality.

The upshot of these remarks is that territorial classifications tend to fall into collectivities and to require representative agencies. I think it wise at this point to proceed illustratively and empirically, with two examples of territorial representation in primitive societies.

Example 1. Leach's monograph on the Kachins, *Political Systems of Highland Burma*,[5] has given us an admirably analyzed picture of territorial groupings. The Kachins are a patrilineal people living in villages and village clusters. Each village contains members of several patrilineages, but there is one lineage that "owns" the village. Leach calls this the "principal lineage" and in the terminology I am using here it would be the "representative" lineage. Similarly there is a principal or representative lineage for each cluster of villages; one village is considered to be senior to others in the cluster and its principal lineage becomes the principal lineage for the whole cluster. A male from the principal lineage is in turn a representative figure for the village or village cluster. The heads of village-clusters have a special honorific title, *duwa*, and Leach calls them "thigh-eating chiefs" from their prerogative of receiving a hind thigh from animals sacrificed within the village cluster. Village headmen sometimes claim the title *duwa* but lack other legitimate prerogatives of the thigh-eating chiefs.[6]

The representative or principal lineage "owns" the land of a village or village cluster in a special sense. Rights of usufruct in the land rest with individual households; they "eat it". Chiefly ownership implies little or no economic advantage but rather a bundle of rights (pp. 155–156), (1) to commit violence on the land, (2) to make offerings to the chief of the sky-spirits, *Madai nat*, (3) to dig ditches around the graves of members of the chiefly lineage, (4) to erect a special kind of house post, (5) to hold a certain kind of communal ceremony

[5] Harvard University Press (for London School of Economics), 1954.
[6] I restrict myself here to *gumsa* organisation. There is a different form (*gumlao*).

called a *manau*, (6) to perform certain annual rituals associated with the earth spirit, *ga nat* or *shadip*.[7]

In the analytical terms I am using here, items (3) and (4) in this list refer to modes of symbolizing a special representative status of the chief. There are normally no "public buildings" in a Kachin village, but the dwelling-place of the headman or chief is differentiated both by its house posts and by containing the setting (*madai-dap*) for the sacrifices to the sky-spirit. Both the chief sky-spirit (*Madai nat*) and the earth spirits, *ga nat*, rule over matters of general importance to the whole village collectivity. The sky-spirits control wealth and prosperity; the earth-spirits, fertility, both human and agricultural. The chief thus has exclusive right of ritual approach to these spirits; (ideologically, his right is based on distant affinal kinship to Madai, and his ritual actions preserve prosperity and fertility). He thus becomes the representative figure for the collectivity's interests vis-à-vis supernatural powers in his capacities (2), (5) and (6). His rights of control over violence in his territory lack an intrinsically communal character, but conform to the universal tendency for these rights to be restricted to territorial representative figures.

A more extended territorial control is vested in certain chiefly lineages. The Kachins have the notion of a "domain" (*mung*) which may contain only a single village cluster, but may be much larger. Where such domains exist, there is a representative lineage. The domain chief (the *mung duwa*) and all subordinate chiefs within the domain are of the same lineage, the subordinate chiefs representing junior branches. (Actually, the Kachins observe ultimogeniture so that the senior lineage is a "youngest son lineage".) The status relations of the chiefly hierarchy are thus grounded in kinship rankings. This is carried further in a system of ranking lineages through their affinal connections (the *mayu-dama* system). Ideally, a chief of any territorial grouping is from a lineage senior to resident lineages with which it has affinal connections.

In general form, the characteristics of this society are very familiar. The use of a lineage as a representative agency over a territory is familiar in the monarchies of Western history, in China, and throughout the world. Before passing on to another example, I emphasize the following points:
a. The linkage of representation and high status.
b. The inter-relations of representative figures at different levels through ideology, kinship, and stratification.
c. The restriction of action for a collectivity to the representative figures.
Example 2. Because of the peculiarly "acephalous" and unpolitical character of their society, I venture to recall a few facts about the Nuer of the Southern Sudan, as described by Evans-Pritchard. The Nuer number some 300,000 and are spread out sparsely in villages over a large region around the upper Nile. They have a common language and culture but are not a collectivity in the

---

[7]   Leach omits this last point from his list but from other evidence in his monograph I conclude he did it through oversight.

sense used here. The largest solidary units are tribes which are economically self-sufficient and lay exclusive claim on definite territories. Within a tribe there are means for settling disputes and grievances but no such means exist between tribes. Tribes are internally segmented into sections, each with its territory and some degree of solidarity; sub-sections of these primary sections also exist. Villages are grouped into tribal sections; they also tend to fall into districts in accordance with the ease of communication and these districts tend to coincide with tertiary tribal sections.[8] At no level in Nuer society is there a figure properly called a chief, i.e., one enjoying representative status and exercising authority and ritual powers accordingly. There is however, a kind of representative status associated with kinship groups. The Nuer have clans which are segmented at various levels into systems of lineages. Neither clans nor lineages are localized, but members from a given clan or lineage may be found in different tribes, tribal sections, or villages. There is, nevertheless, a special association of kinship groups with territorial groupings. In each tribe there is a clan (usually in numerical minority) which enjoys a special status; its members are aristocrats, *diel*, in that tribe though not in others.[9] Similarly primary tribal sections are associated with maximal lineages as its "aristocrats". The "aristocrats" have special prestige in their territorial grouping, some claims to leadership, but no formal authority; they are not the judges of disputes nor the agencies for execution of justice.

The significance of kinship groups as territorially representative groups in this case must apparently be traced to the Nuer needs for conceptualizing social relationships in kinship terms. The relations of tribes and sub-sections are in any case fluid and easily disturbed. Evans-Pritchard treats their relations as hostile *opposition*, occasionally breaking out in feuds and undergoing processes of fission and fusion. These relations are however not wholly anarchic; there are restraints on the modes of fighting feuds and wars (e.g., the women and children are not killed or enslaved). A conceptualization of distinctiveness but also of relatedness and over-arching unity is provided by the kinship structure through the device of "aristocratic" or representative status for particular clans or lineages.

A close linkage between *representation* and *stratification* stands out in these examples. This is a general characteristic of corporate group structure. Representative symbols and agencies must evoke sentiments related to the common values of a corporate group. They must symbolize these values in a positive fashion. Insofar as individuals enter these representative contexts and agencies they must share in this high positive valuation. In any society, then, representative figures must either be drawn from those possessing a generalized high status in some form, or the roles they fill must have sufficient prestige to

---

[8] M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard (ed.), *African Political Systems* (New York, 1940), p. 275.

[9] E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *The Nuer* (Oxford, 1954), pp. 211ff.

assure high status for their incumbents. It also follows that in any society territorially representative institutions must be shaped by the character of the stratification system.

Representation also has intimate links to *authority*. In a highly segmental and traditionalistic society, there is limited need for representative figures to mobilize a total group and commit it to a program of action. Hence the very weak authority of Kachin chiefs and the practical non-existence of territorial authority figures among the Nuer. But insofar as representation does imply the capacity to commit a group to action or to perform coordinated acts for its general welfare, it implies *authority*. The legitimate bases of this authority are the bases of legitimate representation. Weber's well-known stress on the problem of legitimacy for political systems is a stress which might be applied in any corporate group. As I see the matter, the prominence of legitimacy questions in political systems derives from the delicacy and difficulty of integrating social systems about legitimate representative agencies. All institutionalized structures are "legitimate" in some sense but representative agencies must have a peculiarly high and difficult kind of legitimacy.

III. THE NATURE OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS

The territorial representative agencies I have been discussing would be called political institutions in familiar usages of the term "political". The question immediately arises whether or not they constitute the essential core of political systems. There is good reason to regard them in this way. The study of political systems then becomes the study in the first instance of representative agencies over territories. The same sort of fuzziness in the boundaries of political systems exists which exists for social systems in general. But on this showing, the study of political systems has a special focus and other features of a total society enter the study only insofar as they bear on the structure and functioning of territorial representative institutions.

I do not believe that this view of the nature of political systems is in any sense radical or original. I would ,however, argue that it is a much more convenient and practical definition of the political than some others, in particular than the view that political systems are constituted by all the manifestations of power and authority in a society. The difficulty with this latter view is that any social structure contains patterns of power and authority. A political scientist who took seriously the view that his field is the comprehensive study of power and authority would have to busy himself with families and factories as well as with princes and parliaments. There might for some special purposes be advantages in such catholicity, but for most purposes I believe this would be a confusing and disheartening commission.

It is a familiar sociological argument that territorially representative institutions become ultimate agencies of social control. I thus conceive that I am not in

conflict with Weber's definition of the "political" as exclusive control over the legitimate use of force in a territory but I see advantages in not putting the control of the use of force in the definitional center. Political institutions are representative agencies and the ultimate sanctions they can exercise are only one feature of their activity.

There is some sociological theory which can be applied directly to general discussion of the structure of territorially representative agencies (or "political institutions", as I shall now freely call them). For example, the kind of distinction Bagehot made when he talked of the "dignified" and "efficient" parts of the English constitution is observed clearly in many states. In extreme form, the principal symbolic figures may be quite cut off from the effective operation of political authority. Bagehot's queen kept a stubborn grip on affairs but others like the Japanese emperors under the Tokugawa Regime have lost it almost completely. The discrimination of functions here rests, of course, on an analytical distinction relevant in any political system. It is that between symbolic representation and executive control.

IV. COMPARATIVE POLITICS IN DIFFERENT TYPES OF SOCIETIES

A general scheme for the study of comparative politics is implied in the conception of political systems as focussed about territorial representative agencies. From the preceding discussion it appears that these agencies will reflect the social structures they represent and a classification of societies should provide some basis for dividing the vast field of comparative politics. This observation may seem only to throw back one problem on the solution of a more obscure and difficult one. But one need not have in hand a sophisticated and rigorous classification of societies for a rough charting of domains in comparative politics. The familiar distinction of industrial and pre-industrial societies is an important and useful distinction if one reduces the sprawl of the latter category. This may be done by neglecting a large range of so-called primitive societies and concentrating on those having intensive settled agriculture. In the following paragraphs I offer some evidence that it is possible to characterize in a general way the political systems that arise in *agricultural* and *modern industrial* societies.[10]

It would be very helpful at this point if there were a general political science of pre-industrial, agricultural societies. Weber's essay on Patrimonialism in *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* is an isolated monument reminding us of what is possible.

A unified state in these societies has commonly depended on a representative lineage. The structure of the political system has been basically particularistic in accordance with the character of the underlying society. There have con-

[10] The typology of societies was developed at some length in the SSRC conference presentation from which this paper derives.

sequently been great problems in maintaining unity over extended areas. Local particularism has meant a kind of federative structure.[11] Most of the members of a local community have not been direct members of the political system in the sense that a modern citizen is. They have entered into the political system through local representative figures who have normally held a diffuse high status. The integration of the state has then depended on the coherence of an aristocratic class and its relations to the royal lineage. The structure of political institutions reflects this general social structure. (Thus, in the Middle Ages in the West, kings were surrounded by aristocratic councils.) Various devices in different states have appeared to counterbalance the claims of local aristocrats to representative statuses. They have usually involved some measure of universalistic recruitment. Some, like the Chinese bureaucracy, were extraordinarily successful over long periods. Others like the slave households of the Ottomans have been more desperate measures and correspondingly more susceptible to rapid decay. The executive competence of these "patrimonial governments" looks extremely limited by comparison with modern bureaucratic states. They are often sufficient to the needs of a stable agricultural society but very ill adapted to the efficient direction of social change which is of such central importance in modern bureaucratic governments. They have been hampered in effective operation by fixed particularistic claims and Weber has shown a universal tendency for hard-won centralization to crumble into a loose feudalism.

Many special problems which are of minor or trivial significance in modern industrial societies assume central importance in these pre-industrial societies. One obvious example is the subject I like to call "kingship and kinship". Over the world a great many different arrangements have emerged to assure regular succession to royal status. The fact that kings have siblings, collateral and affinal relatives poses a whole series of integrative problems. The interest in the incest problem, for example, has led to considerable attention to the famous royal exception among the Ptolemies, the Azande and elsewhere. Royal incest invites comparisons with different devices having similar functional significance, for example, the Ottoman's elimination of their problems with in-laws by slave marriages and their problems with siblings by extermination. Other arrangements like those of the Banyankole or the Zulu invite comparative attention.

A general comparative politics for pre-industrial societies would doubtless be of primary interest to pure scholarship but it might also be a valuable base

---

[11] S. F. Nadel's *A Black Byzantium* (Oxford, 1942) gives a good picture of this kind of structure in a Nigerian kingdom. I have also found instruction in Funck-Brentano's account of French villages before 1789, *The Old Regime in France* (London, 1929), ch. VIII, and in Marion Smith's picture of the integration of Indian villages into wider political structures (*American Anthropologist*, 54, 1952, pp. 41–56). "Federative" is perhaps too loose a term for what I have in mind; where there is a centralized "capital", the solidarity is radial and there is motivated opposition among the points (village committees) at the periphery.

point for understanding the transitional societies which crowd the contemporary scene.

In the pure type of a modern industrial society we should expect the representative territorial agency to have the following characteristics: (1) It should be an *association* rather than a lineage or a patrimonial household. (2) In its symbolism and ideology it should reflect the universalistic values of the collectivity it represents. If for no other reason, one expects the government to be an association because it must provide rational direction in a continually changing and dynamic society. The universalism in the class structure probably also requires an associational form – there should be no diffusely qualified aristocracy to whom governmental functions might of right be allocated. As in the examples cited above, the symbolism of government must conform to the underlying social structure and its dominant values.

Actual and historical societies approximate to this model, but with characteristic modifications reflecting their history of transition from agricultural-type societies. In the Western world the urge toward equality which Tocqueville saw as the dominant passion in the 19th century has issued in the universalistic concept of citizenship and the ideology of popular government. The idea of a nation as the underlying collectivity has slowly lost its ambiguities. Montesquieu could still speak of "la nation, c'est-à-dire les seigneurs et les évêques", and later De Maistre answers his question: "Qu'est-ce qu'une nation? C'est le souverain et l'aristocratie." Such limitations of the "nation" to its high status groups seem to represent a natural confusion of collectivities with their representative figures, but the confusion has become progressively less likely. The norms of universalism and the facts of status mobility have fostered the conception of a nation as an undifferentiated mass of citizens. The break-up of local particularism and the decline of ascriptive statuses have produced problems of security for individuals that have given great emotional force to nationalism. Various forms of symbolic participation, through elections and otherwise, have reinforced ideologies of government as representative of all the people.

The form of political institutions as associations built on elective offices and bureaucratic hierarchies is basically compatible with universalistic values. A high seriousness deriving from the force of national sentiment provides a high status for representative authority without direct dependence on the class status of those who hold governmental offices. The status of persons in government is, of course, integrated more or less closely with status rankings in other categories. In no modern society are legislators and officials drawn indiscriminately from all class strata; the upper strata make disproportionately heavy contributions and this is no mere survival of older patterns.[12]

[12]   Cf. the survey of the backgrounds of parliamentary representatives in various European countries (including the Soviet Union) by Mattei Dogan, *L'origine sociale du personnel parliamentaire dans l'Est et l'Ouest de l'Europe* (*Transactions of 2nd World Congress of Sociology*, *1954*, II, pp. 175–179).

The anarchist (and Marxist) ideal of a government run by genuinely "common" people is incompatible with the extensive authority and technical difficulty of modern governments. A progressive extension of universalistic recruitment has, of course, been characteristic. We find gradual elimination of the disabilities which kept Jews and Social Democrats out of the old German imperial civil service or which kept the French civil service in the hands of the *haute bourgeoisie*.[13] The familiar high status of representative figures is nevertheless maintained, although tempered by an ideology which makes them "servants of the people".

The problems of integration for political systems in modern industrial societies are distinctly different from those I have suggested for agricultural societies. The resistances of local particularism have been removed and questions of sheer territorial integration are displaced to the international level. In contrast to patrimonial governments, modern bureaucratic governments seem to have lesser problems of organizational stability. The stiff autonomy of aristocrats has given way to the dependable compliance of salaried officials. Recent history, nevertheless, shows no want of difficulties and instabilities in the structure of representative authority. These difficulties seem to rise in part from the strains of transition and in part from intrinsic problems of industrial societies.

From this general picture, I conclude that there is a legitimate *special* kind of comparative politics for modern industrial societies. The conclusion is in a sense very trite – no professional student of modern governments need be told that his study has its own special complexities. It may not, however, be trivial to suggest that there are theoretical as well as pragmatic bases for specialization – the earnest student of comparative politics in its familiar Western scope need not then feel that his specialization is merely a practical consequence of limited energy and erudition. Actually, of course, the rapid diffusion of Western-model political institutions has produced many mixed and transitional situations that blur the lines of convenient division. But these should admit of study in precisely the fashion that their labels suggest, viz. as intermediate or mixed forms between generally understood types of societies and political systems.

<div style="text-align:right">

FRANCIS X. SUTTON
New York

</div>

---

[13]   On this latter see the paper by Bottomore, pp. 143–153 in the *Transactions* just cited.

DESPOTISM, STATUS CULTURE AND SOCIAL MOBILITY
IN AN AFRICAN KINGDOM

I

This paper concerns an idea in which the writer became interested while trying to understand the political institutions of one people – the Baganda of East Africa.[1] Fundamentally, however, it is a *comparative* idea which requires to be tested against a much wider range of data than one person commands. In such circumstances one attempts to achieve a measure of comparative perspective through "reading around" in the history of such other times and places as seem relevant, but amateur groping of this kind is no substitute for criticism by the uniquely wide range of specialists who constitute the clientele of this journal. It is therefore with more than the usual sincerity that the writer invites criticism.

The idea, in brief, is that there is a relationship among the following three elements: political "despotism" or "absolutism", "social mobility" and "status culture". A word is perhaps in order concerning the meaning of these terms, though they will be used here in perfectly ordinary ways. By "despotism" is meant essentially arbitrary or unlimited authority, a situation where the instutional restraints upon the ruler's power are at a minimum. A second meaning sometimes conveyed by the word "despotism" – that of the *illegitimate* exercise of great power – is not of interest here; our concern is rather with situations in which extremely wide discretion on the ruler's part is accepted, the sort of situation which Max Weber called "sultanism".[2] It is recognized, of course, that despotism is always a matter of degree, that complete arbitrariness on the part of the ruler is never institutionalized.

The second of the above terms, "social mobility", requires little comment. It means here simply the freedom with which institutions allow persons to move into and out of the more favored positions in society. Finally, "status culture" consists of values and beliefs self-consciously shared by persons who occupy a common status in society. Persons sharing such a culture form what Max Weber called a *stand*, translated by Gerth and Mills as "status group".[3] "Status group" is distinguished from "class", and "status culture" from "class culture" by the element of self-consciousness. Persons who share common "objective" characteristics, such as a common relationship to the means of production or a common pattern of value and belief, constitute a class but not a status group. The latter involves, in addition, a consciousness of solidarity, a consciousness that the values and beliefs embodied in the group culture define common rights and duties. Of course, all these elements may be present in varying degrees.

The relationship which, it will be suggested, obtains among these elements is as follows: Despotism is related to social mobility in that one of the aspects of the despot's arbitrary authority is his ability to grant and withdraw favored positions without regard to persons' status at the time. Furthermore, the more the despot exercises his authority in this way, the less likely it will be that marked status cultures will persist. Conversely, low social mobility and marked development of status cultures will tend to restrict the development or persistence of despotism. It is not suggested that the formation or persistence of status groups is incompatible with social mobility. The two are compatible so long as mobility is essentially controlled by the group; it is arbitrary mobility, controlled from without the group by the despot, which works against the group and its culture. Again, it is recognized that status groups often develop in association with powerful, even despotic leaders. William the Conqueror, the charismatic war leader, brought with him a group of followers who became the feudal nobility of England. But such status groups, if they persist, tend progressively to come into conflict with the despot, as the barons did with William's successors. Finally, it is not suggested that status groups are the only possible barriers to despotism, although in societies of what may be called the "middle range" of complexity they may well be among the more likely candidates for this role.

Now these are obviously not new ideas; they have, on the contrary, a long ancestry in conservative political philosophies – without, in many cases, the recognition that there are other possible barriers to despotism besides aristocracy. They have also received a good deal of sophisticated treatment at the hands of Tocqueville, Weber and other social theorists.[4] This, then, is an

---

[3]   Max Weber, *Essays in Sociology*, tr. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York, 1946), pp. 186–187.

[4]   Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York, 1946); *The Old Regime and the French Revolution* (New York, 1955). Max Weber's thoughts on the matter appear in both the volumes previously cited and, at greater length, in *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (Tübingen, 1947), especially II, Part Three. Finding Weber's German very difficult, the author is most grateful to Reinhard Bendix for permission to read the manuscript of his forthcoming study,

anthropologist's attempt to return to some of the traditional themes of Western political and social thought for inspiration in understanding a body of exotic material. One always hopes, of course, that in putting to work an ancient set of ideas upon new material one may add something by way of generalization and refinement.

It will perhaps be well to make clear at the outset that this is not an attempt to show a direct parallelism between the development of institutions in Buganda and in the Western world. On the contrary, while the above ideas drawn from the analysis of Western institutional history will, it is hoped, be shown to be useful to an understanding of Buganda affairs, yet the elements to which these ideas draw attention will be shown to interact very differently there. Indeed, it is the argument of this paper that the relative "strengths" of social mobility, status culture and despotism have differed greatly in Buganda and in the West and that serious misunderstanding results from viewing Buganda as representing a "stage" through which the West has passed. We are attempting to ask about Buganda some of the questions which have been asked about the West and thus to understand better some of the differences between them.

II

The Baganda are a Bantu-speaking people, numbering about one million, who inhabit most of the northern shore of Lake Victoria in east-central Africa. Traditionally they were settled agriculturalists relying for subsistence upon their plantain gardens and plots of millet and sweet potatoes, together with small numbers of cattle, sheep and goats; today they also grow cotton and coffee for export. The land is densely settled, but fertile enough that there has always been enough for everyone. In former times, hoe cultivation produced a secure and relatively easy living and a surplus as well for the support of the political hierarchy; in recent times, it has also produced, through cash-crop cultivation, sizeable money incomes. Today the kingdom forms the core of the British Protectorate of Uganda, first established over Buganda in 1894 and then extended to a penumbra of neighboring peoples through the joint efforts of Baganda chiefs and British officers.[5] "Discovered" by the English explorer Speke in 1862,

---

Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait and an Introduction to His Sociological Work, and also for stimulating discussion of the ideas embodied in this paper. Many other social theorists, philosophers and historians have of course considered these matters, perhaps most notably Edmund Burke in his *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (London, 1907).

[5] As in other Bantu languages, a word in Luganda is formed by combining a root with one of a number of "class prefixes". Thus words denoting persons are formed with the prefixes *mu-* (singular) and *ba-* (plural), so that a native of the country which we are discussing is a *muganda* (pl. *baganda*). Words denoting territories are formed with the prefix *bu-* and those denoting languages are formed with *lu-*; the country is therefore *buganda* and the language *luganda.* To make matters more confusing, early Europeans conversed with the Baganda in Kiswahili, the trade language of the coast, which is also a Bantu language but those prefixes are somewhat different. The territorial prefix, for example, is *u-,* corresponding to the

Buganda's total contact with the West is less than one hundred years old.
Contact with Islam is somewhat older, Arab and Swahili traders from the coast
having arrived a few decades ahead of Speke.

As compared with those of other East African peoples, the political institutions
of the Baganda seemed to the first Europeans who had dealings with them to be
extraordinarily highly-developed – to represent, as the Victorian missionaries,
explorers and empire-builders were fond of putting it, "the rudiments of civili-
zation". The *Kabaka*, the ruler, administered his domain through a complex
hierarchy of appointed chiefs, who were both administrators and judges; there
was a corps of tax-gatherers, an efficient military organization, and a capital in
which the *Kabaka* lived in a vast royal enclosure surrounded by the town-houses
of his chiefs; a system of labor service provided for public works – most notably,
in the eyes of footsore travellers who had marched the eight hundred miles
from the coast through deserts and swamps, an excellent network of roads.
All this European observers tended to interpret in the light of their own history,
applying to the kingdom of the *Kabaka* the terminology of medieval Europe.[6]

Then, at the end of the nineteenth century, following a decade and a half of
political instability and warfare among factions associated with the three
introduced religions – Anglican Protestantism, Roman Catholicism and Islam –
the Uganda Agreement of 1900 was concluded between the victorious group of
chiefs, acting on behalf of the infant *Kabaka* Daudi Cwa, and Sir Harry John-
ston, Special Commissioner for Her Britannic Majesty's Government. This
document established the political relationship which was to obtain between the
British and the Baganda for more than fifty years. Britain recognized the *Kabaka*
as "native ruler . . . under Her Majesty's protection and over-rule".[7] In practice
this meant that, while the *Kabaka* was required to take the "advice" of the
British administration, in fact this advice was not constantly pressed upon him
and he thus continued to exercise real and wide authority over his people.
Other important provisions of the Agreement dealt with land. Traditionally,
local patrilineal kin groups had held hereditary use rights in the land, while
appointed and hereditary chiefs had the right to exact tribute in produce and
labor in their areas of jurisdiction and to allocate unoccupied land. Under the

---

Luganda *bu-*. Thus, to the first Europeans to visit it, Buganda was known as Uganda. As the
British Protectorate was extended to other tribes, "Uganda" was retained for the whole,
while "Buganda" remains the name of the kingdom with which this paper is mainly concerned.
[6] For example A. R. Tucker, Anglican Bishop of Uganda, writing of Buganda as he knew
it in 1890: "The system is roughly speaking feudal. The great territorial chiefs own allegiance
to the king as their overlord. Under these again are smaller chiefs, all holding their land on a
service tenure, and all alike liable, at any moment, to be called out for military duty." *Eighteen
Years in Uganda and East Africa* (London, 1908), I, p. 86. Tucker, who was a very acute
observer, recognized, of course, that the parallel was not exact, but Western feudalism provided
the most familiar analogy for him and for other Western observers of the period. They thus
tended to overestimate the contractual element in the relationship between king and chief and
the solidary, status group character of the chiefly elite.
[7] *Laws of the Uganda Protectorate*, revised ed. (1935), VI, p. 1374.

Agreement, somewhat more than half the land of the kingdom was allotted in freehold estates to the *Kabaka* and some 3,700 chiefs, princes and members of the royal family, the remainder being reserved to the British Crown. Since the allotment was carried out by a council made up largely of the chiefs who were its beneficiaries, the Crown's portion tended to consist, apart from town sites, of uncultivable swamps, forests and rocky hilltops, all of which abound in Buganda.

Thus the recipients of the new estates held the vast bulk of the valuable land. These owners of *mailo* land, as it came to be called, after the "square miles" in which it was allotted, were the chiefs who had come to the top during the struggles of the 'eighties and 'nineties in which, in the main, Christianity won out over Islam, and Anglicanism over Roman Catholicism. They were in the main recent converts and were deeply committed to progressive Westernization. Being now in a position to collect money rents from the peasants, who under the Agreement had become their tenants and who in the decades following 1900 grew increasing quantities of cash crops, they had the wherewithal to adopt a semi-European style of life and to educate their children in the new mission schools. Since education was essential to the new type of chieftainship, involving as it did the handling of written documents and increasing contact with British officials, later generations of chiefs were in large measure recruited from the sons and grandsons of the signers of the 1900 Agreement and their supporters. In 1956, 15 of 20 senior chiefs – chiefs of *masaza* (sing. *ssaza*) or counties – were sons or grandsons of men who received allotments in 1900. Twelve were descendants of persons who were among the 300 to receive allotments of seven square miles or larger.[8]

Western observers have often written or spoken of the descendants of the chiefs who negotiated the 1900 Agreement with Britain as a "landed aristocracy" and compared them, at least by implication, with the "squirearchy" which came into prominence in England in Tudor times and after. For example, Lord Hailey, one of the most influential writers on British African affairs, has compared the position of the Muganda landlord with "... that of the squire in rural England in past times" and the Muganda chief with the English Justice of the Peace.[9] Egalitarians have excoriated Sir Harry Johnston for handing over the peasantry to a group of parasitic *rentiers*, while observers of a more conservative bent have praised him for creating a stable, individualistic middle class.[10] Whichever way one looks at it, there is a good deal in the analogy. The position of

[8] A bound volume of the allotment lists is in the possession of the Registrar of Titles, Kampala, to whom the author is grateful for permission to use it.

[9] Lord Hailey, *Native Administration in the British African Territories* (London, 1950), I, p. 12; 81. C. K. Meek, in his *Land Law and Custom in the Colonies* (London, 1949), speaks of a "small landed aristocracy" being created (p. 133).

[10] H. B. Thomas and A. E. Spencer, *A History of Uganda Land and Surveys and of the Uganda Land and Survey Department* (Entebbe, 1938), p. 72; Meek, *op. cit.*, p. 136. These two views may be found among officers of the Uganda Government to this day.

these chiefly families was based upon individual title to land. They were essen-
tially rural in outlook, usually maintaining both a town house for use while
attending to public or private business at the capital and a country seat at which
to lead the squire's life. Those who lacked higher office in the state hierarchy
often served as "parish chiefs" (*ab'emiruka*; sing. *ow'omuluka*), in which capa-
cities they did indeed have many of the functions of the old English Justices of
the Peace. They educated their sons in boarding schools established by the
missions and explicitly patterned after the public schools of England. They
formed the backbone of religious communities which more and more took on
the character of native churches, as contrasted with foreign-dominated missions.
To a present-day visitor at the home of a Muganda gentleman of this group, the
feeling of being carried back to the England of Fielding is almost overpowering.
He will be shown with pride the ancestral acres, now being "improved" with
coffee plantings, and the humble huts of the tenants. He will see the little parish
church built, perhaps, by his host's father or grandfather, and the special pew
reserved for the landowner and his family. In the house, over tea, he will
converse about agricultural progress, about politics and about the affairs of the
"old boys' association" of his host's school, all this interrupted from time to time
by the arrival of messengers, stewards, and workmen requiring further instruct-
ions. A remarkable resemblance, surely.

And yet it is very misleading. Traditional Buganda differed fundamentally
in political dynamics from feudal Europe, and post-1900 Buganda from the
England of Fielding, in that, unlike the feudal barons and the squirearchy, the
elite of neither traditional nor modern Buganda formed a self-conscious status
group. It is inconceivable that the traditional Baganda chiefs would have or-
ganized to promote their common interests as over against those of the *Kabaka*.
The new landowning class have a bit more self-conscious unity, but even they
have never consolidated as a status group. To understand why, we must examine
the structure of traditional Buganda society and the despotic position within it
of the *Kabaka*.[11]

---

[11]   The principal published sources on traditional Buganda society are: John Roscoe, *The
Baganda* (London, 1911); L. P. Mair, *An African People in the Twentieth Century* (London,
1934); and the three volumes by Sir Apolo Kagwa, *Basekabaka be Buganda* (London, 1953);
Ekitabo kye Mpisa za Baganda (London, 1952); and *Ekitabo kye Bika bya Baganda* (Kampala,
1949). There are also many valuable accounts by travellers, missionaries and government
officials as well as, more recently, a rapidly growing volume of historical and biographical
writing by Baganda in Luganda. A complete list of these would be out of place here; those of
particular relevance to this paper will be cited where appropriate. Extremely valuable, but
as yet largely unpublished, historical research on Buganda has been carried out by Mr. D. A.
Low of the History Department, Makerere College; Mr. R. C. Pratt of the Institute of Com-
monwealth Studies, Oxford; and Mr. C. Wrigley of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies,
London. The author is most grateful to them for access to unpublished manuscripts. Aside
from all these written sources, the author has made use of data gathered by himself and other
members of the East African Institute of Social Research in the course of field research in
Buganda between 1954 and 1957.

III

In traditional Buganda, as today, the great majority of the people were *bakopi* (sing. *mukopi*). The word *mukopi* is used for the social classification of persons in two distinct ways: On the one hand it distinguishes a person of non-royal descent, a member of one of the commoner clans, from a prince (*mulangira*, pl. *balangira*), a person descended from a *Kabaka*; on the other hand, it distinguishes an ordinary peasant from a *mwami*, a chief or person of power and wealth. Let us first consider the hereditary distinction between prince and commoner.

The princes do not form a clan in the usual sense. Although all other Baganda are distributed among some thirty-five dispersed, exogamous, totemic patrilineal clans, the princes and princesses are in a different position. For purposes of totemic avoidance, they are distributed among their mothers' clans. As a body, however, they do have a system of segmentary lineages similar to that which prevails in commoner clans. Children of a *Kabaka* are known as "princes of the *mujaguzo*", the great drums which are among the important symbols of kingship. Patrilineal grandchildren of a *Kabaka* are "princes of the *kanaba*", a lesser set of drums among the royal regalia. Patrilineal descendants of princes of the drums are known as "princes of the *mituba* (sing. *mutuba*)", or branches (literally "fig trees"), and each *mutuba*, consisting of the descendants of the sons of a particular *Kabaka*, has its head, just as do the lineages within commoner clans. Only princes of the drums are eligible to succeed to the kingship.

The princes of the branches were traditionally headed by one of their number appointed by the *Kabaka* and styled the *Ssaabalangira* ("head of the princes"). The princes of the drums were under the joint custody of the *Kiweewa*, the senior son of the ruling *Kabaka*, who was by custom ineligible to succeed, and the *Kasujju Lubinga*, the hereditary head of one of the commoner lineages.[12] Now, it was the princes of the drums who were most sharply distinguished from commoners in that each was potentially the next *Kabaka*. Each, except for the eldest, was eligible to succeed, the choice lying with the senior chiefs, who might take into consideration the wishes of the dead *Kabaka*. They were consequently highly honored – in fact were almost a different order of being – but they were also a source of danger to the stability of the state, hence the practice of confining them in the custody of persons who were trustworthy by virtue of their ineligibility for the kingship. Sharing the royal blood, the princes of the drums were potential usurpers and there was no rule of primogeniture to regulate their ambitions. Though they had great honor, therefore, they were kept from power. Particularly during the later period of the kingdom, when concentration of power in the hands of the *Kabaka* was greatest, great care was taken to avoid participation by princes in affairs of state. They could not, for

[12]   According to a memorandum prepared by the late *Kabaka* Daudi Cwa, a copy of which is in the files of the Resident's Office, Kampala, the *Kiweewa* was sometimes also the *Ssaabalangira*.

example, hold chieftainships and some of the later kings went to the length of
having them executed. More distant princes of the branches were less sharply
distinguished from commoners. Having less of the hereditary aura of kingship,
they were less dangerous and were allowed to live freer lives. In many respects,
in fact, there was little to distinguish most of them from commoner peasants.
The more remote its relationship to the ruling *Kabaka*, the more a princely
lineage resembled a commoner clan or lineage.[13]

The other use of the word *mukopi* – to distinguish an ordinary peasant villager
from a *mwami*, a person of importance – suggests an acquired, rather than
hereditary, difference in position. The Prime Minister, for example, might be –
indeed *must* be – a *mukopi* in the sense that he must be of non-royal birth, but
by virtue of the position which he had achieved he was a *mwami*, in *contrast* to a
mukopi. Apparently throughout the nineteenth century the number of political
careers open to talent was steadily increasing.

Legendary history has it that at some time in the remote past major divisions
of the kingdom were under the control of *bataka*, heads of clans or lineages
(literally "men of the land"). It is widely believed that at this period the *Kabaka*
was essentially *primus inter pares*. Gradually, however, succeeding kings were
able to extend and centralize their authority by replacing these hereditary heads
of kinship groups with appointed territorial officials known as *bakungu* (pl.
mukungu).[14] By the end of the nineteenth century, only two or three of the ten
major divisions of the kingdom – the "counties" – were in the hands of here-
ditary, *bataka*-type chiefs; the others were ruled by appointed officials.[15] The
great *bakungu*, the chiefs of counties, were ranked according to a fixed hierarchy
of titles referring to services performed for the *Kabaka*: *ssaabaddu* ("head of
those who serve"), *ssaabagabo* ("shield bearer"), *ssaabawaali* ("head of the
slaves"), *musaale* ("the arrow"), *mutuba omukulu* ("the greater fig tree",
referring to the tree planted at the coronation, the spreading of whose branches
symbolizes the spread of the kingdom), *mutuba omuto* ("the lesser fig tree").[16]
Within each county, again, the chief had his hierarchy of subordinate officials,
ranked according to the same series of titles.[17] Each chief also had his *musigire*,

---

[13]   Heads of princely lineages remote from the present *Kabaka* are sometimes spoken of as
bataka, the term which is used for their commoner counterparts.
[14]   Many examples of this process are given in Kagwa's *Basekabaka be Buganda* and in
M. B. Nsimbi, *Amannya Amaganda n'Ennono zaago* (Kampala, 1956), pp. 68–95. Following
the distribution of freehold estates under the Agreement of 1900, in which many *bataka* lost
their traditional lands, there was a prolonged struggle between the latter and the chiefs who
negotiated the Agreement. Memoranda prepared by the two groups, copies of which are in
the files of the Resident's Office, Kampala, give further instances in which kings before 1900
dispossessed *bataka* in order to reward appointed chiefs. The land allotment of 1900 was in
some respects simply a continuation of this process.
[15]   There were ten counties before 1900. As a result of their cooperation with the British in
extending the Protectorate, the Baganda acquired additional territory out of which ten
additional counties were carved, making up the present twenty referred to earlier.
[16]   Nsimbi, *op. cit.*, pp. 70–71.
[17]   Within each county, the senior subordinate chief held the title *mumyuka*, "second in

a deputy to administer his area in his absence, for advancement depended very largely upon royal favor and it was thus advantageous for the chief himself to spend much of his time at court. At the head of the whole body of appointed officials was the *Katikkiro* ("pinnacle of the roof"), the Prime Minister.

The *bataka*, chiefs who were hereditary heads of clans and lineages, did not disappear. Substantial areas remained under their control and they were not uncommonly given by the kings official appointments which also became hereditary. In one particularly prominent case, the head of the great *mmamba* (lungfish) clan, the *Gabunga*, was given the position of admiral – a position of great importance in view of the fact that the territory of traditional Buganda was essentially a crescent-shaped strip running around the shore of the lake. Fleets of large canoes provided essential means of transport for trade and war.[18] More and more, however, the hereditary chiefs were subordinated to the appointed hierarchy, and in fact the delegation to them of state duties had this as one of its effects. In the case of the admiral just mentioned, it is said that the selection of a successor was often influenced by the *Kabaka*, in spite of the fact that it was, in theory, purely an internal clan affair. The filling of so important a post could hardly, from the point of view of the *Kabaka*, be left entirely to others. The ideological justification for this intervention was provided by the notion that the *Kabaka* was also *Ssaabataka*, "chief of all clan and lineage heads". Heirs had to be presented to him for approval and he could apparently dismiss incumbents under certain conditions. Thus the political influence of kinship groups was progressively limited, both by extending royal prerogative to their internal affairs and by appointing officials over them.[19] This process was still going on at the end of the nineteenth century.

Finally, particularly during the latter part of the nineteenth century, there grew up a third class of chiefs, the *ab'ebitongole*, a group of special-purpose officials and royal favorites outside the official hierarchy. Some were in charge of royal estates; each *Kabaka* added at least one such estate, named after himself or one of his ancestors, so that there is an estate called *Kisuna* after *Kabaka* Ssuna and one called *Kitesa* after *Kabaka* Mutesa I. Other *ab'ebitongole* were in charge of persons who performed special services such as providing firewood

---

command". Among the county chiefs, however, there was no *mumyuka* because "*Kabaka w'e Buganda tamyukibwa*" ("The king of Buganda has no second in command"). *Ibid.*, p. 70. This, of course, is not really true, for the *Kabaka* had his Prime Minister (*vide infra*); the idea, however, is meant to express the absolute *incomparability* of the *Kabaka*.

[18] H. M. Stanley describes war canoes up to seventy-two feet in length and estimates that the *Kabaka* could float a striking force of between sixteen and twenty thousand warriors and canoe men. *Through the Dark Continent* (New York, 1878), I, pp. 313–314.

[19] Interestingly enough, the progressive loss of direct political functions, i.e., functions regarding recruitment to major positions in the state, did not destroy, or even weaken, the *structure* of the clans. They retained control over the inheritance of property, including the freehold estates allotted under the 1900 Agreement. Today they maintain offices, with typewriter-equipped clerks, and their affairs are handled by a special court. They also maintain teams which compete at Buganda's current national sport, soccer.

for the palace, caring for the royal herds or repairing rifles for the arsenal, while still others served in the standing army under the commander of the guards, the *Mujasi*. This latter office was apparently a late nineteenth-century creation representing a further enhancement of royal power; previously military power seems to have been based solely upon militia organized by the territorial chiefs of the official hierarchy.[20] The *ab'ebitongole* were often not under the authority of the older territorial officials but were rather under the direct control of the *Kabaka*.

Thus there were two distinct groups of officials (three if we count the hereditary *bataka*) independently responsible directly to the *Kabaka*, who could appoint, dismiss and transfer them. The concentration of power in royal hands was made even greater by the lack of any clear definition of function, of territorial jurisdiction and of authority as between superiors and subordinates of the sort which is found in the bureaucracies of modern Western states. Part of one chief's territory might be included within that of another and his responsibilities were subject to alteration at the whim of the *Kabaka*. For example, the *Ppookino*, chief of the western county of *Buddu*, was in general responsible for military operations on the western frontier, while the *Ssekiboobo*, chief of the eastern county of *Kyaggwe*, guarded the eastern approaches. There were, however, times when the *Kabaka* suddenly reversed these assignments, sending the *Ssekiboobo*, for example, to raid the Banyankole to the west and the *Muwambya*, a subordinate of the *Ppookino*, to campaign in Busoga to the east of the Nile.[21]

The numerous and detailed accounts which we have of life at the court during the later nineteenth century show a monarch approaching the epitome of arbitrary power. Even making a good deal of allowance for the inevitable bias of European observers, the essential picture is clear: Speke, who maintains a rather good-natured detachment, tells of streams of petty offenders, including members of the royal household, dragged off to mutilation or execution at the hands of the *Ssebatta* (executioner) and his assistants.[22] Kagwa, himself a Muganda chief old enough to remember traditional conditions, describes how the old Prime Minister, Kaira, who had placed the young Mutesa I on the throne and defended him against his rebellious brother princes, became the victim of *kuloopa* – malicious tale-bearing by ambitious rivals, a practice which in Buganda had been developed into a high art. Kaira's estates were plundered, many of his sons were executed and he himself was imprisoned by the young

[20] Stanley (*op. cit.*, I, p. 297 ff.) describes in great detail the order of battle for Mutesa I's campaign against Buvuma in 1875 but does not mention the *Mujasi*. To the writer's knowledge, the first published reference is by Ashe in connection with the inter-regnum following Mutesa's death in 1884. A. M. Harrison, *Mackay of Uganda* (London, 1885), letter from Ashe quoted on pp. 306–307. The inference is that the position of the *Mujasi* was created by Mutesa toward the end of his reign.

[21] Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, pp. 87, 91. These events occurred near the beginning of the reign of Ssuuna II, around 1840.

[22] J. H. Speke, *Journal of the Discovery of the Source of the Nile* (New York, 1864), pp. 333–338, 364–365. Other instances are described in Stanley, *op. cit.*, pp. 363, 393, 397–398.

king, who no doubt found it difficult to tolerate the continued authority of the king-maker. Not even the highly influential queen mother, who had made blood-brotherhood with Kaira's son, attempted to help him.[23] And, perhaps most striking to the modern Western mind, there is the case of Honorat Nyonyintono, a Roman Catholic convert who held an important office during the reign of Mwanga (1884–97). As part of a campaign against the spread of Christianity, which he feared, Mwanga had Nyonyintono emasculated – a terrible and degrading punishment in a country where great importance is placed upon virility. But apparently even this did not destroy the relationship between master and servant, for Nyonyintono remained in his office and was soon even promoted; there is every indication that he remained loyal both to his Catholic faith and to the king.[24]

These incidents recall a traditional saying, in which the *Kabaka* is admiringly compared with the *namunswa*, the queen termite:

Namunswa alya ku nswa ze. ("The queen of the termite hill feeds upon her subjects.")

But if the chief was increasingly clay in the hands of the *Kabaka*, he was mighty in the eyes of his subordinates, to whom he was the agent of the royal will. Another saying extols the glory which comes as the reward of absolute obedience:

Omuddu awulira, y'atabaaza engule ya Mukama we. ("The obedient servant is the one who carries into battle the crown of his Master.")

A faithful chief, particularly one who had extended the boundaries of the kingdom, would be rewarded by being given *carte blanche* to plunder the estates and assume the office of one who had fallen into disfavor. This "pay-off" to the king's loyal servants goes far toward explaining the legitimacy which the *Kabaka* enjoyed, despite his arbitrariness and cruelty. In fact, there was a definite "pay-off" for the nation as a whole: the ever more frequent wars against neighboring peoples, in which more than one hundred thousand men might take part, were essentially raids for plunder, in which everyone who took part received a share. In addition, the nation as a whole received the psychic satisfaction which came from national aggrandizement at the expense of their neighbors. In the context of this ideological and economic commitment to aggressive expansion, the despotic behavior of the *Kabaka added* to his legitimacy, rather than the reverse.

During the latter part of the nineteenth century, the power of the monarch was doubtless increased by the importation of firearms, which he was largely able to monopolize, and by the lack of religious restraints. The traditional religious system, whose most prominent elements were an ancestor cult, including a national cult of the royal ancestors, and a pantheon of gods and nature spirits, undoubtedly acted in former times as a check upon the power of

[23]   Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, pp. 115–119.
[24]   *Ibid.*, p. 141.

the *Kabaka*. However, by the latter half of the nineteenth century, perhaps in part because of the encroachment of Islam and Christianity, the traditional system had lost a good deal of its moral aspect and had tended to become, at any rate in court circles, little more than a system of political and military magic. Mackay, one of the first Protestant missionaries, tells how Mutesa I liked to amuse himself by having the merits of the various systems of faith debated in his presence by Arab traders, Christian missionaries and practitioners of the traditional cults.[25] He evidently regarded them all in a coldly instrumental way and would try each in turn in order to test its effectiveness.

Associated with all this was a high degree of social mobility. Increasingly, power, wealth and honor depended upon the favor of the *Kabaka*. It is of course impossible to arrive at any precise measurement of the degree of upward and downward movement during the nineteenth century, when few records were kept, but it is possible to trace the careers of some of the men who were prominent during the latter part of the century and thus to arrive at a qualitative estimate. Rising from the level of the simple peasant to one of the higher offices of state was relatively rare, and of course there have been few societies in which such rapid rise has been at all common. The reason is plain: Even in the absence of explicit institutional or legal restraint upon mobility, there is a tendency for parents to pass their social standing on to their children. Children of highly-placed parents have a greater opportunity to learn the skills appropriate to high position and to inherit property. In traditional Buganda, the principal route to high rank was through service as a page (*mugalagala*) at the court of the *Kabaka* or in the household of a senior official. A chief was more likely to be able to place his son in an advantageous position of this kind than was a peasant. On the other hand, it was quite common for the son of a quite lowly chief, of which there were many thousands at the village level, to achieve very high rank. One reason was that placing a son in the palace to serve as a page was fraught with danger as well as opportunity. A clever boy had a chance to impress his master and thus to achieve promotion, but he also ran the risk of mutilation or death, for his master's attitude toward him was likely to be exceedingly arbitrary. It was therefore not uncommon for a chief to send the child of a subordinate in place of his own. Particularly if the boy were successful, he would be considered the son of the chief who sent him. This practice must have been reasonably common, for one of the frequent manifestations of *kuloopa* (malicious tale-bearing) was the spreading of rumors to the effect that a powerful or prominent person was not *really* the child of his apparent father but merely a peasant boy, a slave from Bunyoro or the like.

In what sense, then, was there in traditional Buganda a "ruling class"? Clearly there were great differences in power, honor and wealth. Differences in wealth have not been discussed, but these in the main followed the distribution

[25] Harrison, *op. cit.*, 112–177.

of authority. Wealth in foodstuffs, labor, cattle, handicraft products and, as trade with the coast developed, imported goods as well, flowed up through the hierarchy in the form of taxes and tribute; much of it also flowed down again in the form of hospitality. The important thing was *control* over goods and services, and this the chiefs possessed to a marked degree, just as they possessed control over people. But did they form a cohesive group with a distinct culture, a sense of common rights and duties? The system was quite obviously incompatible with a solidary aristocracy united in the pursuit of common interests. It was also, apparently, incompatible with the cultural elaboration of the idea of distinct social strata and of distinct ways of life associated with strata.

There is no word in the Luganda language which expresses the idea of a social stratum, a circumstance which became clear to the author in the course of an attempt to translate the word "class". There are words for "honor" (*kitiibwa*), "wealth" (*bugagga*), "rulership" (*bufuzi*) and "importance" (*bukulu*); there is the word *kika*, which means both "clan" and "kind". The closest approach to "class", however, is apparently a clumsy circumlocution employing the word for "ladder" (*madaala*). The Baganda simply do not think of people as being arranged in social layers; they think of social differences instead in terms of dyadic relations of inferiority and superiority. There is great sensitivity to distinctions of honor, wealth, importance and authority as between particular persons, but no conception of broad groups of persons who are essentially equal with respect to these qualities.

Along with the lack of the *idea* of social strata in traditional Buganda, there was a general absence of cultural differentiation as between persons higher and lower on the social scale, differentiation of the sort which seems to have been common in Western societies throughout their histories in one degree or another. Involved here are more than mere differences in wealth or power; these, as we have seen, were well represented in Buganda. Neither is it merely a matter of the cultural acceptance of inequality; it should be quite obvious that the Baganda were far from being egalitarian, were, in fact, ideologically "non-egalitarian". There were clearly-defined roles for superior and subordinate and an elaborate body of terminology and gesture for talking about and acting out these roles. In the sense of possessing common objective characteristics – wealth, power, "lordly" patterns of behavior – the Baganda chiefs were perhaps a "class". But what was absent in Buganda was the status group's sense of common culture and common destiny which made, say, a member of the Victorian "middle class" look upon the urban working man as an entirely different sort of creature, which made him regard the impending enfranchisement of the new industrial labor force as a threat to the very existence of civil society. Similar attitudes were in an earlier period entertained by aristocrats *vis-à-vis* the "merchant classes". The point is perhaps best brought out by reference to the Western notion of the *parvenu* or the *nouveau riche*. "He can acquire wealth and power", these words say, "but he will always be different

because he was not reared a gentleman." This idea apparently did not exist in traditional Buganda.[26]

There was, to be sure, a good deal of lore about differences in sophistication between the country bumpkin and the man of affairs:

Atannayita y'atenda nnyina okufumba. ("He who has never travelled praises his mother's cooking.")

And:

Akiika embuga amanya ensonga. ("He who attends court knows what's going on.") But these were differences which could be overcome by a clever man. If he achieved high position, he was accepted, no matter what his social origins. The cultural gap between the top and the bottom of the social scale was never so great that it could not be traversed in a single life career. The clever peasant boy might not have the *opportunity* to rise because the chief's son had a greater chance of becoming a page in the palace, but, given the opportunity, he could learn what it was necessary for him to learn in order to become a perfectly acceptable senior chief.

IV

Traditional Buganda society, then, did not contain status groups with status cultures. It was a very hierarchical society in which a good deal of social mobility resulted from the exercise of despotic power by the *Kabaka*. What has been the effect upon the pattern of social stratification in this society of contact with the Western world and, in particular, of the relationship with Great Britain which was established by the Agreement of 1900?

A number of characteristics of the new elite which came to power at the turn of the century suggest that it has been closer to a status group than was anything to be found in the traditional society. First of all, there is an element of individual land-holding. This was definitely a novel feature, providing a heritable form of wealth independent of shifts in royal favor, and the term *nnannyini ttaka* ("landowner") did indeed come to denote an enviable social position. Partly this was a relic of the traditional magico-religious attachment to the land as the burial place of the ancestors; the landowner could hope to establish a lineage of which he would be the honored ancestor.[27] Partly, too, it reflected the very real

[26] The above reference to malicious gossip about chief's parentage would seem to contradict this, but there is really no inconsistency here. This kind of gossip is based, not on status values, but upon values of two other types: First, the Baganda are exceedingly nationalistic and gossip of the kind referred to often raises the imputation of foreign descent. Thus: *si muganda ddala* – "not a *real* Muganda". Second, clan membership is most important to a Muganda and gossip may throw doubt upon it. Both clan and nationality, however, cut straight across differences in power, wealth and honor. Thus it is no disgrace to be the son of a poor peasant; it is only a disgrace to have one's nationality or clanship in doubt. To draw what would seem to be the closest Western parallel, gossip about foreign birth or ambiguous clanship has more the tone of imputed illegitimacy than of imputed lower class origin.

[27] In the traditional clan system, the burial places of lineage heads are the objects of strong

advantages conferred by freehold tenure in the new economy based upon money and cash crop agriculture. Land could and did serve both as a source of liquid capital and as a field for capital investment. A number of factors in the situation, however, combined to reduce the value of landownership as a basis for status interests and solidarity. First, fragmentation, resulting from a demand for ready cash, rapidly multiplied the number of estates and reduced their average size so that by 1953, according to one estimate, there were some fifty thousand owners of *mailo* land.[28] Taking the total number of Baganda at one million, this would mean that one person in twenty or, say, one household in five, owned land.[29] A second factor, and one which may have contributed to the selling off of estates by reducing the attractiveness of land as a field for investment, was the Busulu and Envujo Law of 1927, passed by the Buganda Legislature (*Lukiiko*) at the instance of the British Protectorate Government, regulating the rents and dues payable by tenants and forbidding their eviction except for public purposes. Intended to prevent the exploitation of tenants by landlords, the law accomplished this end but it also made more difficult the rational development of large land units and encouraged a passive landlordism.[30] Finally, a rapid differentiation in the occupational structure of Buganda society following the assumption of the British Proctectorate progressively diminished the relative economic advantage enjoyed by landowners as such. The development of business and industry by means of foreign capital and the proliferation of government services provided a whole range of new occupational opportunities in skilled labor, white collar work and the professions and the new educational system produced persons trained for these roles. By the nineteen-fifties, therefore, for all these

---

group sentiment. These are known as *butaka* (literally just "land", but the word in this form refers only to this particular kind of land) and the heads of lineages are *bataka* ("men of the land"). Some estates allotted in 1900 which were not traditionally *butaka* have come to be regarded as such by descendants of the allottees.

[28] A. B. Mukwaya, *Land Tenure in Buganda. East African Studies*, I (Kampala, 1953), p. 30. If anything, this estimate may be low.

[29] It should be noted that there are today perhaps as many immigrant Africans of other tribes in Buganda as there are Baganda, making a total population of nearly two million. Many immigrants become migrant laborers and short-term tenants on land owned by Baganda and toward them the Baganda landowners do indeed have group feelings of superiority and solidarity. In a sense one might say that the Baganda are becoming a superior status group *vis-a-vis* immigrant foreigners. As yet, however, the immigrants have failed to assert themselves as a group. They live on the fringes of Buganda society, though some of them ultimately take up land and are absorbed. See: A. I. Richards (ed.), *Economic Development and Tribal Change* (Cambridge, 1954).

[30] This is an example of a rather common hostility on the part of some recent British colonial governments toward individual economic enterprise, a hostility noted in the *Report of the East Africa Royal Commission, 1953–55* (London, 1955), especially Chapter 7. A policy based upon similar thinking has been applied in Uganda to the marketing and ginning of cotton, which were cartelized at the instance of the government in order to prevent "destructive competition". Since this was done at a time when the industry was largely in the hands of immigrant Indians and Europeans, one actual, though not intended, result, has been to restrict African participation. In some important ways, then, government economic policy has retarded the development of economically differentiated strata among the Baganda.

reasons, landownership had to a great extent ceased to provide the basis for a solidary elite united in the promotion of common economic interests.

Quite apart from their common economic situation as landowners, however, the new elite of 1900 had a degree of self-conscious cultural unity and sense of common purpose which for a time certainly gave them a good deal of the character of a status group. Above all, they were united by the new Christian faith. During the 1880's, both the Roman Catholic White Fathers of Algiers and the Anglican Church Missionary Society made a substantial number of converts among the younger chiefs and, particularly, among the boys in the traditional "school for chiefs", the corps of palace pages. Why the Christian message was so eagerly received in court circles it is difficult to say. Perhaps the faith of the Gospels offered a refuge from the insecurity of life at the court of an increasingly arbitrary monarch. Then too, European *magezi* ("cleverness"), as represented by the material objects brought by the early explorers and missionaries, doubtless gave an added appeal to the European's religion.[31] However that may be, substantial numbers among the young potential elite were converted sufficiently deeply that they were literally ready to go to the stake, as some did, when the *Kabaka* took alarm and attempted to wipe out what he saw as a threat to his position.[32]

A recent biography of Jemusi Miti Kabazzi, a prominent Muganda political figure who was one of the converted palace pages during this period, conveys the sense of "community of the saved" which the little groups of "readers" felt. The *Kabaka* had ordered all Christians in the palace to be seized and executed, but Jemusi and a few others had escaped and taken refuge in the house of a friendly chief outside the palace gates:

While they were there, they heard their fellow Christian, Musa, being taken away to be executed. And while they were still at Walukagga's (the house was near the road), they saw the executioners come and ask Walukagga for ropes to be used as fetters. Walukagga left the executioners outside and went and fetched some rope. When he came back he told the fugitives that the ropes were wanted for binding Christians. When they heard that, they knelt down and prayed to God to give them joy and they sang the hymn, "Alleluia, Raise up Your Souls." This required much courage, for Walukagga's house was very near the road and everyone passing by could hear what they were saying; but they weren't afraid to have their song heard![33]

In spite of the persecutions, Christianity appears to have attracted a significant

[31]   Valuable accounts of the processes by which Christianity took root in Buganda are given in D. A. Low, *Religion and Society in Buganda, 1875–1900. East African Studies*, VIII (Kampala, 1957) and in John V. Taylor, *The Growth of the Church in Buganda* (London, 1958). Doubtless also the converts' relations with the missionaries were assimilated to the traditional patron-client pattern; the missionaries appeared to young Baganda as powerful patrons. None of these "explanations", of course, detracts from the genuineness of the conversions. Christianity has never had more genuine martyrs than those who were burnt, throttled and disembowelled at the order of the *Kabaka* during the persecutions which followed (*vide infra*).
[32]   J. P. Thoonen, *Black Martyrs* (London, 1942); R. P. Ashe, *Chronicles of Uganda* (London, 1894).
[33]   P. M. K. Lwanga, *Obulamu bw'Omutaka J. K. Miti Kabazzi* (Kampala, 1954), pp. 8–9.

number of the abler young men of the kingdom. By the 1890s, they had come to occupy influential positions in the state hierarchy and they felt able, with the aid of their British allies, to take control. In 1894, a British Protectorate was declared over a kingdom largely governed by the young Christian chiefs. Battles, however, remained to be fought. In 1897 *Kabaka* Mwanga, in a final effort to throw off European influence, made common cause with pagan and Muslim dissidents against the Christian chiefs and the Protectorate. The Christians were led into battle by the two outstanding figures of the period, Apolo Kagwa, leader of the Anglicans, and Stanislaus Mugwanya, leader of the Roman Catholics. Both were ex-palace pages. The sense of mission which they shared is apparent in Kagwa's account of how they met Mwanga's supporters in battle on July 20th:

But the writer of this book and Stanislaus Mugwanya fought from horseback, for we despised those against whom we fought. They were renegade Christians who were fighting for the evil customs of the past. When we saw that they had fled from God, we were unable to fear them. God lifted up our thoughts, for our enemies were firing all around us and we were clearly visible up there on our horses, but they failed to hit us. Then we knew that God was fighting with us.[34]

Mwanga was deposed and his infant son installed as *Kabaka* Daudi Cwa.[35] In 1900, under the terms of the Agreement which they negotiated with the British, Kagwa became Prime Minister, Mugwanya was made Chief Justice and their comrade-in-arms, Zakaliya Kizito Kisingiri, took office as Treasurer. At this point, there is no doubt, these men and their followers formed a self-conscious group with a deep sense of common destiny. They had, they believed, secured for themselves and their people the best the Europeans had to offer – religion, education, Western skills and technology – while at the same time preserving the integrity of Buganda. They regarded the British, as the Baganda do to this day, not as conquerors, but as teachers who will depart when the lessons they have to teach have been learned.[36] The main groups of dissidents having been destroyed, this view became the dominant ideology of the new Buganda; it both conferred legitimacy upon the Christian chiefs and was actively furthered by them. The latter thus emerged in 1900 as the champions of a victorious cause, enriched by the land allocation under the Agreement and with an authority which was, to be sure, circumscribed by the British Protectorate, but was also strongly supported by it.

[34] Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, pp. 205–206. Horses were unfamiliar to the Baganda, having only recently been introduced by the Europeans. Kagwa remarks that this was the first time a Muganda had fought on horseback.
[35] There is no indication that the Christian chiefs viewed their overthrow of Mwanga as an attempt to change the *form* of the political system. There was precedent for overthrowing a *Kabaka* and replacing him with another prince. Kagwa reports that the throne of Jjunju, who ruled, perhaps, in the late eighteenth century, was usurped by his brother, Ssemakookiro (*op. cit.*, pp. 66–70).
[36] On the whole, British officials have regarded the relationship in the same light, although of course the two sides tend to differ about how much remains to be learned.

In part, the descendants of this new elite have maintained their position over the past fifty years. It was noted earlier that a majority of the senior chiefs are today children or grandchildren of the "inner core" of the 1900 elite. To a lesser degree, the same tendency is apparent in other fields of leadership in contemporary Buganda society.[37] Members of these "leading families" also share a common educational background, as was demonstrated recently when the two most "aristrocratic" boarding schools – the Anglican Kings' College, Budo, and the Roman Catholic St. Mary's, Kisubi – held their fiftieth reunions. The parades of "Old Boys" on these two occasions contained a very large part of the wealth and power of present-day Buganda, including a majority of the leaders of the Uganda National Congress, usually considered the most "radical" of Buganda's major political parties. Members of this elite have a strong tendency to marry within it.

And yet the descendants of the chiefs of 1900 have failed to "jell" as a status group. They have developed neither a strong sense of corporate unity nor a subtly differentiated style of life. In part, of course, the development of a real status culture is a matter of time. Fifty years is hardly a sufficient period in which to develop an ideology of status which, as we have seen, was absent in the traditional culture. Again, the economic trends which have been noted – the relative unprofitability and difficulty of land development and the progressive differentiation of the occupational structure – have tended to reduce the advantage which the group derived from the land allotment. Government scholarships have undermined their differential access to education. Apart from all these factors, however, the institution of the despotic monarchy has continued to operate against the solidification of an elite status group. The "revolution" of the Christian chiefs in the 1890s resulted in the incorporation of many elements of Western culture and in armed opposition to a *Kabaka* who refused to accept these innovations; it did not, however, destroy, or even seriously alter, the image of the monarchy in the eyes of the Baganda.

The maintenance of the essentially despotic image of the monarchy is connected with the somewhat unusual (though not unique) course which social and cultural change have followed in Buganda. Many African societies have res-

---

[37]   As part of the study of leadership referred to in footnote 1, the author has carried out, with the help of two research assistants, Messrs. Frederick Kamoga and Simon Musoke, a study of social mobility in Buganda between 1900 and 1956. The land allocation lists were taken as defining the elite of 1900. A numerically comparable list of present-day elite was assembled, partly on the basis of general knowledge of Buganda affairs and partly through interviewing, and an attempt is now being made to determine how many of the present elite are descended from those of 1900. Preliminary analysis indicates that, in general, the "higher civil servants" of the Buganda and Protectorate Governments are the most "aristocratic" groups, while the clergy and the elected members of the *Lukiiko* (legislature) (the county chiefs are ex-officio members and there are also six nominees of the *Kabaka*) are the most "proletarian". Data have also been gathered on affinal relations among members of the elite and on their educational backgrounds, careers, and land holdings. The results of the study will soon be published by the East African Institute of Social Research.

ponded to contact with Western culture by dividing into culturally Western and culturally traditional factions. The acceptance of Christianity, education and technological innovation has tended to commit persons to opposition to traditional political structures. In Buganda, however, as we have seen, these new cultural elements found their protagonists in a group of men who had been recruited in the traditional manner and who emerged in 1900 as masters of the traditional system and rulers in its name. Only in a very fluid society, where the bulk of the strategic political roles were filled through achievement, could an entirely new set of men take charge without fundamental violence to the system. Once this occurred, the great majority of Baganda naturally became at least nominal Christians and eager recipients of Western education and skills. Thus Buganda society and culture could remain essentially whole while in some respects undergoing great change; new elements could be "Gandaized", as it were, so that, for example, the Anglican and Roman Catholic churches rapidly acquired native clergies and became "our churches" instead of foreign missions.[38] In this setting, the despotic image of the monarchy could remain intact alongside all the new elements which had been accepted.

There is, of course, an obvious inconsistency between the Christian ethic, to which the Baganda have committed themselves to at least pay lip-service, and the arbitrary cruelty which was associated with the nineteenth century kingship.[39] Indeed, we have suggested that the contrast between them was one of the attractions of the missionaries' message for their converts. But to modern Baganda, the defects of the nineteenth-century kings were not inherent in the despotic institution as such but were rather the result of evil counsel and the lack of Christian teaching.[40] Modern kings, having received the Word, no longer burn their subjects for trivial reasons and so the inconsistency is removed. The deeper inconsistency which the modern Westerner, with his *very* modern association of Christianity with political democracy, sees between the Christian ethic and arbitrary control of one person by another is much less apparent to a Muganda – as indeed it has been less apparent to countless Christian despots

[38] In an interesting pamphlet entitled *Obuyigirize, Obulafu "n'Okwezaya" mu Buganda* (date and publisher uncertain), the late *Kabaka* Daudi Cwa distinguished between the good things which had come from Western contact – religion, education and progress – and the bad things – increased crime, adultery and sloppy manners. The latter he lumped together under the term "foreignization". A more efficient formula for maintaining one's sense of ethnic integrity while at the same time adopting large parts of another culture can hardly be imagined.
[39] The term "lip-service" is not used here in an evaluative sense. Adherence to any moral system – particularly a utopian one like that of the Gospels – is always partial, but formal acceptance of the system produces a general strain toward conformity with its tenets. Also, there is no implication here that the Christianity of the Baganda is less genuine than that of Westerners, though because of the difference in their social-cultural milieu, Baganda typically are tempted, and sin, in rather different directions from Westerners.
[40] There has also been a tendency to launder the memory of the past. In the pamphlet referred to in footnote [38], the late *Kabaka* wrote that in traditional Buganda there was no torture or human sacrifice and that the people followed the Ten Commandments before they had been made aware of them by missionaries.

and their subjects at other times and in other places. The arbitrary authority of
despots is checked, not by ideology alone, but by groups of persons (perhaps
acting in the name of ideology) who, by pursuing their common interests,
establish patterns of rights and obligations which diffuse and restrict power.
The descendants of the chiefs of 1900 who might have played this role in
Buganda have not coalesced sufficiently to do so.

Since 1900, there have been two reigns. *Kabaka* Daudi Cwa, the infant in
whose name the Agreement was signed, died in 1939. His Cambridge-educated
son, Edward Frederick William Walugembe Mutesa II Luwangula, a captain
in the Grenadier Guards, also succeeded as a child and is still a young man.
Each reign has seen the same political pattern. In each case, a regency of ministers
has served during the infancy of the *Kabaka*. During these periods, the kingdom
has been ruled by an oligarchy of senior chiefs and ministers, working closely
with the British Resident.[41] In each case, when the *Kabaka* has come of age,
there has been a struggle. The *Kabaka* has attempted to exercise his full
traditional powers, including, most importantly, the power to appoint and
dismiss chiefs, while the chiefly oligarchy, with the support of the administration,
have resisted this. Then, in each case, the *Kabaka* has appealed over the heads
of the chiefs and the administration to the public and has succeeded in mustering
popular support for the traditional idea of the all-powerfull king. Daudi Cwa
attempted to assert control over appointments, to limit the terms of office of
the ministers and to introduce a more popular element into the *Lukiiko* (legis-
lature), which at that time consisted entirely of chiefs.[42] The situation was not
favorable, however, and he progressively withdrew into an impotent hostility.
After World War II, when Mutesa II was coming to maturity, the world climate
of opinion was strongly anti-colonial and thus more favorable to an African
monarch who wished to assert himself. In addition, the situation was mean-
while being altered by the growth, in response to Protectorate Government
urging, of a substantial popularly-elected element in the *Lukiiko*. This meant
that a despotic *Kabaka* had now to gain control of the elected members. After
a few years of playing the elegant young gentleman, Mutesa also moved against
the chiefs and the administration, with much greater success than his father had
enjoyed. After a long struggle, involving his deportation in 1953 and subsequent
triumphant return in 1955, Mutesa was able to obtain control of appointments

[41]   In the time of Daudi Cwa, this official was known as the Provincial Commissioner and
Buganda was considered a province of the Protectorate. More recently the terminology has
been changed in order to emphasize the difference between Buganda, with its greater autonomy,
and the remainder of the country, which is subject to more direct supervision by British
officers.

[42]   A more detailed account of Daudi Cwa's relations with his chiefs and with the Protectorate
is given in an excellent forthcoming study by R. C. Pratt, which the latter has kindly allowed
the present writer to read. In another of Daudi Cwa's pamphlets, of which he seems to have
published a good many, he accuses the administration of exceeding its authority under the
Agreement in supervising his relations with his chiefs. This pamphlet is reprinted in M. Kaizi,
Kabaka Daudi Cwa, Obulamu, Omulembe n'Ebirowozo bye (Kampala, 1947), pp. 185–193.

(through an appointments board subservient to himself) and to secure the return of a pliable *Lukiiko* packed with "king's men".[43]

It would be most misleading to suggest that the current political situation in Buganda is simply an extension into the present day of traditional institutions, for there are at least two important new elements. First, while the descendants of the chiefs of 1900 have not coalesced into an effective status group – effective, that is, to the extent of being able to subordinate the monarchy to their interests – they do constitute something which was not present traditionally: a potential or incipient status group with the rudiments of a status culture. Because they include the bulk of the educated talent of Buganda, it is impossible for the *Kabaka* to dispense with their services in the operation of his government. Although this group cannot publicly oppose the *Kabaka* – as was demonstrated recently when one who suggested in a speech that the *Kabaka* should be a "constitutional monarch" was clapped in jail for "insulting the throne" – they do, through their positions in the civil service, quietly subject the *Kabaka* to a measure of restraint. The *Kabaka* can secure the dismissal of chiefs and officials whom he suspects of disloyalty, but the persons whom he causes to be appointed to the vacancies thus created often turn out to be kinsmen and schoolmates of their predecessors.

The second new element is, of course, the colonial relationship with Great Britain, and while the presence of an incipient upper status group tends to restrain the despotic monarch, the colonial situation in its present phase tends to strengthen him. With so vulnerable a scapegoat so close at hand (is it not the British themselves who talk of "education for self-government"?), the *Kabaka* has only to cast himself in the role of anti-imperialist hero and to hang the label of "collaborator" upon his opposition in order to secure popular support.[44] Although ultimately a revolutionary or reformist movement may emerge, at present the "masses" – the rural peasants and the tiny group of urban workers – are enthusiastically royalist in their nationalism and are prepared to return like-minded representatives to the *Lukiiko*.

Thus the traditional pattern of despotism, still thought of and spoken of in

[43] W. P. Tamukedde, in a paper entitled *Changes in the Great Lukiiko* (East African Institute of Social Research, no date), has outlined the history of this body. Originally it was simply the daily gathering of chiefs at the palace for the discussion of whatever matters the *Kabaka* wished to lay before them. The name comes from the verb *kukiika*, "to pay homage". In the 1900 Agreement, the *Lukiiko* received constitutional recognition, but its composition remained entirely official. Between 1939 and 1953, the representative element was steadily enlarged until, by the latter date, a majority of elected members was achieved.

[44] This is not to say that there are no "real" grievances to which the *Kabaka* can appeal. Perhaps the most important is the tendency of the British government to associate Uganda's political progress with that of neighboring Kenya Colony, a territory whose political life is heavily influenced by the presence of a substantial community of European settlers. This latter element has been insignificant in Uganda and Uganda Africans very much fear the consequences of any association with Kenya. It was a reference in a public speech to a possible future closer association between the two territories by the Secretary of State for the Colonies which was the immediate cause of the crisis of 1953.

traditional phrases and images, remains a potent element in a political situation whose other elements include an incipient status group patterned after the English squirearchy of an earlier day and the electoral machinery of twentieth-century mass democracy. Of such institutional incongruities is present-day African politics made up.

V

We have here attempted to trace the interaction among status culture, social mobility and political despotism in an African kingdom in both its traditional and its modern setting. To the writer, these ideas have seemed useful in understanding Buganda politics and he hopes to make further use of them in comparative studies of indigenous and contemporary African political systems. Two areas of comparative investigation seem to merit particular attention. First, in the field of traditional African politics, nineteenth-century Buganda was quite clearly rather unusual. In most African kingdoms, kinship groups have played a much greater role in diffusing authority and traditional systems of religious belief have to a greater extent controlled its exercise. In Buganda one tends to focus upon the status group problem just because, from an Africanist's point of view, these more common checks upon the monarch's authority seem so unusually weak.[45] A second field is that of contemporary African political life, and here again Buganda would appear to exhibit rather unusual features. In many areas, apparently, there has been greater discontinuity between traditional social systems and those now emerging as a result of contemporary economic and political development; it would be useful to pursue through comparative investigation the question of which features of traditional Buganda society have made this extraordinary continuity possible.

It would be presumptuous of the writer to attempt to extend these thoughts beyond Africa, for which his knowledge is thin enough in many areas, to other parts of the world, for which it is practically non-existent. Perhaps, however, specialists in other regions may be induced to comment.

L. A. FALLERS
University of California, Berkeley

[45] Some preliminary thoughts on the differences between Buganda and some neighboring states in these respects are offered in the writer's *Bantu Bureaucracy* (Cambridge, 1956), pp. 227–238.

THE CHRISTIAN REVOLUTION IN BUGANDA*

The kingdom of Buganda, which extends over some seventeen thousand square miles of very fertile country to the north-west of Lake Victoria, was the original nucleus of the British Protectorate to which it has given its name.[1] It was, indeed, the first firm base which the British possessed in the interior of East Africa, and it provided the model, and to a large extent the personnel, for the administration of the surrounding areas. Buganda was also the first part of East Africa in which Christian teaching took root, and the centre from which Christian beliefs were diffused among a wide range of heathen tribes. The Baganda were the first people in the region to become literate, and the first to take part, with any degree of willingness and success, in the cultivation of exportable crops.[2]

This tribe, in short, collaborated more actively than any other with the agencies of western civilisation which, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, were bringing new forms of government, new systems of belief and new types of economic activity to the peoples of East Africa. It may be said that they were the only one of these peoples who did not have civilisation thrust upon them but chose it and strove for it themselves. Yet at the same time no East African people succeeded in retaining so large measure of political autonomy or has been so zealous in preserving its traditional institutions, its national self-consciousness and the essentials of its own culture. It is suggested here that the proximate cause of this dual distinctiveness was that Ganda society had undergone, immediately before the advent of British imperial power, a genuine revolution, which had brought about drastic changes in ideology and in the structure as well as the personnel of government, and that as a result of

---

* My acquaintance with Buganda was gained as a fellow of the East African Institute of Social Research from 1952 to 1954. I am indebted mainly to the former Director of the Institute, Dr. A. I. Richards, and to my former colleague Mr. M. Southwold for such understanding of Ganda institutions as I have acquired. Any persistent misconceptions are my own.
[1] "Uganda" is merely the form which "Buganda" necessarily assumes in the Swahili language, the first medium of communication between the British and the natives of the country.
[2] See my article "Buganda: An Outline Economic History", *Economic History Review*, 2nd ser., X (1957).

these changes it was uniquely fitted to cope with the new situation which confronted it in the last years of the nineteenth century.

The revolution was itself the product of external influences. But as these influences had been at work elsewhere in the region without producing similar results it is necessary to seek the ultimate causes of Buganda's singularity in specific features of its earlier history.

II

It can be conjectured with some degree of probability that "in the beginning", like other forest-dwelling, plantain-growing tribes of east central Africa, the Baganda lived in politically isolated villages, each occupying one of the little swamp-girt hills of which the country is composed and each having a patrilineage as its social nucleus.[3] Buganda, however, lies in an area which has manifestly been one of the main storm-centres of recent African prehistory. It is close to the major linguistic frontier which separates the Bantu-speaking and Nilotic tribes, and it is a member of the "inter-lacustrine" group of states, which have long been ethnologically famous for the complexity of their racial and social composition.[4] Though the details are far from clear, it seems evident that the area has been the scene of an intricate process of invasion and conquest, interpenetration of peoples and cultures, a process which can probably be linked with the diffusion of iron weapons from the north and west. The traditions of Buganda's constituent clans leave no doubt but that the present inhabitants of the country, though uniform in culture, are of very heterogeneous origins, some clans claiming to be autochthonous, while others, including the royal clan, describe the advent of their ancestors from the north, the east or the west.[5]

Out of this turmoil there emerged an organised power-system, one of a large number of kingdoms which took shape in the area some centuries ago. Unlike the dominant groups in many of the neighbouring states, however, the rulers of Buganda did not preserve a tradition of ethnic exclusiveness but inter-married with all sections of the population and associated their leaders with the exercise of power. Acting rather like British administrators confronted with similar segmentary societies, they converted the senior lineage-head of each village, the *mutaka* (pl. *bataka*) or "man of the land", into a kind of subordinate chief. Further, they organised the multitudinous lineages into some thirty non-local

---

[3] For an account of a Uganda tribe which is still thus organised see E. H. Winter, *Bwamba* (Cambridge, 1956).

[4] See, e.g., J. H. Speke, *Journal of the Discovery of the Source of the Nile* (London, 1864); J. Roscoe, *The Bakitara or Banyoro* and *The Banyankole* (Cambridge, 1923); D. Westermann, *Geschichte Afrikas* (Köln, 1952), pp. 328 ff. The specific historical theory advanced by these and other writers, namely that the basic negro population had been subjugated by invading bands of "Hamites", who were caucasoid and therefore "superior", is of very doubtful validity. See L. A. Fallers, *Bantu Bureaucracy* (Cambridge, 1956), pp. 27–30.

[5] A. Kagwa, *Ebika bya Baganda* (Kampala, 1949). M. B Nsimbi, *Amannya Amaganda n'Ennono zaago* (Kampala, 1956).

totemic clans, creating a kinship-patterned hierarchy of which the king, as *Ssabataka* or chief of the lineage-heads, was the apex. Though the principle of the totemic clan was doubtless ancient, the regularity and symmetry of the Ganda system point to a deliberate moulding from above. Rivalry between the clans was artificially stimulated and manipulated so as to serve the purposes of authority. Each clan and sub-section of a clan had some honourable function to perform in the service of the state. All members of a clan stood to gain when its leader won the royal favour, and all were liable to be penalised for his disloyalty.

At a later stage, however, there was superimposed on this hierarchy of lineage-heads a pattern of an entirely different kind. Territorial lordships grew up, administered in the king's interest by officers whom he selected without reference to their kinship affiliations. Though the nature of the historical material[6] is not such that we can be sure, it seems likely that this was a revolutionary innovation. It undoubtedly gained great impetus from the accession of king Mawanda, towards the middle of the eighteenth century. Tradition acknowledges that Mawanda was an usurper, and the romantic tale which it tells of his birth plainly reveals what it seeks to conceal, namely, that he was not of royal blood at all. Moreover his immediate predecessor had himself seized the throne, almost certainly with assistance from the neighbouring kingdom of Bunyoro, from a king whom tradition depicts, with what justification we cannot say, as an insane tyrant. The truth behind the traditional narrative may well be that Buganda was conquered by the Banyoro and that Mawanda was the leader of a successful native reaction. Be that as it may, there is little doubt but that the institutions of the kingdom had been seriously disrupted in this period and that Mawanda, lacking traditional legitimacy, was unable to count on the allegiance of the lineage-heads and had to rely more than previous kings upon force and the support of a personal following.

Though he himself came to a violent end, his system endured and grew. Local government, especially on the expanding frontiers of the kingdom, increasingly passed into the hands of administrators called *bakungu*, who were appointed, promoted and dismissed at the king's pleasure. Any tendency of these chiefs towards insubordination or secession was checked by the formation of groups of semi-professional warriors, called *batongole*, who were quartered in different parts of the kingdom, and whose leaders, usually young men with a career to make, were even more strictly "king's thanes" than were the *bakungu*.[7]

The older clan system, however, did not wither away. The two hierarchies, one based on succession and the other on nomination, operated side by side, so

[6] The principal source is A. Kagwa, *Basekabaka Be Buganda*, 4th ed. (London, 1953), amplified at many points by Nsimbi, *op. cit.*
[7] The original meaning of *Batongole* seems to have been "bachelors". The evolution of the word, which now denotes in general "minor chiefs", thus appears to be parallel to that of "knight".

that each citizen of Buganda had a dual proximate loyalty to his lineage-head
and to his administrative chief, who might or might not be the same person.
The result was an extraordinarily intricate web of political relationships. But at
the centre of the web sat the king, in whose hands were all the threads of power.
He could make his influence felt throughout both hierarchies, setting allegiance
against allegiance, faction against faction, and consolidating for himself a
position of unchallengeable authority.

There was still one major source of instability, the rivalry of the princes of the
blood, which seems to have grown more intense as the kingdom grew more
powerful and the rewards of victory more alluring. From the earliest times it
had been a fundamental principle of the constitution that members of the royal
clan, though enjoying a superior status, should be entirely excluded from
positions of authority. All territorial chieftainships and offices of state were
reserved for commoners, who could not aspire to royal power. This did much
to preserve Buganda from the fissiparous tendencies so prevalent in African
states, but at the same time it added to the tensions at the centre. For to a prince
it was all or nothing, either kingship or obscurity. Thus the history of Buganda
in the latter part of the eighteenth century is a chronicle of almost incessant
intestinal strife. Sons conspired against their father, brothers fought each
against all. But by the beginning of the nineteenth century or a little later order
had been restored. Three successive kings, Suna, Mutesa, Mwanga, obtained
the throne without armed dispute, and throughout the fairly long reigns of Suna
and Mutesa there was practically unbroken internal peace. Constitutionally,
the area of potential conflict had been restricted by the establishment of the
principle that only sons of the reigning monarch were eligible to succeed him.[8]
The king's always numerous brothers were now kept under close surveillance,
and killed if the safety of the state should seem to require this extreme measure.
In terms of political mechanics, a central administration had been developed,
with the *Katikkiro*, or grand vizier, at its head – a corps of household officers
whose interest lay in the cohesion and continuity of the state.[9] Further, aggres-
sive impulses and economic ambitions were increasingly directed outwards.
The kingdom was organised above all for war, that is, for the looting of cattle
and women from the surrounding tribes, and a constant influx of new wealth
helped to cement political allegiances and to compensate the common people
for their increasingly servile condition.[10]

[8]   The principle seems to be affirmed in Suna's personal motto: "Kings beget themselves".
In earlier times a brother or a cousin often succeeded, but son has now followed father for six
generations.
[9]   The strength of the central government was demonstrated by the following episode. While
Suna's father lay dying, the great marcher lord Sewankambo, the most successful captain of
his generation, was summoned to the capital by the courtiers on a trumped-up charge of
sacrilege. He came, without his army, and was duly deprived of his office and his property.
[10]   Much of the character of Ganda economics and politics is summed up in the poet's lament,
which may be freely rendered as follows:

By the mid-nineteenth century, when it began to come under the notice of literate observers,[11] Buganda was an ordered despotism of a kind very rare in Africa. Government was centralised to a degree which, considering the absence of such technical instruments as written documents and wheeled transport, was truly remarkable. To each of his many hundreds of subordinate chiefs, to each of his many hundreds of thousands of subjects, the king's word was unquestioned law. He was surrounded, not by an influential body of counsellors, but by an obsequious claque of courtiers and by droves of eager "pages", each waiting for the day when he would be put at the head of a company of armed men and sent to pillage and replace some insufficiently subservient, or merely unfortunate, district chief. All roads led to the king's court, all ambitions turned towards the single fount of honour, all lesser allegiances gave way before the supreme allegiance to the Buganda state and to the king in whom it was embodied. Yet there was still one possible focus of opposition and dissent. As Dr. D. A. Low has acutely pointed out, the king's only serious rivals were the priests.[12]

III

I should like to suggest here (without claiming any originality) that one of the most fundamental structural distinctions is that which can be drawn between societies in which temporal and spiritual power are one, or closely linked, and those in which they are separated, between societies in which it goes against the grain for priests (or in modern terms, intellectuals – the people whom Radin has rudely called the "neurotic-epileptoids")[13] to oppose the State and those in which it goes against the grain for such people *not* to be in political opposition. Since Hildebrand, perhaps since Benedict, the societies of western Europe have clearly been of the latter kind; and it may not be altogether fanciful to assert that in this respect Buganda was a society of western type.

This contention receives some support from a consideration of mythology. Unlike most kings, the rulers of Buganda did not claim descent from the gods.

"Shall I buy me a woman, the pick of the bunch,
To dig in my garden and cook me my lunch?
I'll have to make do with some skinny old thing,
For all the young wenches are wives of the king."
It is said that the king was delighted with this tribute (A. Kagwa, *Mpisa za Baganda*, London, 1952, p. 264).
[11] The principal travellers tales are those of Speke, *op. cit.*, J. A. Grant, *A Walk Across Africa* (London, 1864), and H. M. Stanley, *Through the Dark Continent* (New York, 1878). A little later there were a number of missionary accounts, including C. T. Wilson and R. W. Felkin, *Uganda and the Egyptian Sudan* (London, 1882), R. P. Ashe, *Two Kings of Uganda* (London, 1889) and J. W. H., *Mackay of Uganda* (London, 1891). The most important anthropological studies are J. Roscoe, *The Baganda* (London, 1911) and L. P. Mair, *An African People in the Twentieth Century* (London, 1934).
[12] D. A. Low, *Religion and Society in Buganda, 1875–1900.* East African Studies, No. 8 (Kampala, 1957).
[13] P. Radin, *Primitive Religion* (London, 1939).

Their ancestor was Kintu, who, though undoubtedly a mythical rather than a historical figure, was conceived as a human hero, not as a god. It is true that he was sometimes described as the son of Gulu (Heaven), who in turn was said (though this may be a recent addition) to be the son of Katonda, the Creator. These deities, however, had no real part in Ganda religion. Gulu played no other role in mythology and none at all in cult. Katonda has been identified with the Christian God, but in pre-Christian times he was insignificant. No myths were attached to him, and indeed the Baganda seemed to have had no explicit cosmogony at all. Moreover, according to other accounts Kintu was not the son but the son-in-law of Gulu, whose daughter Nambi he carried off after performing the usual impossible tasks, and in still other versions he figures merely as a human invader and Nambi merely as the daughter of one of the indigenous clan-heads. The divine status of Kintu, and therefore of the dynasty, was thus at least dubious, and the effective focus of Ganda religious belief and practice lay elsewhere, in a pantheon of departmental spirits called the *balubaale*, who were mythologically quite unconnected with the kings.

Mythology thus reflected the actual relationship between king and priest. Though the monarchy was surrounded by a sufficient degree of mystique to have afforded many illustrations of Frazerian theory,[14] and even to have been taken as the chief exemplar of African sacral kingship,[15] it lacked some of the crucial features of that institution. The king was, for instance, under no obligation to die any but a natural death, nor was he, alive or dead, the object of a cult that could compare with those of the *balubaale*. His dealings with the latter – that is, of course, with their human representatives, the men and women whom they "possessed" – had the character of a relationship between coordinate powers. He sent diplomatic embassies to the great god Mukasa, who resided on one of the islands in the Lake, and between them there was on occasion open conflict.[16]

This separation of powers had a dual effect. On the one hand, the king had greater freedom of action inasmuch as he was not himself a priest, bound to behave as such. On the other hand, since he did not have the priesthood under his control, there were potential critics whom he could not readily suppress. It is reported that an Arab merchant once publicly rebuked king Suna for his cruel acts, telling him of Allah, the Merciful, the Compassionate, and that his temerity went unpunished.[17] It may well be that foreign merchants were too valuable to be ill-treated, however outrageous their behaviour. But it also seems likely that the Arab was unknowingly conforming to a pattern of permitted and expected priestly opposition. There is another story of Suna's reign which throws much light on this. A certain Wabulenkoko, spokesman of

[14] Roscoe, *op. cit.* Id., "Further Notes on the Manners and Customs of the Baganda", *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, XXXII (1902).

[15] T. Irstam, *The King of Ganda* (Stockholm, 1944).

[16] Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 60–61.

[17] Kagwa, *Ebika*, p. 104. J. M. Gray, "Ahmed bin Ibrahim – the First Arab to Reach Buganda", *Uganda Journal*, XI (1947).

Kiwanuka the god of lightning, was arrested on a charge of uttering sedition. Hailed before the king, he maintained an attitude of defiance, threatening Suna with the wrath of his god. To which the king replied: "Do you not know that I am God on earth and that I rule the gods of heaven?" But in the night Kiwanuka struck; the king was temporarily paralysed; and Wabulenkoko was released and loaded with gifts and honours.[18]

This story was no doubt a priestly invention. It nevertheless indicates that priests were at any rate supposed to stand out against despotic rule and that supernatural sanctions were at any rate supposed to have some restraining influence on the conduct of the king. On the other hand Suna's tremendous blasphemy, whether he actually uttered it or not, indicates that he was rebelling against these restraints, and that the balance between church and state was in danger of being disturbed. By the time of his successor, Mutesa (1857–84), the balance had definitely been overthrown. The influence of the priests was very much weakened and the secularisation of society almost complete. Mutesa repeatedly expressed his contempt for the cult of the gods and for the remnants of sacramentalism by which he was himself trammelled. In the later written account of the rites and procedures of the kingdom, section after section ends with the words: "But king Mutesa (or king Suna) abolished this custom."[19] Especially striking was his attitude towards the elaborate royal obsequies, which by immemorial custom included the removal and separate bestowal of the jawbone. The hereditary functionaries who performed this task were supposed to be lavishly remunerated. When Mutesa enquired why this should be so the courtiers obediently replied that it seemed to be just a racket, whereupon the said functionaries were heavily mulcted. He then laid it down that he was to be buried whole, and set about having his ancestors disinterred and reunited with their jawbones. His will prevailed over ritual and tradition, over use and wont. He was, as Suna claimed to be, above the gods.[20]

The consequences of this final emancipation of the despot were in many ways disastrous. Human life lost even the not very strong safeguards which surrounded it in more normal African societies. Summary executions, for small cause or none, were a daily feature of court life. Ritual murder, which seems to have been always an element in Ganda culture, was now carried out on an appalling scale, and without respect of those persons who by custom should have been

[18] Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 89. Nsimbi, *op. cit.*, p. 147. Roscoe, *op. cit.*, p. 227.

[19] Kagwa, *Mpisa*.

[20] This point is brought out with a wealth of illustrations by H. P. Gale, "Mutesa I – Was He a God?", *Uganda Journal*, XX (1956). His argument, however, is vitiated by untenable speculations (such as that Kintu was a migrant Copt and the religion of Buganda a corrupted Christianity) and by metaphysical bias. While he is probably right in linking the insignificance of the High God with the exaltation of the monarchy, he is certainly wrong in supposing that Mutesa really believed himself to be God. In fact, Mutesa was clearly a sceptic: he was above the gods because the gods were only fraudulent old men. His scepticism was not wholly proof against misfortune, however, and during his long fatal illness the priests regained a measure of influence.

sacrosanct. Political life was poisoned by delation and intrigue of the kind called Byzantine. Buganda, in fact, ranked second only to Dahomey among the exhibits in the humanitarian writers' gallery of African horrors. Yet in spite of all this European visitors seem on the whole to have enjoyed their stay. Buganda had at least something to show for its atrocities. It had broken away from the tedious routines of African savagery. Within the limits of East African technique, the standard of material culture was high; there was an atmosphere of order and decorum and disciplined vitality; the people, at any rate those who frequented the court, were quick-spoken and quick-witted, curious, intellectually alive. The main point is that when external influences first began to make themselves felt in the land Buganda was already in a condition of social and cultural flux. It had diverged very far from the stereotype of the static, "traditional" society; and it was soon to diverge still further.

IV

The first contacts with the outer world were commercial ones, arising from the arrival of Arab merchants who sought ivory, and to a lesser extent slaves, in exchange for cotton cloth and other manufactured goods. This trade, which began in earnest about the middle of the nineteenth century, added greatly to the wealth of Buganda but did not at first alter the pattern of its economic and political life. During the 'seventies and 'eighties, however, an increasing proportion of the imports took the form of firearms, which did have a profound effect. Mutesa and his successor Mwanga (1884–97) acquired this new armament primarily with a view to increasing their ascendancy over the surrounding tribes. In this they were not altogether successful, for they were unable to prevent guns reaching the rival kingdom of Bunyoro, which indeed gained rather than lost ground in the contest during this period. On the other hand the new weapons added enormously to the king's power to coerce his own subjects. And there was a further consequence of still greater moment: like the mailed horseman in early medieval Europe, the fusilier in Buganda was inevitably a member of a distinct military class, a corps d'élite in relation to which the ordinary peasant-spearmen were soon playing a merely auxiliary role.

At first the new weapons were distributed among the scattered companies of *batongole*, who were organised under the overall control of a new officer, called the *Mujasi*, or praetorian prefect. In the early years of Mwanga's reign, however, a fresh development took place. Three companies of a novel kind were formed: the *Kisalosalo* (the "guards"), the *Kiwuuliriza* ("those who enforce obedience") and the *Ggwanika* (the "storekeepers", and especially the guardians of the armoury). The members of these companies were the king's personal retainers in a more intimate sense than those of any previous organisation. They were mostly very young men, and they soon began to exploit their physical ascendancy, with the king at their head, in a thoroughly unruly manner. As the

historian Apolo Kagwa, who had been one of them, later put it: "The whole land was in disorder, for we boys were looting goats and cattle wholesale ... and they were killing people on the highways without cause; the king was paying no heed whatever to his country, but only to the boys whom he favoured at the expense of the *bakungu*."[21] In short, whereas the rule of Mutesa had been a despotism based broadly on consent, the rule of Mwanga was a tyranny that was becoming intolerable both to the mass of the people and to the senior chiefs. An explosion clearly could not be long delayed. Yet at the same time the real power of the tyrant had been actually reduced. For in a state of this kind (and by any but African standards the Buganda administration was a ramshackle affair) power clearly rested in the last resort with those who had guns in their hands. The fusiliers were the king's servants but, even if he had not been a vicious and cowardly individual, his control over them would necessarily have been precarious.

Very similar developments were taking place in Bunyoro, but with a crucial difference. King Kabarega's gunmen were mostly foreigners, mercenary adventurers of no social standing, and according to a European observer it was his deliberate policy thus to "govern by the lower classes", so as to secure himself against possible rebellion.[22] In Buganda, on the other hand, the fusiliers were recruited from among the palace pages, youths of chiefly families who had themselves been trained to govern and were thus a much more formidable menace to the king's supremacy. The Bunyoro state remained intact until it was overthrown by British military action, but Buganda had already fallen apart, and been reconstructed, before the British arrived on the scene.

During the 'eighties Buganda was in a state of ideological as well as political ferment. Prompted by the explorer Stanley, Mutesa had asked that missionaries should be sent to his country, and in 1877 a party belonging to the Evangelical wing of the Church of England had duly arrived, to be followed two years later by a group of French Catholics. And, though the aim of Arab residents in Buganda was commerce rather than proselytisation, Islamic influence had already been at work for some time previously. Elsewhere in the interior of East Africa neither Christianity nor Islam had made the slightest headway, but here they both rapidly acquired a considerable body of adherents. Dr. Low has shown how the social structure was here peculiarly favourable to the reception of new teaching, how the missionaries could take their place in the system as pseudo-chiefs, and how, like other influential persons, they naturally came to acquire a clientele.[23] There was also, in all probability, a special psychological factor at work. At the court of Mutesa, and still more at the court of Mwanga,

[21] Kagwa, *Basekabaka*, p. 142. This statement is greatly amplified by Nsimbi, *op. cit.*, pp. 104–5, and by J. K. Miti, History of Buganda (unpublished MS held by the School of Oriental and African Studies, London).

[22] G. Casati, *Ten Years in Equatoria* (London and New York, 1891) II, 26, 61–2.

[23] D. A. Low, *op. cit.*

homosexual practices had become fashionable and even obligatory. Such behaviour was attributed to Arab influence, and certainly it was entirely contrary to ordinary Ganda mores. It may be supposed, therefore, that acute moral tensions had been generated, which rendered the young Baganda sensitive, as few other Africans could be, to missionary denunciations of sin. Apart from all this, there seems no reason to doubt that the majesty of the Christian faith made a profound impression on minds which were open, as these minds were, to the appreciation of unfamiliar things. In a sense, the reception of Christianity and Islam in Buganda is of a piece with the peculiarly eager welcome which was extended here to the new kinds of material possessions which were becoming available in the same period.[24]

It can also be suggested that the missionaries and their converts enacted a role which was necessary to the proper functioning of the Ganda state but which for some time had in effect been vacant – the role of priestly opposition. Though Christianity owed its entrée to the despot, it was not through the despot that the conversion of Buganda was effected, but rather in his despite. Mutesa had soon grown cool towards his missionary guests and Mwanga was consistently hostile. Yet the number and strength of the converts constantly increased; and the king once more found himself criticised and opposed, especially on the sexual issue, in the name of religion.

Now the converts were drawn in the main from two classes: from the professional craftsmen who were attached to the service of the king and the great chiefs, and, much more importantly, from among the palace pages and the young officers of the new royal regiments. Thus it came about that the new weapons and the new ideologies were to a large extent the property of the same small but formidable group. To these people the king's attitude was almost necessarily ambivalent. On the one hand they were his boon companions and the indispensable instruments of his rule. On the other hand they were alarming to him, because they had guns and because they owed part of their allegiance to foreigners who, as he thought – and he was not really wrong – were agents of the external powers now beginning to threaten the independence of his realm. He therefore vacillated wildly between conciliation and repression. In 1886 some forty Christians were seized and burned to death.[25] But the more important converts were spared, at any rate from the extreme penalty, and within a year or so they were once more in high favour. Then, in the summer of 1888, as the shadow of European conquest drew closer, there came a new turn of the wheel. The senior courtiers, pointing out to Mwanga that among the troops close to his person there was scarcely anyone who was not a Christian or a Moslem, succeeded in playing on his fears to the point of persuading him to liquidate the

[24]   On this, see P. G. Powesland, *Economic Policy and Labour*. East African Studies, No. 10 (Kampala, 1957), pp. 1–5.
[25]   These men are regarded as martyrs for the faith and the Catholics among them have been beatified. J. P. Thoonen, *Black Martyrs* (London, 1942).

"readers" once for all. But to move openly against them was no longer possible; they had become far too strong. So he attempted a strategem whereby they could be marooned on an uninhabited island in the Lake. When this move failed, an open conflict became inevitable. On the 1st September 1888 the Moslem and Christian forces, led by the Moslem *Mujasi*, the Catholic Honorat Nyonnyintono, captain of the "guards", and the Protestant Apolo Kagwa, captain of the "storekeepers", advanced upon the palace. There was virtually no resistance. The *Katikkiro*, a bitter adversary of the Christians and chief instigator of the earlier persecutions, now, with his personal following, prudently stayed neutral. Mwanga escaped with a few attendants and fled across the Lake.[26]

Most subsequent accounts of these events have stressed the religious character of the revolt, seeing it as a desperate counter-stroke on the part of the victims of persecution.[27] To contemporaries, however, it appeared in a rather different light. The first missionary report began simply: "Mwanga's day has come Uganda has rebelled."[28] In reality the events had a dual character. It was religion which gave cohesion to the rebels and which set them in opposition to a king whom they could otherwise have continued to serve. But at the same time their action was a political revolution of a classical type, an adjustment of the formal in- stitutions of government to the realities of power. The rebels had already for some time been the dominant force in the state, but had hitherto held only junior rank. (Technically, they were known as the king's "slaves".) Now they were in open control of the system and proceeded to distribute the principal offices of state amongst themselves. They did not, of course, declare a republic, a step which would have been incomprehensible to them, but the revolutionary character of their proceedings was plainly indicated by the fact that the prince whom they installed in Mwanga's place, the only one they could get hold of at the time, was Mutesa's eldest son, the one member of the royal family who by custom was *not* eligible for the throne.

A few weeks later the Moslem section of the rebels, instigated by their Arab friends, turned on the Christians and defeated them. The Christians, however, retired in good order and established themselves on the confines of the kingdom. Shortly after this the new king, Kiwewa, acting in a way that had more than one precedent in earlier history, attempted to rid himself of the faction to whom he owed his throne. But the times were new and the attempt failed utterly. Kiwewa was deposed in his turn and a third brother, Kalema, now became king. The new regime was predominantly Moslem, but its character was to some extent counter-revolutionary. The conservative, pagan element rallied to it for a

[26]   These and the ensuing events are recounted by Kagwa, *Basekabaka;* Miti, *op. cit.;* R. P. Ashe, *Chronicles of Uganda* (London, 1894); J. R. L. Macdonald, *Soldiering and Surveying in British East Africa* (London and New York, 1897); J. M. Gray, "The Year of the Three Kings of Buganda", *Uganda Journal*, XIV (1950).
[27]   E.g., H. B. Thomas and R. Scott, *Uganda* (London, 1935), p. 23.
[28]   *Mackay of Uganda, op cit.*, p. 388.

while, and some of the leading roles were enacted by precisely those elderly
chiefs who had suffered most at the hands of Mwanga's youthful guards. The
revolutionary dynamic now lay with the Christian forces,[29] and it was they who
were the eventual victors. Having made common cause with the exiled Mwanga
(for without royalty at their head they would have been politically and psycholo-
gically impotent) they re-invaded the kingdom, and on 5th October 1889, after
a long and bitter struggle, they returned in triumph to the capital.

<p align="center">V</p>

The small group of Europeans who in the 'seventies had begun to plan the
commercial, evangelical and, half-consciously, the political penetration of east
central Africa had looked on Buganda as the obvious base for their operations.
Later on, as the kingdom seemed to be barring its gates to European influence,
it came to be regarded, on the contrary, as a formidable obstacle which would
have to be swept away. The missionary Robert Ashe, deeply distressed by the
slaughter of his converts, went home in 1887 crying, "*Delenda est Buganda*",
and indeed plans of military conquest were being mooted in certain quarters at
this time.[30] Now, however, everything was once more changed, for under
Christian leadership Buganda lay wide open to European commerce and religion.
The additional demand for political submission, which was presented by the
British in the person of Captain (later Lord) Lugard at the end of 1890, was less
readily conceded. It was only by exploiting Protestant-Catholic rivalries that
Lugard, with very little military force at his disposal, was able to make himself
master of the country.[31] On the other hand, the desire to support the Protestant
cause had been one of the main motives for his intervention, and the decision
in 1893 to confirm the creation of an imperial Protectorate was taken largely
because Buganda was a Christian (and now predominantly Protestant) kingdom,
which could be represented to public opinion as needing British protection in
order to survive. At all events, having once reconciled themselves to British
dominion, the Protestant and Catholic leaders together entered into a kind of
partnership with the new rulers, with whom they fought side by side on a
number of occasions – against the Banyoro in 1894–6, against their own king in
1897, when he made a despairing effort to throw off the shackles imposed on him
both by the British authorities and by his nominal servants, and later in the same
year against mutinous contingents of the British mercenary forces. In return,
they received British support in the consolidation of their own internal autho-

[29]   Their spirit is illustrated by Kagwa's comment on a serious setback. "If God had not
been with us, that battle would have destroyed us utterly. For our leader (Nyonnyintono)
had been slain, and many others also, and we were very few. Yet were we not dismayed, even
for a single day, but our strength continued marvellously increasing".
[30]   *Foreign Office Confidential Prints*, Nos. 5433 and 5867.
[31]   On these events there is a voluminous literature. The best account is that of M. Perham,
Lugard: The Years of Adventure (London, 1956).

rity. The "alliance" was sealed in 1900 by the compact known as the Uganda Agreement, one of the most notable features of which was the grant to the Baganda chiefs, as individuals, proprietary rights over the greater part of the land.[32]

The Christian leaders had at no time been consciously altering the structure of the state. Kings had been violently deposed before this, though not within living memory. After the dust of the revolution had settled there was still a king in Buganda, and the offices which the revolutionaries appropriated were the traditional offices of the kingdom. But the structure of the state had nevertheless been very drastically altered: it was no longer a despotism but an oligarchy. After his restoration Mwanga was little more than a puppet in the hands of those who had restored him, and his replacement in 1897 by his two-year-old son did no more than underline the degeneration of the monarch's power. Before the revolution the answer to the question, "Who owns the land?" had been invariably "the king", but in the 'nineties the British came to the conclusion that the land belonged to the "Buganda Government", or to "the king and the chiefs".[33] Power now rested collectively with a group which, in spite of the deep internal cleavage between Protestant and Catholic, can best be regarded as a Party, membership of which could be obtained by formal enrolment (baptism) and carried with it a claim to privilege and place. The oligarchs were a genuinely revolutionary group. They had a distinctive doctrine and a distinctive ethic, and they were inspired by a dynamic which consisted of eager participation in all forms of European culture, from tea-drinking to cathedral-building. In the immediate post-revolution period, Buganda was the scene of an intellectual efflorescence which has been described as "one of the most remarkable and spontaneous movements for literacy and new knowledge that the world has ever seen".[34] By a curious twist, the very people who had turned the ordered monarchy of Mutesa into an unruly tyranny now became the architects of a new order. Sir Apolo Kagwa, who had begun his career as the leader of a band of teen-age ruffians in the service of a barbarian king, grew into a highly respected Christian statesman, Regent of Buganda for seventeen years and "prime minister" (Katikkiro) for thirty-seven, recipient of an order of knighthood normally reserved for ambassadors and colonial governors.[35] There is no need to suppose that his character had fundamentally altered, but his power-drives had found new and more constructive modes of operation.

In course of time, however, as was perhaps to be expected, the oligarchs tended to lose both their dynamism and their identity as a distinct social group. The ideological basis of class-membership disappeared as Christianity became the religion of the majority of the people. The possession of firearms, which

---

[32] Text in all editions of the *Laws of Uganda*.
[33] *Foreign Office Confidential Prints*, Nos. 6951/32 and 6964/47.
[34] R. Oliver, *The Missionary Factor in East Africa* (London, 1952), p. 184.
[35] For a short biography see G. A. Gollock, *Sons of Africa* (London, 1928).

had been its original material basis, naturally became irrelevant under the
British peace, and the ownership of estates, which might have been expected to
provide an alternative basis, did not in fact do so; for reasons which cannot be
discussed here,[36] a permanent landowning aristocracy, in the full meaning of that
term, did not take shape. Moreover the prestige and power of the monarchy were
gradually restored. To a large extent this was done by the deliberate policy of
the oligarchs themselves,[37] who were aware that their own power was not fully
legitimate in the eyes of the people and that the possession of a king tended to
enhance the dignity and autonomy of Buganda in its relations with the British.
To exalt the monarchy must have seemed safe enough when the monarch was
an infant, but in the long run it was fatal to them. After the passing of the
revolutionary generation the Baganda chiefs lapsed more and more into the
role of administrative officials in the British service, while the aspirations of
Ganda patriotism came to be embodied once again in the person of the king.
Thus, like many others, the Ganda revolution petered out, allowing the pre-
existing patterns of political action to re-assert themselves, almost as though the
revolution had not occurred. Almost, but not quite. For the revolution had in
fact served its purpose. It had carried the Baganda smoothly into the new age of
European dominion and economic development, had enabled them to derive
full profit from the material and cultural benefits of the new dispensation with-
out damage to their integrity as a people[38] and above all without that loss of
self-respect which was suffered by so many Africans in face of the overwhelming
superiority of European accomplishment. Thanks to their Christian leaders,
they have always been able to think of themselves, not without some self-
deception but also not without some measure of truth, as partners and colla-
borators of the British, as people who had put themselves willingly under
European tutelage and would again be free.

VI

As I have been privileged to read the article on Buganda which has been
contributed to this issue by Professor Fallers, it may perhaps be in order for me
to offer some comments on the similarities and differences of interpretation
which are discernible in our two accounts. Clearly there is very little that is
actually divergent in our analyses of nineteenth-century Ganda society, but
there are some important differences of emphasis and of implied evaluation.
In particular, we attach very different degrees of significance to the events which
I have made the focus of my essay and which, following contemporary accounts,

[36] They are outlined in my monograph, *Crops and Wealth in Uganda*. East African Studies,
No. 13 (Kampala, 1959).
[37] This appears to be the principal motif of Kagwa's historical and ethnographical writings.
[38] Whether this was ultimately a "good thing" is another matter. The continuing strength of
Buganda patriotism is an impediment to the growth of the wider allegiance to Uganda which,
it would be generally agreed, must be developed if a viable polity is to emerge in this area.

I have described as a revolution. One result of this is that I feel able to make a more hopeful assessment of the current prospects for the emergence of a liberal regime. For, although despotism is in a sense normal in Buganda, I would maintain that revolution, of a reconstructive rather than a cataclysmic kind, is part of the pattern too. And my own impression, for what it is worth, is that the overwhelming tide of royalist emotion generated by the recent exile and restoration of king Mutesa II is already ebbing fast, and that although the "king's friends" are at present in power they are already very much on the defensive.[39] Apart from the checks still imposed by the presence of British authority, there are both social and what may be called ideological impediments to the establishment of despotism in Buganda. The nascent bourgeoisie of professional men, traders, wealthy coffee-planters and the like, though admittedly not a true "status group", does have interests and aspirations which are hardly consonant with absolutist rule, at any rate of the naive kind represented by the Ganda kingship. Hitherto such people have been mainly concerned with emancipation from the control of the "civil-service" chiefs, and in this they have tended to be allies of the king. But the alliance is unlikely to endure; there are already signs that they resent the privileges now appropriated by the courtly clique.

Further, although it cannot be claimed that there are many Baganda in whom the philosophy of liberalism has taken deep root, prostration at the feet of a despot (this is not solely a metaphor) is not an attitude which western-trained intellectuals can comfortably maintain for long – and I have suggested that Baganda "intellectuals" have always declined to adopt this posture. Students have in fact recently been concerned in demonstrations, not indeed against the person of the king, but against the policies of his government. Moreover, just as Mwanga simultaneously alienated the Moslem and Christian sections of his subjects, so his grandson has antagonised the very influential Catholic church as well as the Protestant and secularist intellectuals. In short, I would say that the prospects for liberty are reasonably bright – perhaps brighter than they are in a state such as Ghana, where the new leaders are likely to inherit the kind of allegiance formerly given to political systems which, though less despotic in practice than Buganda, were at the same time theocratic in a way that Buganda never was.[40]

On more general theory there is perhaps this to say. Conditioned to think in terms of sequence rather than of configuration, my question is inclined to be, not "What kinds of institution, or what forms of social structure, are compatible or incompatible with despotism?", but "How does despotism arise and what are

[39]   This was made evident by their puerile attempt to frame their leading opponent – an attempt which was as futile as the desert island stratagem tried by Mwanga in 1888. Their refusal to permit direct elections, while it may serve to prolong their tenure of power, is also symptomatic of weakness.

[40]   See D. E. Apter, *The Gold Coast in Transition* (Princeton, 1955), especially pp. 104–5 and 304–5. (I may, however, have misinterpreted a writer whose language I do not fully understand.)

its effects?" It should be noted that structural-functional and historical ex-
planations are neither identical nor mutually exclusive. To say that despotism
cannot coexist with a self-concsious aristocracy is not quite the same as saying
that Buganda had the one *because* it lacked the other. We have also to ask what
are the factors which make respectively for aristocracy and for despotism.
Unfortunately, however, though I have attempted a general account of the
development of the Ganda state, the evidence here is not really sufficient for this
question to be answered with any precision.

As to the effects of despotism, I would be inclined to maintain with Frazer
that it can be a liberating force, which, by "breaking the chain of custom which
lies so heavy on the savage",[41] may clear the way for more complex institutions,
for a wider and more varied range of human action. Frazer, secure in the belief
that despotism was a stage through which civilisation had already safely passed,
was no doubt able to look on it with greater complacency than is possible for us.
But may not his thesis nevertheless contain a core of truth? There can be little
doubt that Mutesa's Buganda had greater potentialities for change and growth
than the more democratic systems which were usual in East Africa. And was
not the great age of Athenian democracy preceded by the "tyranny" of Peisis-
tratus? And should not Thomas Cromwell be counted among the architects of
English, and American, liberty?

The history of Buganda suggests certain other inferences of a general order.
It was shown that despotism was superseded here by a conspicuously progressive
oligarchy, and it was suggested that this revolution became possible partly
because the very operations of despotism, assisted by an innovation in military
technique, had created a new class which was unamenable to monarchical
control, and partly because this same class was ideologically antagonistic to the
monarch. Perhaps the following propositions may be found acceptable: that
if progress is to be maintained, despotism must in due course give way to freer
and more subtle forms; that it may well contain within itself the seeds of such
a transformation; but that the transformation may nevertheless fail to be effec-
ted unless the fundamental institutions of the society include the principle of
priestly opposition.

C. C. WRIGLEY
University College, Ibadan

---

[41]   Frazer, J. G. *Lectures on the Early History of the Kingship* (London, 1905), p. 86.

SLAVERY AND THE GENESIS OF AMERICAN RACE PREJUDICE

Over a century ago, Tocqueville named slavery as the source of the American prejudice against the Negro. Contrary to the situation in antiquity, he remarked: "Among the moderns the abstract and transient fact of slavery is fatally united with the physical and permanent fact of color." Furthermore, he wrote, though "slavery recedes" in some portions of the United States, "the prejudice to which it has given birth is immovable".[1] More modern observers of the American past have also stressed this causal connection between the institution of slavery and the color prejudice of Americans.[2] Moreover, it is patent to anyone conversant with the nature of American slavery, particularly as it functioned in the nineteenth century, that the impress of bondage upon the character and future of the Negro in the United States has been both deep and enduring.

But if one examines other societies which the Negro entered as a slave, it is apparent that the consequences of slavery have not always been those attributed to the American form. Ten years ago, for example, Frank Tannenbaum demonstrated that in the Spanish and Portuguese colonies in South America, slavery did not leave upon the freed Negro anything like the prejudicial mark which it did in the United States.[3] He and others[4] have shown that once the status of slavery was left behind, the Negro in the lands south of the Rio Grande was accorded a remarkable degree of social equality with the whites. In the light of such differing consequences, the role of slavery in the development of the American prejudice against the Negro needs to be reexamined, with particular attention paid to the historical details of origins.

I

Tannenbaum showed that in the Portuguese and Spanish colonies there were at least three historical forces or traditions which tended to prevent the attri-

[1] *Democracy in America* (New York, 1948), I, 358–60.
[2] Most recently, Oscar and Mary Handlin, "The Origins of the Southern Labor System", *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd Series, VII (April, 1950), 199–222.
[3] *Slave and Citizen; The Negro in the Americas* (New York, 1947).
[4] Gilberto Freyre, *Brazil: An Interpretation* (New York, 1945), pp. 96–101; Donald Pierson, *Negroes in Brazil* (Chicago, 1942), pp. 330–6.

bution of inferiority to the Negro aside from the legal one of slavery. One was
the continuance of the Roman law of slavery in the Iberian countries, another
was the influence of the Roman Catholic Church, and the third was the long
history – by Anglo-American standards – of contacts with darker-skinned peoples
in the course of the Reconquest and the African explorations of the fifteenth
and sixteenth centuries. Roman law, at least in its later forms, viewed slavery
as a mere accident, of which anyone could be the victim. As such it tended to
forestall the identification of the black man with slavery, thus permitting the
Negro to escape from the stigma of his degraded status once he ceased to be a
slave. The same end, Tannenbaum showed, was served by the Roman Church's
insistence upon the equality of all Christians and by the long familiarity of the
Iberians with Negroes and Moors.

In North America, of course, none of these forces was operative – a fact which
partly explains the differing type of slavery and status for Negroes in the two
places. But this cannot be the whole explanation since it is only negative. We
know, in effect, what were the forces which permitted the slave and the Negro
in South America to be treated as a human being, but other than the negative
fact that these forces did not obtain in the North American colonies, we know
little as to why the Negro as slave or freedman, occupied a degraded position
compared with that of any white man. A more positive explanation is to be
found in an examination of the early history of the Negro in North America.

It has long been recognized that the appearance of legal slavery in the laws of
the English colonies was remarkably slow. The first mention does not occur
until after 1660 – some forty years after the arrival of the first Negroes. Lest we
think that slavery existed in fact before it did in law, two historians have assured
us recently that such was not the case. "The status of Negroes was that of
servants", Oscar and Mary Handlin have written, "and so they were identified
and treated down to the 1660's".[5] This late, or at least, slow development of
slavery[6] complicates our problem. For if there was no slavery in the beginning,
then we must account for its coming into being some forty years after the
introduction of the Negro. There was no such problem in the history of slavery
in the Iberian colonies, where the legal institution of slavery came in the ships
with the first settlers.

The Handlins' attempt to answer the question as to why slavery was slow in
appearing in the statutes is, to me, not convincing. Essentially their explanation
is that by the 1660's, for a number of reasons which do not have to be discussed

[5]   Handlin, "Origins of Southern Labor", p. 203.
[6]   Virtually all historians of the institution agree on this. See U. B. Phillips, *American Negro
Slavery* (New York, 1933), pp. 74–77; J. C. Ballagh, *History of Slavery in Virginia* (Baltimore,
1902), pp. 28–35. More recently, however, Susie Ames, *Studies of the Virginia Eastern Shore
in the Seventeenth Century* (Richmond, 1940), pp. 101–10 and W. F. Craven, *Southern
Colonies in the Seventeenth Century, 1607–1689* (Baton Rouge, 1949), pp. 217–9 have more
than suggested that it is possible that slavery existed in Virginia almost from the very beginning
of the Negro's history in America.

here, the position of the white servant was improving, while that of the Negroes was sinking to slavery. In this manner, the Handlins contend, Negro and white servants, heretofore treated alike, attained different status. There are at least two major objections to this argument. First of all, their explanation, by depending upon the improving position of white servants as it does, cannot apply to New England, where servants were of minor importance. Yet the New England colonies, like the Southern, developed a system of slavery for the Negro that fixed him in a position of permanent inferiority. The greatest weakness of the Handlins' case is the difficulty in showing that the white servant's position was improving during and immediately after the 1660's.

Without attempting to go into any great detail on the matter, several acts of the Maryland and Virginia legislatures during the 1660's and 1670's can be cited to indicate that an improving status for white servants was at best doubtful. In 1662, Maryland restricted a servant's travel without a pass to two miles beyond his master's house;[7] in 1671 the same colony lengthened the time of servants who arrived without indenture from four to five years.[8] Virginia in 1668 provided that a runaway could be corporally punished and also have additional time exacted from him.[9] If, as these instances suggest, the white servant's status was not improving, then we are left without an explanation for the differing status accorded white and Negro servants after 1660.

Actually, by asking why slavery developed late in the English colonies we are setting ourselves a problem which obscures rather than clarifies the primary question of why slavery in North America seemed to leave a different mark on the Negro than it did in South America. To ask why slavery in the English colonies produced discrimination against Negroes after 1660 is to make the tacit assumption that prior to the establishment of slavery there was none. If, instead, the question is put, "Which appeared first, slavery or discrimination?" then no prejudgment is made. Indeed, it now opens a possibility for answering the question as to why the slavery in the English colonies, unlike that in the Spanish and Portuguese, led to a caste position for Negroes, whether free or slave. In short, the recent work of the Handlins and the fact that slavery first appeared in the statutes of the English colonies forty years after the Negro's arrival, have tended to obscure the real possibility that the Negro was actually *never* treated as an equal of the white man, servant or free.

It is true that when Negroes were first imported into the English colonies there was no law of slavery and therefore whatever status they were to have would be the work of the future. This absence of a status for black men, which, it will be remembered was not true for the Spanish and Portuguese colonies, made it possible for almost any kind of status to be worked out. It was con-

[7] *Maryland Archives*, I, 451.
[8] *Ibid*, II, 335.
[9] W. W. Hening, *Statutes at Large; being a Collection of all the Laws of Virginia...* (Richmond, 1809), II. 266.

ceivable that they would be accorded the same status as white servants, as the
Handlins have argued; it was also possible that they would not. It all depended
upon the reactions of the people who received the Negroes.

It is the argument of this paper that the status of the Negro in the English
colonies was worked out within a framework of discrimination; that from the
outset, as far as the available evidence tells us, the Negro was treated as an
inferior to the white man, servant or free. If this be true, then it would follow
that as slavery evolved as a legal status, it reflected and included as a part of its
essence, this same discrimination which white men had practised against the
Negro all along and before any statutes decreed it. It was in its evolution, then,
that American colonial slavery differed from Iberian, since in the colonies of
Spain and Portugal, the legal status of the slave was fixed before the Negro came
to the Americas. Moreover, in South America there were at least three major
traditional safeguards which tended to protect the free Negro against being
treated as an inferior. In summary, the peculiar character of slavery in the
English colonies as compared with that in the Iberian, was the result of two
circumstances. One, that there was no law of slavery at all in the beginning, and
two, that discrimination against the Negro antedated the legal status of slavery.
As a result, slavery, when it developed in the English colonies, could not help
but be infused with the social attitude which had prevailed from the beginning,
namely, that Negroes were inferior.

II

It is indeed true as the Handlins in their article have emphasized that before the
seventeenth century the Negro was rarely called a slave. But this fact should
not overshadow the historical evidence which points to the institution without
employing the name. Because no discriminatory title is placed upon the Negro
we must not think that he was being treated like a white servant; for there is
too much evidence to the contrary. Although the growth of a fully developed
slave law was slow, unsteady and often unarticulated in surviving records, this
is what one would expect when an institution is first being worked out.[10] It is
not the same, however, as saying that no slavery or discrimination against the
Negro existed in the first decades of the Negro's history in America.

As will appear from the evidence which follows, the kinds of discrimination

---

[10] John C. Hurd, *Law of Freedom and Bondage in the United States* (Boston, 1858–61), I,
163, points out that the trade "in negroes as merchandise was ... recognized as legitimate by
European governments, without any direct sanction from positive legislation, but rested on
the general customs among nations, known both in municipal and international private law".
Furthermore, he reported that none of the colonies ever found it necessary to pass laws
legalizing slavery. He quotes from the Connecticut Code of 1821: "Slavery was never directly
established by statute; but has been indirectly sanctioned by various statutes and frequently
recognized by courts, so that it may be said to have been established by law." I, 212 n.

visited upon Negroes varied immensely. In the early 1640's it sometimes stopped short of lifetime servitude or inheritable status – the two attributes of true slavery – in other instances it included both. But regardless of the form of discrimination, the important point is that from the 1630's up until slavery clearly appeared in the statutes in the 1660's, the Negroes were being set apart and discriminated against as compared with the treatment accorded Englishmen, whether servants or free.

The colonists of the early seventeenth century were well aware of a distinction between indentured servitude and slavery.[11] This is quite clear from the evidence in the very early years of the century. The most obvious means the English colonists had for learning of a different treatment for Negroes from that for white servants was the slave trade[12] and the slave systems of the Spanish and Portuguese colonies. As early as 1623, a voyager's book published in London indicated that Englishmen knew of the Negro as a slave in the South American colonies of Spain. The book told of the trade in "blacke people" who were "sold unto the Spaniard for him to carry into the West Indies, to remaine as slaves, either in their Mines or in any other servile uses, they in those countries put them to".[13] In the phrase "remaine as slaves" is the element of unlimited service.

The Englishmen's treatment of another dark-skinned, non-Christian people – the Indians – further supports the argument that a special and inferior status was accorded the Negro virtually from the first arrival. Indian slavery was practised in all of the English settlements almost from the beginning[14] and, though it received its impetus from the perennial wars between the races, the fact that an inferior and onerous service was established for the Indian makes it plausible to suppose that a similar status would be reserved for the equally different and pagan Negro.

The continental English could also draw upon other models of a differen-

[11]   The Handlins, "Origins of Southern Labor", pp. 203–4, have argued that in the early years slavery meant nothing more than a low form of labor and that it had no basis in law. This is true insofar as statute law is concerned, but, as will appear later, in practice quite a different situation obtained.

[12]   The Handlins, "Origins of Southern Labor", pp. 203–4, argue that the continental colonies could not have learned about a different status for Negroes from that of white servants from the slave trade because, they say, "the company of Royal Adventurers referred to their cargo as 'Negers', 'Negro-servants', 'Servants... from Africa', or 'Negro Persons' but rarely as slaves." They overlook, however, abundant references to Negro slaves in the correspondence of the contemporary Royal African Company. Thus in 1663 a warrant for that company refers to "negro slaves" as a part of its monopoly. *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial*, V, 121; see also p. 204. In that same year the Privy Council wrote that the Spanish were "seeking to trade with our island of Barbada for a supply of Negro Slaves...". And then the letter referred to a "supply of Negro Servants", and later still "for every Negro Person a Slave" and then "all such Negro Slaves". K. Donnan, *Documents Illustrative of the History of the Slave Trade*, (Washington, 1930), I, 161–2.

[13]   Quoted in Donnan, *Slave Trade*, I, 125.

[14]   See particularly, Almon Lauber, *Indian Slavery in Colonial Times Within the Present Limits of the United States* (New York, 1913), Chap. IV.

tiated status for Negroes. The earliest English colony to experiment with large numbers of Negroes in its midst was the shortlived settlement of Providence island, situated in the western Caribbean, just off the Mosquito Coast. By 1637, long before Barbados and the other British sugar islands utilized great numbers of Negroes, almost half of the population of this Puritan venture was black. Such a disproportion of races caused great alarm among the directors of the Company in London and repeated efforts were made to restrict the influx of blacks.[15] Partly because of its large numbers of Negroes, Old Providence became well known to the mainland colonies of Virginia and New England.[16] A. P. Newton has said that Old Providence

forms the connecting link between almost every English colonising enterprise in the first half of the seventeenth century from Virginia and Bermuda to New England and Jamaica, and thus it is of much greater importance than its actual accomplishments would justify.[17]

Under such circumstances, it was to be expected that knowledge of the status accorded Negroes by these Englishmen would be transmitted to those on the mainland with whom they had such close and frequent contact.

Though the word "slave" is never applied to the Negroes on Providence, and only rarely the word "Servant", "Negroes", which was the term used, were obviously *sui generis*; they were people apart from the English. The Company, for example, distrusted them. "Association [Tortuga island] was deserted thro' their mutinous conduct", the Company told the Governor of Old Providence in 1637. "Further trade for them prohibited, with exceptions, until Providence be furnished with English."[18] In another communication the Company again alluded to the dangers of "too great a number" of Negroes on the island and promised to send 200 English servants over to be exchanged for as many Negroes.[19] A clearer suggestion of the difference in status between an English servant and a Negro is contained in the Company's letter announcing the forwarding of the 200 servants. As a further precaution against being overwhelmed by Negroes, it was ordered that a "family of fourteen" – which would include servants – was not to have more than six Negroes. "The surplusage may be sold to the poor men who have served their apprenticeship".[20] But the Negroes, apparently, were serving for life.

Other British island colonies in the seventeenth century also provide evidence which is suggestive of this same development of a differing status for Negroes,

[15] A. P. Newton, *The Colonising Activities of the English Puritans* (New Haven, 1914), p. 258.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 260.
[17] A. P. Newton, *The European Nations in the West Indies, 1493–1688* (London, 1933), pp. 173–4.
[18] *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial*, I, 249.
[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 277–8.
[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 278–9.

even though the word "slave" was not always employed. Though apparently the first Negroes were only brought to Bermuda in 1617,[21] as early as 1623 the Assembly passed an "Act to restrayne the insolencies of Negroes". The blacks were accused of stealing and of carrying "secretly cudgels, and other weapons and working tools". Such weapons, it was said, were "very dangerous and not meete to be suffered to be carried by such Vassals...", Already, in other words, Negroes were treated as a class apart. To reinforce this, Negroes were forbidden to "weare any weapon in the daytyme" and they were not to be outside or off their master's land during "any undue hours in the night tyme....".[22]

During the 1630's there were other indications that Negroes were treated as inferiors. As early as 1630 some Negroes' servitude was already slavery in that it was for life and inheritable. One Lew Forde possessed a Negro man, while the Company owned his wife; the couple had two children. Forde desired "to know which of the said children properly belong to himself and which to the Company". The Council gave him the older child and the Company received the other.[23] A letter of Roger Wood in 1634 suggests that Negroes were already serving for life, for he asked to have a Negro, named Sambo, given to him, so that through the Negro "I or myne may *ever* be able" to carry on an old feud with an enemy who owned Sambo's wife.[24]

There is further evidence of discrimination against Negroes in later years. A grand jury in 1652 cited one Henry Gaunt as being "suspected of being unnecessarily conversant with negro women" – he had been giving them presents. The presentment added that "if he hath not left his familiarity with such creatures, it is desired that such abominations be inquired into, least the land mourn for them".[25] The discrimination reached a high point in 1656 when the Governor proclaimed that "any Englishman" who discovered a Negro walking about at night without a pass, was empowered to "kill him then and theire without mercye". The proclamation further ordered that all free Negroes "shall be banished from these Islands, never to return eyther by purchase of any man, or otherwise...".[26] When some Negroes asked the Governor for their freedom in 1669, he denied they had any such claim, saying that they had been "purchased by" their masters "without condition or limitation. It being likewise soe practised in these American plantations and other parts of the world."[27]

[21]   J. H. Lefroy, *Memorials of the Discovery and Early Settlement of the Bermudas or Somers Islands, 1515–1685* (London, 1877), I, 127.
[22]   *Ibid.*, I, 308–9.
[23]   *Ibid.*, I, 505. Cases in 1676 and 1685 indicate that this practice of dividing the children became the standard practice under slavery in a colony where the parcels of slaves were so small that few masters could have a spouse on their plantations for each of his adult Negroes. *Ibid.*, II, 427, 547–8.
[24]   *Ibid.*, I, 539. Emphasis added.
[25]   *Ibid.*, II, 30.
[26]   *Ibid.*, II, 95–6.
[27]   *Ibid.*, II, 293. As late as 1662 the perpetual character of slavery for Negroes was being obscured by their serving for ninety-nine years. See *Ibid.*, II, 166, 184.

In Barbados Negroes were already slaves when Richard Ligon lived there in
1647–50. "The Iland", he later wrote, "is divided into three sorts of men, viz:
Masters, servants, and slaves. The slaves and their posterity, being subject to
their masters for ever," in contrast to the servants who are owned "but for five
years...".[28] On that island as at Bermuda it was reported that Negroes were
not permitted "to touch or handle any weapons".[29]

On Jamaica, as on the other two islands, a clear distinction was made between
the status of the Negro and that of the English servant. In 1656 one resident of
the island wrote the Protector in England urging the importation of African
Negroes because then, he said, "the planters would have to pay for them" and
therefore "they would have an interest in preserving their lives, *which was*
wanting in the case of bond servants...".[30]

It is apparent, then, that the colonists on the mainland had ample opportunity
before 1660 to learn of a different status for black men from that for Englishmen,
whether servants or free.

III

From the evidence available it would seem that the Englishmen in Virginia and
Maryland learned their lesson well. This is true even though the sources avai-
lable on the Negro's position in these colonies in the early years are not as
abundant as we would like. It seems quite evident that the black man was set
apart from the white on the continent just as he was being set apart in the island
colonies. For example, in Virginia in 1630, one Hugh Davis was "soundly
whipped before an Assembly of Negroes and others for abusing himself to the
dishonor of God and the shame of Christians, by defiling his body in lying with
a negro".[31] The unChristian-like character of such behavior was emphasized
ten years later when Robert Sweet was ordered to do penance in Church for
"getting a negro woman with child".[32] An act passed in the Maryland legis-
lature in 1639 indicated that at that early date the word "slave" was being
applied to non-Englishmen. The act was an enumeration of the rights of "all
Christian inhabitants (slaves excepted)".[33] The slaves referred to could have
been only Indians or Negroes,[34] since all white servants were Christians. It is

[28]   Richard Ligon, *A True and Exact History of the Island of Barbados* (London, 1657),
p. 43.
[29]   *Ibid.*, p. 46.
[30]   Quoted in Richard B. Morris, *Government and Labor in Early America* (New York, 1946),
p. 499. As early as 1633, on the island of Tortuga, the separation of whites, servants or no,
from Negroes was in evidence. At a time of anarchy on the island, "The eighty-odd Englishmen
in the island had formed a council among themselves for the government of the colony and
to keep in subjection the one hundred and fifty negroes, twenty-seven of whom were the
company's property". Newton, *Colonising Activities*, p. 214.
[31]   Hening, *Statutes*, I, 146.
[32]   *Ibid.*, I, 552.
[33]   *Maryland Archives*, I, 80.
[34]   It is not known whether there were any Negroes in Maryland at that date. J. R. Brackett,
The Negro in Maryland (Baltimore, 1889), p. 26 found no evidence of Negroes before 1642.

also significant of the differing treatment of the two races that though Maryland and Virginia very early in their history enacted laws fixing limits to the terms for servants who entered without written contracts, Negroes were never included in such protective provisions.[35] The first of such laws were placed upon the books in 1639 in Maryland and 1643 in Virginia; in the Maryland statute, it was explicitly stated: "Slaves excepted".[36]

In yet another way, Negroes and slaves were singled out for special status in the years before 1650. A Virginia law of 1640 provided that "all masters" should try to furnish arms to themselves and "all those of their families which shall be capable of arms" – which would include servants – "(excepting negros)"[37]. Not until 1648 did Maryland get around to such a prohibition, when it was provided that no guns should be given to "any Pagan for killing meate or to any other use", upon pain of a heavy fine.[38] At no time were white servants denied the right to bear arms; indeed, as these statutes inform us, they were enjoined to possess weapons.[39]

One other class of discriminatory acts against Negroes in Virginia and Maryland before 1660 also deserves to be noticed. Three different times before 1660 – in 1643, 1644 and 1658 – the Virginia assembly (and in 1654, the Maryland legislature) included Negro and Indian women among the "tithables". But white servant women were never placed in such a category[40], inasmuch as

[35]   Handlin, "Origins of Southern Labor", p. 210; Hening, *Statutes*, I, 411, 539. This is not to say that some Negroes were not indentured servants, for there is evidence to show that limited service was enjoyed by some black men. This was true even during the period after the recognition of slavery in the statutes. In October, 1673, for instance, the Council and General Court of Virginia ordered that "Andrew Moore A Servant Negro", who asserted he was to serve only five years, and who had the support of several "oathes", was declared free. Moreover, his erstwhile master was compelled to "pay him Corne and Clothes According to the custome of the country" and 400 pounds of tobacco and cask for the Negro's service since his time expired and to "pay costs". *Minutes of the Council and General Court of Colonial Virginia*, edited by H. R. McIlwaine (Richmond, 1924), p. 354.

[36]   Hening, *Statutes*, I, 257; *Maryland Archives*, I, 80.

[37]   *William and Mary Quarterly*, Second Series, IV (July, 1924), 147.

[38]   *Maryland Archives*, I, 233.

[39]   Handlin, "Origins of Southern Labor", p. 209, implies that these early restrictions were later repealed. "Until the 1660's", the Handlins write, "the statutes on the Negroes were not at all unique. Nor did they add up to a decided trend." In substantiation of this point they instance the "fluctuations" in the Negro's right to bear arms. Their cited evidence, however, does not sustain this generalization. Four references to the statutes of Virginia are made; of these four, only two deal with arms bearing. The first one, that referred to in the text above, indicates that Negroes were not to be armed. The other reference is at best an ambiguous statement about who is taxable and which of the taxables are to serve in the militia. It in no wise constitutes either a repeal or even a contradiction of the earlier statute, which, therefore, must be presumed to be controlling. Their evidence for "fluctuations" in the right of Indians to bear arms suffers from the same weakness of sources. The two statutes they cite merely confirm the right of certain Indians to possess guns and deny them to other Indians. No "fluctuation" in rights is involved.

[40]   Hening, *Statutes*, I, 242, 292, 455; *Maryland Archives*, I, 342. The statement in Handlin, "Origins of Southern Labor", p. 217 n, that the "first sign of discrimination was in 1668 when white but not Negro women were exempt", is therefore erroneous.

they were not expected to work in the fields. From the beginning, it would seem, Negro women, whether free or bond, were treated by the law differently from white women servants.[41]

It is not until the 1640's that evidence of a status for Negroes akin to slavery, and, therefore, something more than mere discrimination begins to appear in the sources. Two cases of punishment for runaway servants in 1640 throw some light on the working out of a differentiated status for Negroes. The first case concerned three runaways, of whom two were white men and the third a Negro. All three were given thirty lashes, with the white men having the terms owed their masters extended a year, at the completion of which they were to work for the colony for three more years. The other, "being a Negro named John Punch shall serve his said master or his assigns for the time of his natural Life here or elsewhere".[42] Not only was the Negro's punishment the most severe, and for no apparent reason, but he was, in effect, reduced to slavery. It is also clear, however, that up until the issuing of the sentence, he must have had the status of a servant.

The second case, also of 1640, suggests that by that date some Negroes were already slaves. Six white men and a Negro were implicated in a plot to run away. The punishments meted out varied, but Christopher Miller "a dutchman" (a prime agent in the business) "was given the harshest treatment of all: thirty stripes, burning with an "R" on the cheek, a shackle placed on his leg for a year "and longer if said master shall see cause" and seven years of service for the colony upon completion of his time due his master. The only other one of the seven plotters to receive the stripes, the shackle and the "R" was the Negro Emanuel, but, significantly, he did not receive any sentence of work for the colony. Presumably he was already serving his master for a life-time – *i.e.*, he was a slave.[43] About this time in Maryland it does not seem to have been unusual to speak of Negroes as slaves, for in 1642 one "John Skinner mariner" agreed "to deliver unto... Leonard Calvert, fourteen negro-men-slaves and three women-slaves".[44]

From a proceeding before the House of Burgesses in 1666 it appears that as early as 1644 that body was being called upon to determine who was a slave. The Journal of the House for 1666 reports that in 1644 a certain "mulata" bought "as a slave for Ever" was adjudged by the Assembly "no slave and but

---

[41]   In his well-known emigrant pamphlet, *Leah and Rachel* (London, 1656), p. 12, John Hammond casts some interesting light on contemporary opinion regarding women who worked in the fields in Virginia. "The Women are not (as is reported) put into the ground to work, but occupie such domestique imployments and housewifery as in England ... yet some wenches that are nasty, beastly and not fit to be so imployed are put into the ground..."
[42]   *Minutes of the Council*, p. 466.
[43]   *Ibid.*, p. 467.
[44]   Catterall, *Judicial Cases*, I, 57 n. Mrs. Catterall does not think any Negroes came under this agreement, but the language itself testifies to an accepted special status for Negroes at that time.

to serve as other Christian servants do and was freed in September 1665".[45]
Though no reason was given for the verdict, from the words "other Christian
servants" it is possible that he was a Christian, for it was believed in the early
years of the English colonies that baptism rendered a slave free. In any case,
the Assembly uttered no prohibition of slavery as such and the owner was
sufficiently surprised and aggrieved by the decision to appeal for recompense
from the Assembly, even though the Negro's service was twenty-one years, an
unheard of term for a "Christian servant".[46]

In early seventeenth century inventories of estates, there are two distinctions
which appear in the reckoning of the value of servants and Negroes. Uniformly,
the Negroes were more valuable, even as children, than any white servant.
Secondly, the naming of a servant is usually followed by the number of years
yet remaining to his service; for the Negroes no such notation appears. Thus in
an inventory in Virginia in 1643, a 22-year old white servant, with eight years
still to serve, was valued at 1,000 pounds of tobacco, while a "negro boy" was
rated at 3,000 pounds and a white boy with seven years to serve was listed as
worth 700 pounds. An eight-year old Negro girl was calculated to be worth
2,000 pounds. On another inventory in 1655, two good men servants with four
years to serve were rated at 1,300 pounds of tobacco, and a woman servant with
only two years to go was valued at 800 pounds. Two Negro boys, however,
who had no limit set to their terms, were evaluated at 4,100 pounds apiece, and
a Negro girl was said to be worth 5,500 pounds.[47]

These great differences in valuation of Negro and white "servants" strongly
suggest, as does the failure to indicate term of service for the Negroes, that the
latter were slaves at least in regard to life-time service. Beyond a question,
there was some service which these blacks were rendering which enhanced their
value – a service, moreover, which was not or could not be exacted from the
whites. Furthermore, a Maryland deed of 1649 adumbrated slave status not
only of life-time term, but of inheritance of status. Three Negroes "and all their
issue both male and female" were deeded.[48]

Russell and Ames culled from the Virginia court records of the 1640's and
1650's several instances of Negroes held in a status that can be called true
slavery. For example, in 1646 a Negro woman and a Negro boy were sold to

[45] *Journals of the House of Burgesses of Virginia*, edited by H. R. McIlwaine (Richmond,
1914), II, 34.
[46] *Ibid.*, II, 34–5. His plea, however, was turned down, the Assembly not knowing "any
Reason why the Publick should be answerable for the inadvertency of the Buyer..."
[47] John H. Russell, *The Free Negro in Virginia, 1619–1865* (Baltimore, 1913), p. 36. Russell
concludes from his survey of inventories of estates for this early period that Negroes were
valued from 20 to 30 pounds sterling, "while white servants of the longest term... receive a
valuation of not more than £15 sterling". *Ibid.*, p. 35. Catterall, *Judicial Cases*, I, 58 n, upon
concluding her investigation of inventories of estates, picked 1644 as the date at which
"'servant' standing alone, had generally become synonomous with 'white servant' and 'negro'
with 'negro slave', ..."
[48] Catterall, *Judicial Cases*, IV, 9.

Stephen Charlton to be of use to him and his "heyers etc. for ever". A Negro
girl was sold in 1652 "with her Issue and produce... and their services forever".
Two years later a Negro girl was sold to one Armsteadinger "and his heyers...
forever with all her increase both male and female".[49] For March 12, 1655 the
minutes of the Council and General Court of Virginia contain the entry,
"Mulatto held to be a slave and appeal taken".[50] Yet this is five years before
Negro slavery is even implied in the statutes and fifteen before it is declared.
An early case of what appears to be true slavery was found by Miss Ames on the
Virginia eastern shore. In 1635 two Negroes were brought to the area; over
twenty years later, in 1656, the widow of the master was bequeathing the child
of one of the original Negroes and the other Negro and her children.[51] This
was much more than mere servitude – the term was longer than twenty years and
apparently the status was inheritable.

Wesley Frank Craven, in his study of the seventeenth-century Southern
colonies, has concluded that in the treatment of the Negro "the trend from the
first was toward a sharp distinction between him and the white servant".[52] In
view of the evidence presented here, this seems a reasonable conclusion.

Concurrently with these examples of onerous service or actual slavery of
Negroes, there were of course other members of the race who did gain their
freedom.[53] But the presence of Negroes rising out of servitude to freedom[54]
does not destroy the evidence that others were sinking into slavery; it merely
underscores the unsteady evolution of a slave status. The supposition that the
practice of slavery long antedated the law is strengthened by the tangential
manner in which recognition of Negro slavery first appeared in the Virginia
statutes.[55] It occurred in 1660 in a law dealing with punishments for runaway
servants, where casual reference was made to those "negroes who are incapable

[49]   Russell, *Free Negro in Virginia*, pp. 34–5. He also reports the instance of a Negro by the
name of John Casor who was claimed, in 1655, as a "Negro for his life", but he was rescued
from such a status by two witnesses testifying that he had an indenture. *Ibid.*, pp. 32–3.
[50]   *Minutes of the Council*, p. 504. Handlin, "Origins of Southern Labor", p. 216, in arguing
the late development of a different status for Negroes as compared with whites in Virginia,
says: "As late as the 1660's the law had not even a word to describe the children of mixed
marriages. But two decades later, the term mulatto is used..." Such a statement is
obviously misleading, for though the Handlins presumably mean statute law, the decisions of
the General Court were also "law". The *Oxford English Dictionary* cites references for the
word "mulatto" for 1595, 1613 and 1657.
[51]   Ames, *Eastern Shore*, p. 105.
[52]   Craven, *Southern Colonies*, p. 219.
[53]   See especially Russell, *Free Negro in Virginia*, pp. 36–9. ‿e also Brackett, *Negro in
Maryland*, p. 37.
[54]   An indication that even freedom for the Negro carried certain disabilities is afforded
by an instance reported by Ames, *Eastern Shore*, p. 107 from the Northampton
County court records of 1654. For contempt of authority and abuse of certain persons,
Anthony Longoe, a Negro, was ordered, almost twenty years after his release from service,
to receive "thirty lashes now applied, and tomorrow morning thirty lashes more".
[55]   A year earlier, 1659/60, a statute dealing with trade with the Dutch promised remission of
a ten shilling tax if "the said Dutch or other forreiners shall import any negro slaves...". This
is the first reference in the Virginia statutes to Negroes as slaves. Hening, *Statutes*, I, 540.

of making satisfaction by addition of time",[56] since they were already serving for life.

Soon thereafter, as various legal questions regarding the status of Negroes came to the fore, the institution was further defined by statute law. In 1662 Virginia provided that the status of the offspring of a white man and a Negro would follow that of the mother – an interesting and unexplained departure from the common law and a reversion to Roman law. The same law stated that "any christian" fornicating "with a negro man or woman . . . shall pay double the fines imposed by the former act". Two years later Maryland prescribed service for Negroes "durante vita" and provided for hereditary status to descend through the father. Any free white woman who married a slave was to serve her husband's master for the duration of the slave's life, and her children would serve the master until they were thirty years of age. Presumably, no penalty was to be exacted of a free white man who married a Negro slave.[57]

As early as 1669 the Virginia law virtually washed its hands of protecting the Negro held as a slave. It allowed punishment of refractory slaves up to and including accidental death, relieving the master, explicitly, of any fear of prosecution, on the assumption that no man would "destroy his owne estate".[58]

In fact by 1680 the law of Virginia had erected a high wall around the Negro. One discerns in the phrase "any negro or other slave" how the word "negro" had taken on the meaning of slave. Moreover, in the act of 1680 one begins to see the lineaments of the later slave codes. No Negro may carry any weapon of any kind, nor leave his master's grounds without a pass, nor shall "any negroe or other slave . . . presume to lift his hand in opposition against any christian", and if a Negro runs away and resists recapture it "shalbe lawful for such person or persons to kill said negroe or slave . . .".[59]

Yet it would be a quarter of a century before Negroes would comprise even a fifth of the population of Virginia. Thus long before slavery or black labor

[56] Hening, *Statutes*, II, 26. The equivalent Maryland statute (1663) referred to "Negroes and other Slaves, who are incapeable of makeing Stisfaction [*sic*] by Addition of Tyme..." *Maryland Archives*, I, 489.
[57] Hening, *Statutes*, II, 170: *Maryland Archives*, I, 533–4. Handlin, "Origins of Southern Labor", p. 215 sees the genesis of these prohibitions in concern over status rather than in objection to racial intermarriage. This seems to be true for Maryland. But in speaking of the Virginia circumstances they write: "It was to guard against the complications of status that the laws after 1691 forbade 'spurious' or illegitimate mixed marriages of the slave and the free..." Actually, however, the Virginia statute of 1691 (Hening, *Statutes*, III, 87) clearly aimed at the prevention of "abominable mixture and spurious issue" by forbidding marriage of "English or other white man or woman being free" with "a negro, mulatto or Indian man or woman *bond or free*". (Emphasis added.)
[58] Hening, *Statutes*, II, 270. The working out of the exact legal status of slave property, however, was a slow one. A Virginia law of 1705 (Hening, *Statutes*, III, 333–4), declared "Negro, Mulatto and Indian Slaves... to be real estate", but there were a number of exceptions which suggest the later chattel nature of property in slaves. In South Carolina slaves were decreed to be real estate in 1690 and not until 1740 were they said to be legally chattels. Hurd, *Law of Freedom*, I, 297, 303.
[59] Hening, *Statutes*, II, 481–2.

became an important part of the Southern economy, a special and inferior
status had been worked out for the Negroes who came to the English colonies.
Unquestionably it was a demand for labor which dragged the Negro to Ameri-
can shores, but the status which he acquired here cannot be explained by
reference to that economic motive. Long before black labor was as economically
important as unfree white labor, the Negro had been consigned to a special
discriminatory status which mirrored the social discrimination Englishmen
practised against him.[60]

<center>IV</center>

In the course of the seventeenth century New Englanders, like Southerners,
developed a system of slavery which seemed permanently to fasten its stigma
upon the Negro race. But because of the small number of Negroes in the
northern provinces, the development of a form of slavery, which left a caste in
its wake, cannot be attributed to pressure from increasing numbers of blacks,
or even from an insistent demand for cheap labor. Rather it seems clearly to be
the consequence of the general social discrimination against the Negro. For
in the northern region, as in the southern, discrimination against the Negro
preceded the evolution of a slave status and by that fact helped to shape the
form that institution would assume.

    References to the status of the Negroes in New England in this period are
scattered, but, as was true of the Southern provinces, those references which are
available suggest that from the earliest years a lowly, differential status, if not
slavery itself, was reserved and recognized for the Negro – and the Indian, it
might be added. The earliest date asserted in the sources for the existence of
Negro slavery in Massachusetts is that of 1639. John Josselyn tells of a Negro
woman held on Noddles Island in Boston harbor. Her master sought to mate
her with another Negro, Josselyn says, but she kicked her prospective lover out
of the bed, saying that such behavior was "beyond her slavery...".[61] Though the
first legal code of Massachusetts, the Body of Liberties of 1641, prohibited
"bond-slavery" for the inhabitants, it clearly permitted enslavement of those

---

[60]   Like Virginia, Maryland developed its slave law and status long before the Negroes had
become an important aspect of the labor force. As late as 1712, Negroes made up only
slightly more than 20 per cent of the population. Brackett, *Negro in Maryland*, pp. 38–9. If
Virginia was slow in bringing her slave practices out into the open air of the statute books, the
same could not be said of Carolina. In the Fundamental Constitutions, drawn up in 1669, it is
stated in article CX that "Every freeman of Carolina shall have absolute power and authority
over his negro slaves, of what opinion or religion so ever".
[61]   Massachusetts Historical Society, *Collections*, Third Series, III, 231. There is no doubt
that there were Negroes at this time in Massachusetts, for in 1638 Winthrop reported that
Capt. Peirce brought back from Old Providence "some cotton, and tobacco and negroes..."
John Winthrop, *History of New England*, James Savage, ed. (Boston, 1853), I, 305.

who are "sold to us",[62] which would include Negroes brought in by the international slave trade.[63]

Such use of Negroes was neither unknown nor undesirable to the Puritans. Emanuel Downing wrote to John Winthrop in 1645 about the desirability of a war against the Indians so that captives might be taken who, in turn, could be exchanged

for Moores, which wilbe more gayneful pilladge for us then [sic] wee conceive, for I doe not see how wee can thrive untill wee gett into a stock of slaves sufficient to doe all our busines, for our children's children will hardly see this great Continent filled with people, soe that our servants will still desire freedome for themselves, and not stay but for verie great wages. And I suppose you know verie well how we shall maynteyne 20 Moores cheaper than one English servant.[64]

The following year the Commissioners of the United Colonies recommended that in order to spare the colonies the cost of imprisoning contumacious Indians they should be given over to the Englishmen whom they had damaged or "be shipped out and exchanged for Negroes as the cause will justly serve".[65] Negroes were here being equated with Indians who were being bound out as prisoners: this was treatment decidedly a cut lower than that visited upon white servants.[66] That enslavement of Negroes was well known in New England by the middle of the century at the latest is revealed by the preamble to an act of Warwick and Providence colonies in 1652. It was said that it "is a common course practised amongst Englishmen to buy negers, to that end they may have them for service or slaves forever...".[67]

---

[62] Some events of 1645 indicate that those few words were of crucial importance to the Puritans. That year some Negroes were brought to Massachusetts by a Captain Smith and they were ordered by the Gereral Court to be returned to Africa on the ground that their importation constituted "the hainous and crying sinn of man-stealing". But this was man-stealing only because Smith and his men had captured the Negroes in a raid, instead of buying them from traders. *Records of Massachusetts*, III, 48, 58, 84.

[63] Very early in New England history the concept of perpetual servitude – one of the distinguishing marks of slavery – appears in the records. In 1637 Roger Williams, in pleading for the lives of the captured Indians during the Pequot War, alludes to "perpetuall slaverie" as an alternative to their execution. Massachusetts Historical Society, *Collections*, Fourth Series, VI, 214. The will of John Winthrop, written in 1639, deeded to his son Adam "my island" and "also my Indians there and my boat and such household as is there" Robert C. Winthrop, *Life and Letters of John Winthrop* (Boston, 1869), II, 252. Though at least three white men were sentenced to "slavery" in Massachusetts in the early years, in at least two cases this did not, in fact, amount to perpetuity, for they appear to have been released in a short time. The use of the word as a special form of service, however, is most interesting. *Records of Massachusetts*, I, 246, 310, 269.

[64] Massachusetts Historical Society, *Collections*, Fourth Series, VI, 65.

[65] *Records of the Colony of Plymouth* (Boston, 1859), IX, 71.

[66] John Cotton in 1651 clearly distinguished between slavery and servitude. He wrote Cromwell in that year in regard to the Scottish prisoners sent to New England, that "we have been desirous... to make their yoke easy... They have not been sold for slaves to perpetuall servitude, but for 6, or 7 or 8 yeares, as we do our owne". Quoted in George H. Moore, *Notes on the History of Slavery in Massachusetts* (New York, 1866), p. 17 n.

[67] *Records of the Colony of Rhode Island...* (Providence, 1856), I, 243.

By mid-century, Negroes were appearing in the inventories of estates and, significantly, the valuation placed upon them was very close to that found in Virginia inventories of the same period. Their worth is always much more than that of a white servant. Thus in 1650 "a neager Maide" was valued at £ 25; in 1657 the well-known merchant, Robert Keayne left "2 negros and a negro child" estimated to be worth £ 30. "A negro boy servant" was set at £ 20 in an estate of 1661.[68] A further indication of the property character of Negroes was the attachment by the constable of Salem in 1670 of a Negro boy "Seasar" as the "proper goods of the said Powell".[69]

Despite the small numbers of Negroes in New England in this early period, the colonies of that region followed the example of the Southern and insular provinces in denying arms to the blacks in their midst – a discrimination which was never visited upon the English servant. In 1652 Massachusetts provided that Indians and Negroes could train in the militia the same as whites, but this apparently caused friction. The law was countermanded in 1656 by the statement "henceforth no negroes or Indians, altho servants of the English, shalbe armed or permitted to trayne".[70] Although as late as 1680 it was officially reported to London that there were no more than thirty "slaves" in Connecticut, that colony in 1660 excluded Indians and "negar servants" from the militia and "Watch and Ward".[71]

Edward Randolph in 1676 reported that there were a few indentured servants in Massachusetts "and not above two hundred slaves", by which he meant Negroes, for he said "they were brought from Guinea and Madagascar".[72] But it was not until 1698 that the phrase "Negro slave" actually appeared in the Massachusetts statutes.[73] The practice of slavery was preceding the law in Massachusetts precisely as it had in the South. Though an official report to London in 1680 distinguished between Negro slaves and servants in Connecticut,[74] the law of that colony did not bother to define the institution of slavery. Indeed, as late as 1704, the Governor gave it as his opinion that all children born of "negro bond-women are themselves in like condition, i.e., born in servitude", though he admitted that there was no statute which said so. His

[68]　Quoted in William B. Weeden, *Economic and Social History of New England* (Boston, 1891), p. 149 n. It was officially reported in 1680 by Connecticut colony that three or four "Blacks" were imported each year from the Barbados, and that they usually sold for £22 apiece. This was much more than the going price for servants. *Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut* (Hartford, 1850–90), III, 298.

[69]　Quoted in Lorenzo Greene, *The Negro in Colonial New England, 1620–1776* (New York, 1942), p. 172.

[70]　*Records of Massachusetts*, III, 268, 397.

[71]　*Records of Connecticut*, III, 298, I, 349.

[72]　Quoted in Palfrey, *History of New England*, III, 298.

[73]　Hurd, *Law of Freedom*, I, 262. Greene, *Negro in New England*, pp. 65–6, says that in 1670 slavery in Massachusetts became legally inheritable, for in that year the word "strangers" was dropped from the Body of Liberties as a description of those who might be enslaved.

[74]　*Records of Connecticut*, III, 298.

contention was, however, that such legislation was "needless, because of the constant practice by which they are held as such...".[75]

During the last years of the seventeenth century, laws of Connecticut and Massachusetts continued to speak of Negroes as "servants", but it was very clear that the Negro's status was not being equated with that of the white servant. The General Court of Connecticut observed in 1690 that "many persons of this Colony doe ...purchase negroe servants" and, since these servants run away, precautions have to be taken against such eventualities. It was therefore laid down that all "negroe or negroes shall" be required to have a pass in order to be outside the town bounds. Any inhabitant could stop a Negroe, free or slave, and have him brought before a magistrate if the black man were found to be without such a pass. Moreover, all ferrymen, upon pain of fine, were to deny access to their ferries to all Negroes who could not produce a pass.[76] Massachusetts in 1698 forbade trade with "any Indian, or negro servant or slave, or other known dissolute, lewd, and disorderly person, of whom there is just cause of suspicion".[77]

By the early years of the eighteenth century, the laws of Connecticut and Massachusetts had pretty well defined the Negro's subordinate position in society. Massachusetts acted to restrict the manumission of slaves by providing in 1703 that "molatto or negro slaves" could be freed only if security was given that they would not be chargeable upon the community. Another law set a curfew upon Indians, mulattoes and Negroes for nine o'clock each night. In 1705 Massachusetts became the only New England province to prohibit sexual relations between Negroes and mulattoes and Englishmen or those of "any other Christian nation".[78] Moreover, "any negro or mulatto" presuming to "smite or strike" an English person or any of another Christian nation would be "severely whipped".[79] In 1717 Negroes were barred from holding land in Connecticut.[80]

Thus, like the colonists to the South, the New Englanders enacted into law, in the absence of any prior English law of slavery, their recognition of the Negroes as different and inferior. This was the way of the seventeenth century; only with a later conception of the brotherhood of all men would such legal discrimination begin to recede; but by then, generations of close association between the degraded status of slavery and black color would leave the same prejudice against the Negro in the North that it did in the South.

---

[75] Quoted in Bernard C. Steiner, *History of Slavery in Connecticut* (Baltimore, 1893), p. 18.
[76] *Records of Connecticut*, IV, 40.
[77] Hurd, *Law of Freedom*, I, 262–3.
[78] *Ibid.*, I, 263, Massachusetts had prohibited marriages between whites and Negroes, mulattoes and Indians in 1692. Lauber, *Indian Slavery*, p. 253.
[79] Hurd, *Law of Freedom*, I, 263. Rhode Island, too, in 1728, provided that before a Negro or mulatto could be manumitted, security had to given that he would not become a public charge. Hurd, *Law of Freedom*, I, 276.
[80] Greene, *Negro in New England*, p. 312.

It would seem, then, that instead of slavery being the root of the discrimination visited upon the Negro in America, slavery was itself molded by the early colonists' discrimination against the outlander. In the absence of any law of slavery or commandments of the Church to the contrary – as was true of Brazil and Spanish-America – the institution of slavery into which the African was placed in the English colonies inevitably mirrored that discrimination and, in so doing, perpetuated it.

Once the English embodied their discrimination against the Negro in slave law, the logic of the law took over. Through the early eighteenth century, judges and legislatures in all the colonies elaborated the law along the discriminatory lines laid down in the amorphous beginnings. In doing so, of course, especially in the South, they had the added incentive of perpetuating and securing a labor system which by then had become indispensable to the economy. The cleavage between the races was in that manner deepened and hardened into the shape which became quite familiar by the nineteenth century. In due time, particularly in the South, the correspondence between the black man and slavery would appear so perfect that it would be difficult to believe that the Negro was fitted for anything other than the degraded status in which he was almost always found. It would also be forgotten that the discrimination had begun long before slavery had come upon the scene.

CARL N. DEGLER
Vassar College

THE EVOLUTION OF JAPANESE COLONIALISM

Reflecting upon the career in the colonial government of Formosa that was to win him world-wide fame in the early twentieth century, Baron Shimpei Goto once remarked that "Japan had made no preparations whatever for the administration of the island at the time of its acquisition". Underscoring this neglect, he added, was "the fact that, in the case of other nations confronted by a similar occasion, elaborate schemes are generally formulated to meet contingencies connected with the occupation of a new territory".[1] One may wonder whether the Baron included among the "elaborate schemers" the "absent-minded" builders of the British Empire.

It does not matter whether Baron Goto was aware of the complex historical processes, of the actions and accidents, involved in the creation of great empires. It is not even important whether he really believed that the colonial programs of the imperial powers were, like the war plans carefully devised by army general staffs, drawn from secret files as occasions demanded. Goto was primarily interested in the formulation and implementation of a colonial policy for Japan. His observation on his government's lack of preparedness to assume control and direction of Formosan affairs should thus be taken not simply as a confession and condemnation but rather as a statement of purpose.

The real problem confronting Baron Goto was that Japan was a latecomer to the contest for overseas empire. Unlike the nations of western Europe, whose far-flung imperial dominions had been acquired over greater or less periods of time since the sixteenth century, Japan's imperial holdings at the dawn of the twentieth century consisted of little more than a semi-savage island acquired but a few years before as a fruit of war. Whatever experience Japan had known in overseas expansion and settlement lay, moreover, in so remote a past as to be more an historical memory than a colonial tradition. Furthermore, the Japanese possessed neither a literature on colonial affairs, a policy to guide their efforts in their new overseas territory, nor a class of administrators trained in the government and exploitation of other men. On the surface, Japan's venture into the

---

[1]   Shimpei Goto, "The administration of Formosa (Taiwan)", in Shigenobu Okuma (compiler), *Fifty years of new Japan*, 2 vols. (London, 1909), II, 530.

business of colonialism at the turn of the present century appeared extremely unpromising.

Yet, the builders of modern Japan's colonial structure worked with many advantages. They did not, on the one hand, have to contend with the inertia, dead-weight, and accumulated debris of imperial systems that had literally grown like Topsy nor was it necessary for them to cope with the manifold vested interests created in an extended process of historical change. They did not inherit the abuses and mistakes entrenched by time in almost every colonial administration nor did they possess the biases and illusions of peoples old and complacent in the ways of empire. Japan's pioneer colonial policy-makers were, on the other hand, able to avail themselves of the vast experience accumulated by the imperial powers over the course of several centuries and by discriminate selection to secure the knowledge and technique promising the success of their efforts.

Despite the heavy debt to prevailing imperial systems, it would be an error to conclude that Japanese colonialism was a mere amalgam or refinement of the policies and techniques of other powers. Had this been the case, it is doubtful that the Japanese colonial system would have achieved its ends so well. For the aims and purposes of the Japanese, however they be evaluated, were nevertheless their own, while Japanese needs and ambitions as well as the range of alternatives for their fulfillment were as much the product of Japanese history and culture as of the pressure of the events of the times. Borrowing from the rich experience of other nations but making a distinct contribution themselves, Japanese colonial builders were to devise a system that was peculiarly Japanese.

Easy, if at times misleading, as it may be to generalize about the colonial systems which rest upon empires created throughout the world during the age of expansion, it is apparent that basic inspirations and motives for their creation have historically varied. What is of particular significance, however, is that few of the drives which culminated in colonialism in America, Africa, and Asia before the nineteenth century may be detected in the more recent Japanese activity. European expansion to and colonization of other lands was for long generated by scientific intellectual curiosity, by the frustrations and daring of merchant adventurers, and by the naked greed of established élite classes. The conquest and settlement of areas remote from mother countries were, in addition, sparked by religious dissidence in Europe, by evangelical and missionary fervor, and by the quest of emigrants for the political and economic opportunities closed to them at home. As a consequence of these various impulses, traditions and practices of international and intercontinental mobility were well established among Europeans by the late nineteenth century and colonialism was accepted by many peoples as a normal aspect of national affairs.

In Japan colonialism was to follow a course of development significantly different from the western European patterns. Though Japan was a late arrival on the scene of imperialism, it was for reasons dissimilar to German and Italian,

not to speak of American, experiences. The inescapable fact is that Japanese history from the middle of the seventeenth to the middle of the nineteenth century had in several fundamental respects no counterpart in Europe.[2] Not only did the Japanese confront for long a Chinese Empire dominating Eastern Asia and its outlying areas but their own abortive efforts had convincingly demonstrated the folly of expansionist ventures.[3] But of infinitely greater importance was the policy of national isolation and seclusion deliberately pursued, and with astonishing consistency, by the government of Japan from 1640 to 1854.[4]

How Japan would have fared and what changes would have been wrought, had not the military dynasts of the Tokugawa Shogunate maintained their policy of national isolation for two centuries and more, are questions which can educe only speculative answers. Conceivably, an expanding foreign commerce, technological innovation, and intellectual and cultural stimuli from abroad might have undermined the foundations of Tokugawa life and society and weakened Japan for an ultimate and devastating onslaught by imperialist powers from the west. It is, on the other hand, possible that the steady and persistent intrusion of alien influences might have hastened those internal social changes that would have enabled Japan to enter the competition for overseas empire sooner and under different circumstances than she finally did. Or, it is imaginable that Japan as a nation open to the world might have developed the potential to withstand both the threats of imperialist aggression and the temptations of overseas expansion.

Whatever the fate of Japan might have been as a nation accepting rather than rejecting the outside world, once the final decision had been reached by the Tokugawa Shogunate, it was rigorously enforced for more than two hundred years. Neither the Shoguns, the *de facto* rulers of the land, nor their councillors, apparently ever entertained serious regrets or misgivings about their policy nor is there any convincing evidence that the daimyo and their samurai retainers ever chafed at the restrictions against relations with foreign countries and peoples. Occasionally the Shogunate did, to be sure, sanction an excursion

[2] For suggestive and imaginative comments upon this problem see Sir George Sansom, *Japan in world history* (New York, 1951), *passim*.
[3] The nature and scope of Japanese expansionism under Toyotomi Hideyoshi, the so-called "Napoleon of Japan", have been well treated in the master's dissertation of John Lane. For a summary see John Lane (ed.), *Columbia University East Asian Institute Studies no. 4; researches on the social sciences on Japan* (New York, 1957), 60–62. Hideyoshi's onslaught against Korea in the late sixteenth century has recently been studied in Giuliana Stramigioli, "Hideyoshi's expansionist policy on the Asiatic mainland", *Asiatic Society of Japan, Transactions*, 3rd series, III (December, 1954), 74–116.
[4] The background of the seclusion policy is succinctly presented in Charles R. Boxer, "Closing of Japan, 1636–1639", *History Today*, VI, no. 12 (December, 1956), 830–39. For more extended treatment see the same author's *The Christian century in Japan, 1549–1650* (Berkeley, 1951), 362 ff., and Sir George Sansom, *The western world and Japan* (New York, 1950), 167–180.

into the forbidden high seas.[5] It also deemed it politic to blink at the clandestine
trade carried on by powerful daimyo remote from the centers of Tokugawa
strength and to frown upon, but tolerate, an infrequent intellectual attack upon
the policy of isolation.[6] But, by and large, the seclusion policy enjoyed the
overwhelming support of Japan's ruling military class.

During Tokugawa times national seclusion was gradually to become more
than a demand of the law; it was to develop into a tradition with a sanctity and
an orthodoxy of its own. Given the existing system of political control and
military power, this tradition could, in the final analysis, be challenged and
changed only by those who upheld it.[7] Nevertheless, the policy inherited by
successive generations of Tokugawa shoguns was so strongly rooted that its
ultimate modification and abandonment were to necessitate the invoking of a
primary purpose of the policy, namely, the security and welfare of the country.

Because of the long duration of the policy of national isolation and the drastic
restrictions upon economic, cultural, and intellectual influences from abroad,
there was no social class in Tokugawa Japan whose existence and development
were not peculiarly affected. Although the socio-legal stratifications established
during the early seventeenth century were not to be fundamentally altered
during the Tokugawa period as a whole, social and economic change could not
be entirely arrested. While, however, stresses and strains were to be raised,
they were not of sufficient intensity or strength to destroy the legally established
social system and, especially, the domination of the military aristocracy. The
implications of this may perhaps be best appreciated by reference to the history
of western European peoples during the era of Japanese isolation.

Doubtless the foremost social characteristic of Tokugawa Japan was the
prolongation of the existence of a feudal warrior class long after the invention
and development of firearms and cannon had relegated the European knight to
history and romance. During the later years of the Shogunate some samurai
were to acquire considerable political power on a local level and were to aspire
after the prerogatives and power of the Shogunate itself. Many other samurai
were, however, to become deeply impoverished and, perhaps for that very reason,
to become all the more jealous of their social status and privileges. Powerful or

[5]   Voyages to the south of Japan are dealt with in Hyman Kublin, "The discovery of the
Bonin Islands: a reexamination", *Association of American Geographers, Annals*, XLIII,
no. 1 (March, 1953), 27–46. For a daring expedition to the north see Mamiya Rinso, "*Kita
Yezo zusetsu or a description of the island of northern Yezo*" (translated and annotated by
John A. Harrison), *American Philosophical Society, Proceedings*, XCIX (April 15, 1955),
93–117.
[6]   On the northern trade see John A. Harrison, "The Saghalien trade; a contribution to Ainu
studies", *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, X, no. 3 (Autumn, 1954), 278–293. The
intellectual challenge to isolation is discussed in Donald Keene, *The Japanese Discovery of
Europe; Honda Toshiaki and other discoverers, 1720–1798* (New York, 1954), especially 142–152
and 170–178.
[7]   The functioning of the Tokugawa regime is admirably limned in John W. Hall, *Tanuma
Okitsugu, 1719–1788, forerunner of modern Japan* (Cambridge, Mass., 1955), especially
chs. 1–2.

poor, however, the samurai possessed in common a contempt and dislike for the merchant of the cities and towns and a callous indifference to the plight of the peasants. But no matter what the ambitions or grievances of Japan's social classes may have been, there could be no fundamental change without the consent of the sword-carrying governors.[8]

No class in Tokugawa Japan was to be more constricted and warped in its development than the merchant. Hedged in by innumerable restrictions, discriminated against by sumptuary legislation, and denied opportunities to participate in lucrative foreign trade, the Japanese merchant of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was conservative in action and defensive in psychology and outlook. Unlike his counterpart in Europe the Tokugawa merchant was not and could not be an adventurer blazing new trails to commerce in distant lands nor a middleman dispensing the goods brought to Japan from countries near and far. He could fulfill, and even dare refuse, the demands for credit from financially embarrassed feudal lords but, because of the "Great Peace" prevailing in the land, he could not reap the tremendous profits from the financing of war and foreign adventure that the members of his class in Europe did. And, most importantly, though he could ingratiatingly solicit favors from the mighty military aristocrats, he could never influence, much less shape, policy on matters of state.

In addition to the merchants, the artisans and peasants, the great mass of the people of Tokugawa Japan, were, in admittedly immeasurable ways, vitally affected by the policy of national isolation. Though their numbers increased very sharply during the years of peace and prosperity in the seventeenth century, population growth was little more than nominal during the last one hundred and fifty years of the Shogunate. Some peasants were to seek an escape from unbroken hardships and misery by migrating to the cities and towns but, since neither feudal lords nor their fiscal agents could look lightly upon the loss of subjects and tax payers, the overwhelming number of tillers of the soil were unable to look forward to an improvement of their lot. In contrast, thus, to the western European artisan and peasant, to the serf of tsarist Russia, and to the early American colonist and pioneer, Japanese peasants and laborers were never to have in Tokugawa times the opportunity of emigration abroad or of flight into a rich but unsettled frontier area. Confined to his village by an effective system of political and police control and restricted in his movement by the powerful ties of family and tradition, the Japanese peasant was resigned to living out his life in the locale of his birth.

The characteristics of Tokugawa life, reflecting the long standing barriers to international communication and intercourse, will to a large extent account for the peculiar nature of later Japanese overseas expansion and colonialism.

[8]   Robert A. Wilson, *Genesis of the Meiji government in Japan, 1868–1871* (Berkeley, 1957), 5. See also the view of George Beckmann, *The making of the Meiji constitution* (Lawrence, Kansas, 1957), especially 1–3.

Suggestive comparisons may obviously be made with the experience of other peoples who entered the race for colonies at relatively late moments in modern history. In the case of the United States, for example, it is assuredly the revolutionary tradition, the anti-colonial spirit, the democratic outlook, and the call of an open frontier which largely serve to explain both nineteenth century American isolationism and the pattern and rationalization of twentieth century American colonialism. Japanese colonialism, with the distinct features it has possessed it recent times, may similarly be interpreted partially in terms of the Tokugawa legacy. The tradition of isolation, the inheritance of capricious and arbitrary rule, the persistence of a hierarchical society and value system, the perpetuation of a petty and provincial "middle class" devoid of entrepreneurial spirit, and the existence of a crushed and immobile peasantry – this heritage of Tokugawa history was to be reflected unmistakably in later Japanese colonial thought and practice.

The years between the abandonment of Tokugawa isolation and the final commitment to colonialism, embracing roughly the last half of the nineteenth century, were a critical era of transition for Japan. It was during this period, as in Germany, Italy, and to some extent the United States, that a multitude of relatively autonomous states were to be forged into a more centralized political organism, that the fires of nationalism were to be vigorously stoked, and that expansion towards newly claimed political frontiers was to occur. These were years when new dimensions were to be given to the political concept of Japan, when visions of an even greater Japanese Empire were to be stirred, and when the basis of a Japanese "irredentism" was to be laid. The years from Commodore Perry to the Treaty of Shimonoseki were, accordingly, if not consciously preparatory, nevertheless formative for Japanese colonialism.

The era of transition to colonialism was initiated with the severe shock to Tokugawa foreign policy delivered by Commodore Perry's naval-diplomatic mission in 1853. The ensuing struggle for decision within Japan understandably soon resolved itself into a problem of national security. Other motives of the contending factions apart, it is clear that concern for the defense of the land pervaded the various and conflicting proposals submitted by the Shogunate and the many feudal lords. Of all the centers of feudal power, however, the Shogunate was the most realistic in recognizing that the abandonment of the isolationist policy was both necessary and inevitable and that a radically new point of departure in matters of foreign policy had to be established. The Tokugawa were, however, to discover too late that their decision meant the destruction of the political and social system essential to their own survival.[9]

It is an irony of history, if a commonplace of power politics, that the foreign policy of the Shogunate, which had aroused such bitter opposition amongst the

[9] The struggle over foreign policy in the closing years of the Tokugawa Shogunate is brilliantly analyzed in the lengthy "Introduction" of William G. Beasley, *Select documents on Japanese foreign policy, 1853–1868* (London, 1955).

feudal clans of the southwest, was to be adopted in its essentials once Tokugawa rule had been destroyed. In the same way that Shogunal policy after the conclusion of the Perry Treaty emanated from apprehension over western aggression, so too the foreign policy of the new government of the Meiji Emperor, established in 1868, was to a large extent founded on fear. The vigor of its activities notwithstanding, the Meiji regime was for long to be on the defensive in its international relations, its practical objectives being the maintenance of peace, the observation but ultimate abolition of the so-called "unequal treaties", and a modest expansion aimed at the promotion of the national security.[10]

Only when the vital but limited goals of its foreign policy are borne in mind is it possible to understand the expansionist activities of the early Meiji government. In moving into and establishing or strengthening its authority in the Bonin Islands, Okinawa, Hokkaido, and the Kuriles during the first decade of the Restoration era the central government of Japan had no thought of embarking upon a career in empire and colonialism.[11] Possessing or inheriting claims of varying validity to sovereignty over these islands, the Meiji leaders viewed their actions as a reassertion and clarification of authority rather than as the annexation and conquest of alien lands and peoples. Despite the misleading terminology of the times, neither the Bonins, Okinawa, nor Hokkaido was considered by government officials to be a colonial area nor its settlers and inhabitants to be colonial subjects.[12] As a consequence, these outlying islands were to be administered in ways completely different from territories later annexed into the Japanese Empire.[13]

Allowing for technical differences in constitutional and legal status, Japanese policy towards Okinawa and the Bonins was for many years to be suggestive of the treatment accorded Hawaii, Guam, and Puerto Rico by the United States. But while American attitudes and behavior towards their insular possessions were primarily the product of indifference, Japanese policy in their southern islands was largely dictated by the poverty of the mother country. It was a rare Meiji oligarch who would have disputed the need for vigorous development programs in the Bonins, Okinawa, and Hokkaido but, considering the tremen-

[10] Hilary Conroy, *The Japanese frontier in Hawaii, 1868–1898* (Berkeley, 1953), *passim.*

[11] Security considerations will also explain Japan's abortive attempt to purchase the island of Guam from Spain shortly after the Meiji Restoration. The particulars are set forth in Shimomura Fujio 下村富士男), *Meiji ishin no gaikō* 明治維新の外交 (*The foreign relations of the Meiji restoration*) (Tokyo, 1948), 291–294.

[12] The Japanese expressions *kaitaku* (開拓) and *shokumin* (植民) may both be translated as "colonization". The former term has, however, the connotation of "reclamation" or "development", while the latter implies settlement of an alien territory. In speaking of their activities in the Bonins, Okinawa, and Hokkaido the Japanese customarily used the term *kaitaku.*

[13] The Bonin Islands were to be incorporated into Tokyo-fu, or the government of Metropolitan Tokyo. During the Meiji period (1868–1912) Hokkaido was to be administered by several different types of government, finally being established as a *cho* (廳), or territory. Okinawa alone quickly attained prefectural status.

dous modernization enterprises under way in the homeland, it was evident that
the required financial and economic resources were not available. Before very
long, however, the course of international developments helped to resolve the
dilemma and to establish the scale of priorities in Japan's program of overseas
development efforts.

When the early Meiji government proclaimed its sovereignty over the Bonins
and Okinawa, it had cause to believe that its claims would not be unchallenged.[14]
As it became increasingly evident that Japanese sovereignty over the Bonins
would not be contested by the United States and Great Britain and that Chinese
claims to Okinawa would not be aggressively pressed, Japan's minimum objec-
tives of security in these areas were thereby fulfilled. Resting content with
acknowledged possession of these islands, the Meiji government was able to
pursue a "holding action" in the south, the development of the Bonin Islands
and Okinawa being postponed to a more propitious time.[15] Until the Sino-
Japanese War of 1894–95 the Bonin Islands were, consequently, as little known
to most Japanese as are the Virgin Islands to present-day Americans, while in
Okinawa this period of Japanese rule was to be dubbed the "Do-Nothing Era".[16]

As opposed to its somewhat lackadaisical policy towards the Bonins and
Okinawa, the Restoration government was alert, even before the Shogunate had
been completely destroyed, to the need for positive action in Hokkaido. Here, at
the "Northern Gate to the Empire", it was well understood that a bastion
against Russian expansion in the northern Pacific would have to be constructed.[17]
The activities of other western powers in China, Southeast Asia, and India may
well have caused chronic uneasiness among the Meiji leaders but the confronta-
tion of Russians and Japanese in the northern islands, it was quickly realized,
posed an immediate and critical problem. No elaborate explanation was thus
required when the colonization and defense of Hokkaido were given top
priority in the government's development programs.

Had any nation of the late nineteenth century but Japan undertaken a
venture of the proportions of the Hokkiado colonization project, scarcely a
ripple of international interest would probably have been aroused. That Japan,

[14]   For an eye-witness account of the Japanese annexation of the Bonin Islands in 1875 see
Russell Robertson, "The Bonin Islands", *Asiatic Society of Japan, Transactions*, 1st series,IV
(1876), 111–142, The Japanese claim to Okinawa is justified in Charles Lanman, "The islands
of Okinawa", *International Review*, VII (1880), 18–27.
[15]   A early attempt to encourage settlement in the Bonins is discussed in Hyman Kublin,
"The Ogasawara venture, 1861–1863", *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, XIV (June, 1951),
261–284. Life and conditions in Okinawa during the period of Japanese annexation are
described in R. H. Brunton, "Notes taken during a visit to Okinawa Shima – Loochoo
Islands", *Asiatic Society of Japan, Transactions*, IV (1876), 66–77.
[16]   United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, *The Ryukyu Islands; prewar
and postwar (through 30 june 1957)* (Naha, Okinawa, 1957?), 6. See also William P. Lebra,
"Culture change in rural Okinawa", Pacific Science Board, National Research Council,
Scientific investigations in the Ryukyu Islands (SIRI) 1951; post-war Okinawa (Washington,
1955), 178.
[17]   John A. Harrison, *Japan's northern frontier* (Gainesville, 1953), 64.

whose own economic modernization had not as yet advanced beyond the stage of mere ambition, could seriously plan to uplift as culturally and economically "primitive" an area as Hokkaido is ample testimony to her desperate concern for security. Being acutely aware of its technical limitations, however, the new national government approached the problem in a fashion typical of the Meiji period as a whole. With the assistance and advice of foreign experts, largely American, a promising development program was inaugurated.[18] It is a silent commentary upon the Japanese view of Hokkaido that the experienced administrators and technicians of nations with established colonial empires were not engaged.

The Hokkaido development project is probably the least appreciated and most denigrated undertaking in the development of modern Japan.[19] It was perhaps inevitable, given the pioneer nature of the enterprise, that mistakes be made, that criticism be profusely raised, and that the project be sucked into the maelstrom of power politics. Yet it was tragic when the program, which had been making excellent progress, was to founder upon a scandal. Though a basically sound policy was abandoned, the experiments in Hokkaido were nevertheless to provide the Japanese with their first practical experience in the development and colonization of areas dissimilar to the home islands. At the same time the unhappy ending of the original project was to obscure a record of sound achievement and to cast the very term of colonization into popular disrepute.

Japanese colonialism, as we have known it in our times, had its origins in the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War. It is not necessary to determine here whether Japan conspired to seize the great island of Formosa from China in 1894–95; it is most likely she did not.[20] What is germane is that, when Japan acquired sovereignty over the tropical island by the Treaty of Shimonoseki, she encountered the problems which were to become typical in her colonial endeavors in the twentieth century. It was, moreover, in Formosa that Japan was to create the pattern of colonialism which was, with with the addition of subsequent more sophisticated glosses, to be applied in the administration and exploitation of such later conquests as Korea and Manchuria.

Whatever her reasons for acquiring Formosa may have been, events were rapidly to demonstrate that Japan did not know for some time what to do with

[18]   John A. Harrison, "The Capron mission and the colonization of Hokkaido, 1868–1875", *Agricultural History*, XXV (July, 1951), 135–142.
[19]   See the appraisals by John A. Harrison, *Japan's northern frontier*, 140–142, and Shosuke Sato, "Hokkaido and its progress in fifty years", in Shigenobu Okuma (compiler), *op. cit.*, II, 513–529.
[20]   Japan's principal experience with Formosa before the Sino-Japanese War was the dispatch of a punitive expedition against the local head-hunting aborigines in 1874. The episode is studied in Hyman Kublin, "The 'modern' army of early Meiji Japan", *Far Eastern Quarterly*, IX, no. 1 (November, 1949), 35–36. For an advice to the Japanese government on the strategic position of Formosa see Ernst L. Presseisen, "Roots of Japanese imperialism; a memorandum of General Legendre", *Journal of Modern History*, XXIX, no. 2 (June, 1957), 108–111.

her new possession. Entailed was a crucial problem somewhat similar to that
which the United States was to face a few years later when the Philippines were
annexed. The Japanese government had, in short, to determine whether it
wished to become engaged in the prospectively profitable but potentially trou-
blesome business of colonialism. At the time Formosa was considered to be as
great a military and strategic liability as an asset, while, apart from a noisome
carpet-bagging element in Japan, responsible political and business leaders were
chary of a commitment to an area notorious for its political instability and
economic stagnancy. Until the Japanese government reached a final decision
on the disposition of Formosa, there could, thus, prevail no colonial policy
worthy of the name and Japanese efforts, largely of an *ad hoc* nature, were to be
devoted to the pacification of the island by a military regime.[21]

In view of the purpose which Formosa was later to serve in the Japanese
Empire, it is easy to overlook what may well have been a compelling reason for
Japan's decision to embark upon a career in colonialism and, moreover,
literally to dedicate herself to the achievement of success according to the
prevailing standards of imperialism. Desirous of securing unqualified accept-
ance as a great power, of becoming the "Great Britain of the East", Japanese
leaders may well have feared that, if they failed to respond to the challenges
which empire posed, admission to the ranks of the world's élite might be delayed.
A mere glance at the foreign press was enough to reveal the firm doubts enter-
tained about Japan's, or any Asian nation's, capacity to become a successful
colonizing power. National pride, whetted by the sneers and disparagement of
western commentators upon the Far Eastern scene, may well have been crucial
in shaping Japan's final decision on colonialism.

Once Japan had overcome her irresolution and decided to make the best of
her opportunity in Formosa, a colonial policy was to be developed with charac-
teristic care and foresight. The first step was the determination of the principles
upon which Japanese rule in the new colony would rest. As soon as these were
established to their full and firm satisfaction and Japanese colonial leaders
themselves understood the goals that were to be pursued, their subsequent
efforts were to be largely concerned with the discovery and application of
methods.[22] In establishing a system of colonial administration on Formosa

[21]   "We acquired Formosa in 1895 after the war with China", said Inazo Nitobe, "largely
because we could not get anything else." And, he added, "the island was for a while a white
elephant to Japan, and its sale was even discussed at one time." Inazo Nitobe, "Japanese
colonization", *Asiatic Review*, XVI, no. 45 (January, 1920), 115. See also George W. Barclay,
Colonial development and population in Taiwan (Princeton, 1954), 7.
[22]   The establishment of a firm and efficient colonial administration in Formosa occurred
during the office of the fourth Governor-General, Lieut.-General Viscount Kodama, much of
whose fame as a colonial administrator was derived from his able and brilliant Chief of Civil
Administration, Baron Shimpei Goto. "In Baron Kodama and Dr. (now Baron) Goto",
said the scholar Seiji Hishida, "Japan has produced colonial administrators worthy to be
placed in the same class as Lord Cromer and Cecil Rhodes." Seiji Hishida, "Formosa:
Japan's first colony", *Political Science Quarterly*, XXII, no. 2 (June, 1907), 268.

Japan was, *mutatis mutandis*, to follow generally the same procedures which had been and were being used in promoting the modernization of the homeland. If the Japanese achieved remarkable results in their new colony, it was because they themselves had already acquired in Meiji times an incomparable experience in institutional innovation and manipulation.

The preconceptions held by the architects and directors of Japan's colonial system were few but nevertheless vital. Though at first sensitive but later disdainful of world opinion, Japanese colonial leaders never possessed serious doubts about their country's purposes in Formosa. For the rationalizations of the conscience-stricken western colonial powers, for the doctrines of the "white man's burden" and of "la mission civilisatrice", they had but polite cynicism and scorn. For them the welfare of Formosa and its peoples had no meaning apart from the interests of the mother country and there existed no intention of lavishing blood and resources upon an enterprise open to eventual liquidation. Disavowing any desire to prepare their Formosan colonial subjects for ultimate self-government, much less independence, Japan subordinated and, at best, identified the destiny of Formosa with her own future.

The establishment of a highly centralized and authoritarian colonial administration in Formosa may be explained variously. It was due not merely to the fact that the Meiji oligarchs, inheritors of the Tokugawa political tradition, could not grant to Japan's colonial subjects the political power denied to Japanese citizens. Nor was it because social organization and governmental traditions on Formosa did not lend themselves to decentralized or indirect rule. Most important perhaps was that the Japanese government did not consider the development of Formosa to be an end in itself but rather a means to an end. Japan's rulers would, accordingly, brook no interference or opposition with their plans to reduce Formosa to the desired relationship with the mother country. Administered by a military governor backed by the overwhelming strength of the imperial army, for Japan never placed faith or reliance in colonial troops, Formosa under Japanese rule was to be transformed into an "island of policemen".[23]

In the pursuit of her purposes in Formosa Japan obeyed the sternest dictates of *sacro egoismo*, the island being considered as much a business enterprise as a government operation.[24] Determined that their colony be a source of profit to the mother country, Japanese administrators were to assess their successes and

[23] "The extension of the police force", General Count Katsura, second Governor-General, recalled, "was an object of paramount importance in the government of Formosa. So also was the implanting in the minds of the people a high regard for the virtues of His Majesty the Emperor, as well as to secure a thorough appreciation by them of the goodwill and sincerity of our Government, and this could not better be attained than by extending the administrative police force of the island." General Count Katsura, "Formosa; the early administration", in Alfred Stead (ed.), *Japan by the Japanese* (New York, 1904), 582.

[24] Formosa, said Baron Goto, "has come into more intimate relations with the economic world of Japan Proper, to which it is now bound by ties as close as those of mother and child." Okuma, *op. cit.*, II, 547.

failures by the principles of the accountant. Other nations may well have
derived the satisfactions of empire from the mere possession of overseas domains
but to Japan Formosa represented an investment which was expected to provide
the return of both principal and interest in as quick a time as possible. This does
not mean that national pride was not stirred by the continuing record of progress
in the fostering of education, public health, transportation and communication
facilities, and the instruments of law and order, for these achievements were
concrete demonstrations to the world that Japan's colonizing ability could not
be lightly treated. But it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Japan's greatest
joy in Formosa was the annual financial statement.[25]

Baron Shimpei Goto, the first Chief of Civil Affairs on Formosa, perhaps
best exemplified Japan's modern colonial spirit. "I wish", he said, "to found
Formosa on scientific principles".[26] For the Baron, the political and moral
issues of colonialism having been settled by the very annexation of the island
into the Japanese Empire, the primary responsibility of the colonial servant was,
accordingly, to advance the interests of the mother country and, coincidentally,
those of the colonial subjects. To achieve these ends it was necessary to cope
with what were essentially administrative and technical problems, which were
susceptible to solution within the limitations of human intelligence and know-
ledge. With these convictions Goto and his aides, notably Dr. Inazo Nitobe,
proceeded to dissect and analyze the imperial systems of the world in a method-
ical search for colonial techniques and methods. Formosa under Goto and his
successors was literally to be transformed into a colonial laboratory and from
persistent and unflagging study and experimentation there was to emerge a
rational and scientific system of colonialism which had its foremost parallels
in aspects of the Dutch, French, and German empires.[27]

---

[25] Baron Shimpei Goto, "Formosa under Japanese administration", *Independent*, LIV
(July 3, 1902), 1589, is a typical example.
[26] Quoted in Yosaburo Takekoshi, *Japanese rule in Formosa* (New York, 1907), 11.
[27] "During my stay in Taihoku [capital of Formosa]", Takekoshi wrote, "I often went to
Baron Goto's official residence and was astonished at the splendid collection of books there.
These were arranged on shelves built on both sides of the corridors, both upstairs and down.
Afterwards I was told by the Baron that the greater part of this collection belonged to the
Governor-General's office, and he added, 'You know we look upon the Governor-General's
office as a sort of university where we may study the theories and principles of colonization, in
which branch of knowledge we, Japanese, are not over-well-posted. The Governor-General is
the president, I am the manager, and this room we are now in is the library of this Colonization
University.'" *Ibid.*, 21–22.
Closely associated with Baron Goto, a medical doctor by training and with experience in
public health administration, was Dr. Inazo Nitobe. Though he was widely known to
Americans for many years, through his voluminous writings and numerous lectures, as an
interpreter of Japanese history and culture to the west, Nitobe was primarily an agricultural
economist with extensive experience in the development of Hokkaido. Before assuming his
post as head of the Industrial Bureau of Formosa, he toured Southeast Asia and Australia,
studying tropical agriculture. From his observations he developed the famous Taiwan Sugar
Policy, the introduction of which was to transform the economy of the island and establish its
firm economic base. Sukeo Kitasawa, *The Life of Dr. Nitobe* (Tokyo, 1953), 45–47.

Regardless of the label that be attached to Formosa under the Japanese – a colonial laboratory or an island of policemen[28] – there can be no doubt as to its success in terms of the aims and purposes of its sovereign. Within a period of a generation Japan was to eliminate all scepticism about its ability to carry on as a colonizing power. Japan was to demonstrate in Formosa to the satisfaction of the most confirmed and demanding imperialist that backward and underdeveloped areas could be technically transformed into colonies highly profitable to the mother country. And in the same way that late nineteenth century experimentation in the development of Hokkaido was to furnish experience fruitfully applied in South Sakhalin, acquired from Russia in 1905, so too were the techniques of colonization devised in Formosa to be introduced with conspicuous results in Korea as well as in the Pacific island "mandates" obtained after World War I.

Japan's last great venture in colonialism before 1931, when the initiative in expansionism was to be seized and held by aggressive militarists, was the annexation of Korea in 1910. As opposed to Formosa, possession of which had been acquired without much forethought, the extension of Japanese control over Korea represented the final solution to a problem which had been discussed and debated since the early years of the Meiji era. The nature of Japanese interest in the peninsula country, at first strategic and then increasingly economic, had rarely aroused broad differences of opinion among the leaders of the Meiji government; Korea had rather raised the question of the method of fulfillment of these interests. Successive victories in war with China and Russia removed all lingering doubts.[29]

Having been deeply involved in Korean affairs for more than a generation before their annexation of the country the Japanese knew Korea as they had not known Formosa. In Korea there was to be little vacillation and indecision, no searching and groping for techniques of administration and exploitation, for the colonial policy and practice that had been forged in the crucible of Formosa were found to be generally adequate. Thus, though the Japanese were for a brief while to toy with a protectorate, their inability completely to control the country by indirect rule, the persistence of local opposition, and the logic of their own colonial convictions were to lead to the utter destruction of the Korean monarchy. If, as a result, Japanese rule in Korea until the end of World War II was to differ from that in Formosa, it was not in essence but rather in scale.

Korea was never permitted by the Japanese to exist as a mere excrescence of empire. Like Formosa, the old "Hermit Kingdom" was also expected to submerge its identity in and to have no interests apart from those of its imperial sovereign. And when Koreans, renowned for their stubbornness, refused to

[28] These designations are used respectively in: "Japan as a colonizing power", *Spectator*, XCVIII (March 23, 1907), 447–448; and George H. Kerr, "Formosa – colonial laboratory", *Far Eastern Survey*, XI, no. 4 (February 23, 1942), 50–55.

[29] See especially Hilary Conroy, "*Chosen mondai:* the Korean problem in Meiji Japan", *American Philosophical Society, Proceedings*, C, no. 5 (October, 1956), 443–454.

play the role cast for them by their conquerors, they were ruthlessly and brutally hammered into submission and compressed into a system of political and police control far more effective, because of its technological superiority, than anything the Japanese themselves had known in Tokugawa times. During an age, moreover, when many of the colonial administrations throughout the world were being modified in response to the pressures of their subject peoples, Japan increasingly foisted upon her newest colony an apparatus of soldiers, policemen, bureaucrats, technicians, and teachers to guide the Koreans in the proper fulfillment of their duties as obedient and productive subjects of the Emperor. For sheer effectiveness of political control no other colony of the twentieth century ever approximated Korea, a prototype in many ways of the police states which were to emerge in the aftermath of World War I.[30]

Unlike other imperial states Japan has never been accused of having neglected her colonies; on the contrary, if any charge may be made, it is that Korea, not to speak of Formosa, suffered from excessive attention. Although Japan was no different from other colonial powers in possessing a fervent faith in the superiority of her own way of life, the consequences of this ethnocentric pride were unique. Other colonial powers frequently encouraged, but never insisted upon, the adoption by colonial subjects of the culture and ways of the metropolitan country; for Japan with its traditions of social and cultural conformity this policy was evidently inconceivable. If, accordingly, Koreans have to this very day continued to resent the harsh effects of the Japanese regime, it is not simply because of the merciless economic exploitation and draconian rule of their erstwhile colonial overlords. Perhaps far more traumatic was the conscious and deliberate campaign by the Japanese to extinguish a culture and way of life of more than two thousand years in the making.[31]

Extraordinary as it may seem, most Japanese of the past generation or two have persisted in passing over lightly what was assuredly the crowning insult to Korean nationalistic sensitivities. For far from being apologetic, countless Japanese have rather been proud of their nation's achievement in their former colony. In the Japanese view, Korea was during its colonial period raised from a politically degenerate kingdom to a well-ordered society, from a backward and poverty-stricken country to a productive and flourishing land, and from a helpless pawn of power politics to a secure and protected member of a virile imperial system.[32] As in the case of so many peoples who have secured release

---

[30]   The literature dealing with the imposition of Japanese control over Korea is fairly extensive. An excellent account will be found in the chapter, "I will whip you with scorpions", in F. A. McKenzie, *Korea's fight for freedom* (New York, 1920).

[31]   The depth of Korean bitterness was to be revealed when negotiations were conducted with Japan in 1953 for the settlement of many outstanding problems. When the Japanese representative, Kubota, stated that Korea had benefited from Japanese rule, the government of President Syngman Rhee broke off discussions and for several years thereafter refused to resume talks until the objectionable statement had been withdrawn. Ki Suk Shin, "Perspectives of Korea-Japan conference", *Chungang Herald*, II, no. 2 (April, 1958), 3.

[32]   Japanese and Korean views of the colonial record are studied in Hyman Kublin, "Korea

from imperial domination, Koreans have, not surprisingly, been unwilling to draw their verdict from official statistics and self-serving government reports. For, the records carefully compiled by colonial administrative officials reveal that Japanese policy was above all devoted to uplifting Korea but unfortunately not its people.

Though Korea presented an infinitely more complex colonial problem than Formosa, the Japanese colonial administration was able to achieve results extremely gratifying to the home government. Formosa having been established on a firm political and economic footing before the annexation of Korea occurred, it is understandable that Japan could approach the new colonial challenge with immeasurably greater boldness and confidence. By the time, furthermore, that the desired political conditions had been established in Korea, a project that required at least a decade, Japan had had the benefit of a half century of industrial and scientific training and progress. But rather than strike out *de novo* and cope with the costly and formidable technical problems involved in a program of development for Korea's sake, Japan preferred to apply her own skills and experience, limited though they were, to the realization of her own interests. An economic system independent of or competitive with that of the mother country was avoided. Japan did not, thus, retard the economic development of Korea; it was more advantageous to warp and bend it to her own needs. In time Koreans were to find it as difficult to live with their conquerors as to exist without them.[33]

The absorption of Korea represented the culmination of a distinct phase in the evolution of Japanese colonialism. Under the leadership of oligarchic bureaucrats powerfully influenced by their own peculiar historical traditions, by their hopes and ambitions for personal and national advancement, and especially by their fears for their country's future, an empire of modest territorial proportions was created in the peripheral areas of the Japanese archipelago. This empire, pieced together from "no-man's islands" on the sea frontier to north and south and particularly from satellites of the decaying Chinese Empire, was far more compact than any other imperial regime of the twentieth century. Relatively easy to control with the military and police forces of the homeland, the Japanese Empire, which embodied the hopes and anxieties of Meiji Japan itself, excited the dread and antagonism only of its despoiled and chastened neighbors but scarcely the envy and concern of the richer and stronger imperial powers of the times. If there existed any grave danger to the perpetuation of this empire, it lay perhaps in a Japanese appetite for overseas territory increasingly whetted by Japanese imperial success.

---

and Japan: neighbor's keepers?", *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, LXXXI (October, 1955), 1084–1091.

[33] During the period of Japanese rule it was rather Koreans who emigrated to Japan in the tens and hundreds of thousands. By and large they were employed as cheap, unskilled laborers. The pioneer study by Edward W. Wagner, *The Korean minority in Japan, 1904–1950* (New York, 1951), is useful for the entire problem.

Among the many empires of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the Japanese was in many ways unique. What distinguished it primarily was neither its size nor location, neither the composition of its peoples nor the manner of its creation, which was decidedly conventional in an age of rampant imperialism. Of paramount significance was perhaps the Asian provenance of this empire. For, although imperial regimes had risen and fallen in the East for several millenia, the phenomenon of an expanding Asian empire in an era when the western powers were engaged in the obliteration of national independence in Asia was clearly extraordinary. And whatever motives and drives, aims and purposes, that may be ascribed to the western nations in their imperialist activities, it is most likely that none are to the same degree attributable to Japan.

Until the end of the Russo-Japanese War and its aftermath it may be postulated that security considerations were uppermost in Japanese expansionism. Japan, being an Asian state, could, in view of the temper and trend of the times, scarcely rest secure in the hope and belief that she alone would be exempt from western imperialist aggression. While it may validly be argued that Japan had actually little to fear from the western powers, it is nevertheless understandable that Meiji statesmen could not afford to gamble with their nation's future. The deliberation with which a program of modernization, designed to insure the survival of national independence, was prosecuted had, consequently, as its obverse face a foreign policy of limited expansion into nearby critical areas essential to the defense and security of the land.

In the construction of her empire before World War I the tremendous stakes and her limited resources permitted Japan, a relatively backward and undeveloped country, only the barest margin for political, military, and economic error. Not able to afford even the luxury of interest in any other part of the world but the East Asia of which she was a part, Japan's maximum choice was to focus national attention and energy upon the creation of a Greater Japan. The resulting imperial domain and colonial system were to be as distinct and peculiar as the circumstances responsible for their creation.

The study of Japanese imperialism and colonialism is useful not only for the light cast upon Japanese history itself; it provides also additional perspectives for an understanding of these historical phenomena which have in modern times customarily been associated with western civilization. Viewed in this manner, the older British, French, and Russian empires as well as the Spanish, Portuguese, and Dutch may be seen as self-generating or self-perpetuating political organisms reflecting the changing needs, problems, and pressures of national states evolving over greater or less periods of time. With these complex imperial apparatuses the pre-World War I Japanese empire obviously had little in common. Of the later imperial systems founded by the United States, Italy, and Germany, it was perhaps only the product of Bismarck and Kaiser Wilhelm II that approximated the Japanese.

It is a curious historical coincidence that at the very moment the old feudal

order of the Tokugawa was giving way to imperial centralization in Japan, a congeries of autonomous states was simultaneously being welded into an empire in Germany. But, unlike Japan, political unification in Germany after 1848 had to be achieved in face of the opposition of powerful surrounding states. Victory in successive wars against Austria-Hungary and France meant, accordingly, only the elimination of obstruction to German unification but not the destruction of external danger to the new German state. Ringed by potentially hostile nations, Germany under the cautious Bismarck could not like Japan seek a coveted security through expansion into weak and fluid border areas. The Iron Chancellor attempted rather to fashion through diplomacy an invincible alliance system.

No pressing sense of need for security led Germany, as Japan, to engage in overseas imperialist activity. Bismarck was probably never more than half convinced of the value of the colonies demanded by venturous business interests nor could he view without quiet cynicism the quest for prestige of clamorous nationalists. In Germany, thus, as opposed to Japan, the state adopted its policy of expansion in Africa and the Pacific in response to internal pressures of a quasi-popular nature. If Bismarck had to be urged on to a course of imperialism, Kaiser Wilhelm II, who assumed a personal and active direction of the affairs of state, could scarcely be restrained. And, tragically, though the territories which he added to the empire of Bismarck's creation were nothing but frills, his policies and activities were to hasten the explosion that destroyed imperial Germany itself.

In impulses and manner of creation the pre-World War I empires of Germany and Japan differed significantly. Some suggestive similarities may, however, be noted in the spirit and policy of these two powers towards their colonial domains and subjects. Both Germany and Japan, possessing relatively uncluttered views of their roles as colonial powers, were from the outset determined to extract the maximum benefit from their imperial properties and tended, accordingly, to emphasize efficiency and precision in their administrative and exploitative practices. Insofar as Germany is concerned, colonial techniques and usages reflected sharply the highly developed bureaucratic tradition, the deeply rooted social paternalism, the economic rationalism, and the scientific bent of the homeland itself. The German colonial agent, whether administrator, businessman, or technician, was, moreover, ordinarily able and competent and imbued with a stern sense of purpose and mission. If he did not succeed in building a more lasting empire, it was assuredly because of the more fundamental failure of the fatherland.

The Japanese and German empires exemplified the most highly integrated systems of colonialism in modern times. In much the same fashion as the Germans, the Japanese understood to their full satisfaction their purposes in engaging in colonialism and pursued their objectives with relentless and unswerving logic. Possessing outstanding administrative and organizational

talent, having a fine regard for the intricacies of detail, and revealing a peerless appreciation for methods and techniques of whatever cultural origin, the Japanese fashioned a colonial system which patently did not fail for lack of determination and effort. Like the German, the Japanese colonial system was successful as long as it endured.

HYMAN KUBLIN
Brooklyn College

HENRY GEORGE ON TWO CONTINENTS:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN THE DIFFUSION OF IDEAS

The impact of Henry George's land value taxation theory was nothing less than global in scope, and his epochal *Progress and Poverty* – first published in 1879 – gained wider fame than any other political or socio-economic treatise emanating from an American pen. While George's doctrine was essentially a product of of his experience in California during the land-grabbing 60's and 70's, the most pervasive influence of the San Francisco sage was not manifested at home, but in Europe, Australasia and other distant places.

It is with some aspects of this remarkable diffusion of Georgeism during the latter part of the 19th century that this study is concerned. In particular, we would like to examine the circumstances under which this ideological stimulus was transmitted and received in such divergent settings as England, China and Japan. First we will trace the history of the Georgeist influence in each of these countries and then compare their respective patterns of development.

I. ENGLAND

In the fall of 1882 the struggling young writer, George Bernard Shaw, was strolling along a London street one evening when he happened to wander into Memorial Hall while a meeting was in progress. Writing about this event twenty-two years later, Shaw recalled that he knew at once that the speaker had to be an American for four reasons:

Because he pronounced "necessarily" with the accent on the third syllable instead of the first; because he was deliberately and intentionally oratorical, which is not customary among shy people like the English; because he spoke of Liberty, Justice, Truth, Natural Law, and other strange eighteenth-century superstitions; and because he explained with great simplicity and sincerity the views of the Creator who had gone completely out of fashion in London in the previous decade and had not been heard of there since... Now at that time I was a young man not much past twenty-five, of a very revolutionary and contradictory temperament, full of Darwin and Tyndall, of Shelley and DeQuincey, of Michael Angelo and Beethoven, and never in my life studied social questions from the economic point of view, except that once in my boyhood read a pamphlet by John Stuart Mill on the Irish Land Question. The result of my hearing that speech and buying from one of the stewards at the meeting a copy of "Progress and Poverty" for sixpence (Heaven only knows where I got the sixpence!) was that I plunged into a course of economic study, and at a very early stage of

it became a Socialist and spoke from that very platform on the same great subject, and from hundreds of others as well... And that all the work was not mere gas, let the feats and pamphlets of the Fabian Society attest. When I was thus swept into the great Socialist revival of 1883, I found that five-sixths of those who were swept in with me had been converted by Henry George.[1]

Shaw's reaction to Henry George's first public address in England was typical of the catalytic effect of the American's personality upon an England that was ripe for land reform. In this section we will try to evaluate George's role in this stage of British Socialist development by first sketching briefly the earlier growth of British social and economic thought which either provided ethical justification for, or pointed towards George's program of socializing economic rent, and which in at least one case anticipated almost the exact language of the San Francisco Sage; and then to discuss the nature of his association with British Socialists – the forces which attracted them as well as those which led to their divorcement.

Once, in addressing some thousands of unemployed Londoners gathered around the Royal Exchange (the Lord Mayor had denied them the use of Guildhall) George began by calling attention to the inscription carved in the granite of the Exchange, "The Earth is the Lord's", and added, "Aye, the landlords'."[2] If British audiences were easily sparked by this kind of oratory it was not only because 19th-century England was suffering from an unequal distribution of property more than almost any other country in Europe, but because English tradition had long nursed the concept that the right to own land was bestowed equally by God upon all the children of men.[3]

Locke, for example, in his chapter on property in *The Second Treatise of Civil Government* stated that "it is very clear that God, as King David says (Psal. cxv. 16), 'has given the earth to the children of men', given it to mankind in common".[4] But Locke was not attacking private ownership of land; on the contrary he justified private ownership on the grounds that it is man's labor, his cultivation of the soil which gives him the right of ownership:

God gave the world to men in common; but since he gave it to them for their benefit and the greatest conveniences of life they were capable to draw from it, it cannot be supposed he meant it should always remain common and uncultivated. He gave it to the use of the industrious and rational – and labour was to be his title to it – not to the fancy or covetousness of the quarrelsome and contentious.[5]

---

[1]   From a letter to Hamlin Garland in 1904. Excerpts quoted from Charles A. Barker, *Henry George* (New York, 1955), pp. 375–76.

[2]   Barker, *op. cit.*, p. 412.

[3]   "The idea of a natural right to the land and of a common interest in it is the instinctive possession of every nation. But in England the feeling seems more general than elsewhere, because, possibly, of the number of large proprietors and of the serious abuses to which the system has given rise." Charles Gide and Charles Rist, *A History of Economic Doctrines* (London, 1932), p. 559.

[4]   Thomas Cook (editor) (New York, 1947), p. 13

[5]   *Ibid.*, p. 137.

While Locke's doctrine provided a useful justification of private property, by implication it provided a basis for land reform as well, since it emphasized the actual use of the land for social benefit, and Locke's statement that "the measure of property, nature has well set by the extent of men's labour and the conveniences of life" could be utilized to the advantage of those protesting against the abnormally large holdings of gentry who did not make full use of the soil.

By the end of the 18th century much stronger assertions were forthcoming. In 1775 Thomas Spence like Locke felt that "in the state of nature the earth and the fulness thereof were common", but denied Locke's thesis that labor exerted upon land bestowed permanent title to property. The labor argument was valid with regard to manufactured goods but who could "seriously argue that the earth was manufactured by the aristocracy"? Spence's solution was that the parishes should seize the land and let it to the farmers at a moderate rental.[6]

A more scholarly approach, likewise based upon natural rights, was evolved by Professor William Ogilvie in 1781. Ogilvie asserted that "the earth having been given to mankind in common occupancy, each individual seems to have by nature a right to possess and cultivate an equal share".[7] Like Locke he believed that "all property should be the reward of industry", and his solution was almost exactly that formulated by Henry George a century later, namely, the taxing of the entire value of the soil (minus improvements) and thereby restoring ownership to the community. Ogilvie's essay did not receive wide notice but was reprinted by the Chartists in 1838.

The closest anticipation of George's solution was that of Patrick Edward Dove in 1850. Starting with the premise that the Creator provided the earth for the benefit of all men, Dove showed that "the actual division of the soil need never be anticipated. ... how can the division of the advantages of the natural earth be effected?" His answer is precisely that of Henry George: "By the division of its annual value or rent; that is by making the rent of the soil the common property of the nation."[8] Although praised by Carlyle and others when it first appeared, Dove's work was practically unknown until 1889 when the accusation was made that Henry George had plagiarized from it, an accusation that was never substantiated. In fact when George wrote *Progress and Poverty* in 1879 the only land reformer with whose work he was acquainted was Herbert Spencer.

Although Spencer later repudiated his early views on land, they are pertinent here because of their influence on George. In his *Social Statics* (1850) Spencer, using the arguments of natural rights and individualism, stated that "each man

[6] M. Beer, *A History of British Socialism* (New York, 1948), pp. 106–107.
[7] George R. Geiger, *The Philosophy of Henry George* (New York, 1933), p. 185. We have leaned heavily upon this scholarly exposition of George's philosophy. It is especially helpful in comparing George's ideas with those of earlier reformers and economists.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 168.

is free to use the earth for the satisfaction of his wants, provided he allows all others the same liberty. And conversely, it is manifest that no one, or part of them, may use the earth in such a way as to prevent the rest from similarly using it... Equity, therefore, does not permit property in land." While agreeing with Locke that the only justification for landed property would be that of labor, contrary to Locke he believed that historically, ownership was acquired by force, and not consent. His solution is that "instead of being in the possession of individuals, the country would be held by that great corporate body – society. Instead of leasing his acres from an isolated proprietor, the farmer would lease them from the nation. Instead of paying his rent to the agent of Sir John or his Grace, he would pay it to an agent of the community..."[9]

Although he attacked socialism and communism as paternalistic fallacies in this same work, Spencer at this time considered the freedom to use the land as a necessary condition for giving free-play to individualism, a theme which was soon echoed by English liberalism.

Ricardo, in his *Principles of Political Economy* (1817) showed that differential rent is not a natural quality of land (taking the example of a new colony where there is more land than is demanded) but that rent appears only "when the progress of population calls into cultivation land of an inferior quality or less advantageously situated. Rent then is not an indication of nature's generosity, but the result of the pressure of population." Ricardo's definition of rent is that it is the "difference between the produce obtained by equal portions of labour and capital employed on land of the same or different qualities".[10]

When we come to John Stuart Mill we have the synthesis of the laws of nature and the rights of man as expounded by Locke, Spence, Ogilvie and Paine, with the law of rent as formulated by Ricardo. Mill's arguments, which are outlined in his *Principles of Political Economy* (Book V, chapter 2) gave rise to the Land "Tenure Reform Association" in 1870, and whose program "claimed for the benefit of the State, the Interception by Taxation of the Future Unearned Increase of the Rent of the Land (so far as the same can be ascertained), or a great part of that increase, which is continually taking place, without any effort or outlay by the proprietors, merely through the growth of population and wealth, reserving to the owners the option of relinquishing their property to the State at the market value which it may have acquired at the time when this principle may be adopted by the Legislature."[11] The term "unearned increment" to designate that value of the land which was a result, not of the owner's improvements, but the growth of society, was popularized by Mill.

By this time it was not only long-haired agitators who were inveighing against the British land tenure system, but respectable Liberals like John Morley and Cliff Leslie who joined Mill's reform association. In 1873 Mill could say that

---

[9]   *Ibid.*, pp. 287–291.
[10] Gide and Rist, *op. cit.*, p. 553.
[11] *Dissertations and Discussions*, V (New York, 1874), p. 225.

"it is no longer necessary to begin at the very beginning to show how there comes to be a land question, and what the question is. The newspapers and the speeches of members of Parliament and others are full of it; friends and enemies alike have helped to bring it into notice; and now we read everywhere of Land Tenure Reform, and the unearned increment of rent."[12]

This then was the background to English thought in the latter half of the 19th century which led the way to land reform and what Shaw called the "socialist revival". Since 1848 when the Chartists (for whom the question of the common ownership of the land had taken precedence over every other consideration) had disintegrated, socialism had been in the doldrums. The efforts of Liberal Laborism, led by Gladstone, had siphoned off labor discontent from the unruly waters of class warfare. The lot of the worker was improving through peaceful parliamentary action ("Our legislators are socialists without knowing it," boasted Sidney Webb); yet the attack on the outmoded land tenure system, which had hardly changed since medieval times could still rally the forces of English reformers. Thus *Progress and Poverty* – and not Marx's *Das Kapital* – was to herald the revival of socialism.

Soon after its publication in 1879, *Progress and Poverty* was widely distributed in England. After reviewing the arguments of his predecessors, little need be added in explanation of George's analysis. His theory, based primarily upon Ricardian economics, pushed the Law of Rent to the limit. Rent was the unearned increment *par excellence*; it was the source of all evil – depriving both the capitalist of his legitimate profit and the laborer of his just return. George's solution, however, differed from that of Spencer and Mill: the latter would tax only *future* increments of land value, and if the owner were dissatisfied, the state would buy the land at the current market value, and thus provide him with decent compensation. George however, had no such inhibitions. Rent to him was not just another source of revenue – it represented society's stake in land, and the entire value of the land which resulted from the rise of population and the progress of civilization belonged to society. Socialization of rent was not just another aspect of social reform – not the Fabians' "transition to Social Democracy" – but the final and only solution, the panacea that would remove the ills from modern industrial society without in any way curbing the initiative of capitalist entrepeneurs. It was his reconciliation of individualism and socialism. In fact George never claimed to be a socialist – he never used socialist terminology and never even advocated "land nationalization" as it was commonly understood; his solution began and ended in the taxation of land values:

I do not propose to either purchase or confiscate private property in land. The first would be unjust (since the increased value was not earned by the owner) and the second, needless. Let the individuals who now hold it still retain if they want to, possession of what they are pleased to call *their* land. Let them continue to call it

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 269.

their land. Let them buy and sell, bequeath and devise it. We may safely leave them the shell, we take the kernel. *It is not necessary to confiscate land; it is only necessary to confiscate rent.*

··· We already take some rent in taxation. We have only to make some changes in our modes of taxation to take it all.

What I therefore propose as the simple yet sovereign remedy which will raise wages, increase the earnings of capital, extirpate pauperism, abolish poverty, give remunerative employment to whoever wishes it, afford free scope to human powers, lessen crime, elevate morals, and taste, and intelligence, purify government and carry civilization to yet nobler heights, – is to appropriate rent by taxation.[13]

We have already noted Shaw's testimony on the effect of this doctrine in England; other acknowledgments are not lacking, as for example, the following statement concerning Ramsay MacDonald:

It would probably be true to say that MacDonald had been a Socialist from the time he read George's *Progress and Poverty*. "It familiarized people with the idea of common use of property, of common creation of values, of common claims to share in aggregate wealth," he has written. "It led them to discuss the problem of poverty, not as a result of personal shortcomings, but as an aspect of a certain form of social organization." George's book, indeed, had a more dramatic effect upon British political thought than any work published during the last century. It dominated the minds of the Radical wing of the Liberal Party just as it galvanized into action those who had been groping towards a Socialist Commonwealth. It even achieved the undoubted feat of making Karl Marx a popular author, for chapters of *Das Kapital* were published and read as sequels to *Progress and Poverty*.[14]

And Tom Mann, who was to take a different course, and become a militant syndicalist, likewise acknowledged his debt to George:

In 1881 I read Henry George's book *Progress and Poverty*. This was a big event for me; it impressed me by far as the most valuable book I had so far read, and to my agreeable surprise at the time, it seemed to give an effective answer to Malthus. It enabled me to see more clearly the vastness of the social problem... His book was a fine stimulus to me ... and giving me what I wanted – a glorious hope for the future of humanity, a firm conviction that the social problem could and would be solved.[15]

Even Sidney Webb, who apparently was not in need of George's stimulus acknowledges its impact:

Little as Mr. Henry George intended it, there can be no doubt that it was the enormous circulation of his *Progress and Poverty* which gave the touch which caused all the seething influences to crystallize into a popular socialist movement. The optimistic and confident tone of the book, and the irresistable force of its popularization of Ricardo's Law of Rent sounded the dominant "note"' of the English socialist party of today.[16]

This was the role of Henry George in England: he took the economic teachings of Malthus and Ricardo – that "dismal science", as it was called by Carlyle –

---

[13] Henry George, *Progress and Poverty* (New York, 1916 ed.), pp. 401–402.
[14] H. Hessel Tiltman, *J. Ramsay MacDonald* (New York, 1929), p. 18.
[15] From *Tom Mann's Memoirs*, quoted by Geiger, *op. cit.*, p. 236.
[16] From *Socialism in England*, p. 21, quoted by Geiger, *op. cit.*, p. 235.

and deduced from it, not poverty and the pressure of population upon land, but prosperity and plenty as the logical concomitants to the march of civilization.

Although George helped revive socialism in Britain (Hyndman's Social Democratic Federation was formed in 1881 and the Fabian Society was founded in 1884) by emphasizing the evil of land monopoly – a social problem that was particularly acute in Britain, in Shaw's words, the British socialists soon outgrew Henry George. Mill had long before extended the concept of unearned increment to include *all* types of differential profit which were social in origin. And what was the government going to do with the huge revenue collected from land? George's answer was vague, in terms of social benefits, and services to society. But the Fabians wanted the municipalities to engage in industry – to start socializing industry and not just land. Shaw explains the Fabian position as follows:

...and here we have checkmate to mere Henry Georgeism, or State appropriation of rent without Socialism. It is easy to show that the State is entitled to the whole income of the Duke of Westminster and to argue therefrom that he should straightway be taxed twenty shillings in the pound. But in practical earnest the State has no right to take five farthings of capital from the Duke or anybody else until it is ready to invest them in productive interprise.[17]

The Fabians could not stop with Georgeism because the essence of this doctrine – the taxation of land values – had overflowed the confines of socialism and rapidly spread to the camp of the Liberals. Practically everyone left of the House of Lords was clamoring for land value taxation (not all of them of course, advocating *complete* appropriation of rent, as did George), and the Fabians were moving ahead of the Liberals in preaching a broader form of Social Democracy. Shaw writes about the Liberals:

Here the moderate members are content to demand a progressive Income Tax, which is virtually Lord Hobhouse's proposal; and the extremists are all for Land Nationalisation, which is again Lord Hobhouse's principle. The cry for taxation cannot permanently be resisted. And it is worthy of remark that there is a new note in the cry. Formerly taxes were proposed with a specific object – as to pay for a war, for education, or the like. Now the proposal is to tax the landlords in order to get some of *our* money back from them – take it from them first and find a use for it afterwards. Ever since Mr. Henry George's book reached the English Radicals, there has been a growing disposition to impose a tax of twenty shillings on the pound on obviously unearned incomes: that is, to dump four hundred and fifty millions a year down on the Exchequer counter, and then retire with three cheers for the restoration of the land to the people.[18]

Unless social democracy were carried forward, the downfall of the landed gentry, said Shaw, would fill the streets with unemployed lacemakers, coach builders, domestic servants, etc. – who formerly catered to the aristocracy.

Shaw's essay was written in 1889, only seven years after he had been "awa-

---

[17] G. B. Shaw, et al., *Fabian Essays* (New York, 1891), p. 233.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 233.

kened" by Henry George. By this time, appropriation of rent was just another plank in the Fabian platform, which called for "the emancipation of industrial capital" as well. But it would be a mistake to credit George with just the introduction of a specific proposal; what George did was help inculcate a spirit, a frame of mind among the masses which made the work of gentlemen socialists like Webb much easier.

Crane Brinton has remarked that "if ideas really do influence the crowd, it is only after they have been transformed into symbols, ritual, stereotypes".[19] George's influence in England during the 1880's is an outstanding example of this type of phenomenon. In the first part of this section we tried to show how the truths which George brought to Britain were not new—they were part and parcel of British liberal thought. Neither in his analysis nor in his solution did George bring radically new ideas to Britain. What he did bring however, was a dramatic portrayal of a type of injustice which he had literally seen grow overnight with his own eyes in California in the 1870's – the injustice of land speculation and land monopoly. George saw speculators grab thousands of acres in Marin county while workers in San Francisco lived huddled together in poverty. In hitting at land monopoly George was striking at an injustice that was anathema to the Manchester businessman as well as the worker in the London slums.[20] George did more than to popularize Ricardo and Mill; by his evangelical, crusading zeal (his five extended speaking tours in England and Ireland between 1882–1889 had almost as much to do with his influence as his writings) he dramatized the spirit of social reform, and once the wheels were set in motion, the movement he helped inaugurate left him far behind. George never captured British socialism; he merely recharged its spiritual batteries, helped it become a mass movement, and in a period of only a few years became only an historical figure associated with a particular phase of British socialist development, rather than one of its chief apostles. By 1889 when George came to England for the last time, it is significant that the majority of the "Henry George Campaign Committee" was Liberal in make-up. Fabian socialists like Webb still welcomed his presence – not as a socialist agitator, but as a wedge into the ranks of respectable Liberals and Conservatives – a missionary to the clergy – an ambassador for the spirit of social reform (specifically, land reform) rather than a teacher of socialist doctrine. Webb's letter to George, briefing him on his impending visit, is indicative of the role in which the Fabians had cast him at this period:

You will find us making progress in a direction which may generally be called socialistic, and on the land question in particular, ordinary Liberal opinion is fast ripening. The Radicals and the town wage earners generally hardly need your visit, except always by way of inspiration and encouragement. They are already pushing the party leaders as

[19]   *English Political Thought in the 19th Century* (London, 1933), p. 3.
[20]   A vast amount of unimproved land, free of taxation, was tied up in Britain. One-fifth of the land within the boundaries of London county lay vacant; in Birmingham almost 25% of the land was unimproved. Similar conditions prevailed in Edinburgh, Manchester, Bradford, etc. See Yetta Scheftel, *The Taxation of Land Values* (New York, 1916), pp. 380–381.

fast as they can... What holds things back is the great class of the middle class, religious, respectable, cautious, and disliking the Radical artisan. These need your instruction most, and you are of course just the man who can give it to them, without offense or resentment. Your visit will do immense good in stirring up the *bourgeoisie* – especially among dissenting sects. Pray pay them special attention and remind all your committee to bring you into contact with all the ministers around...

I am afraid that you will be denounced by the wilder kind of Socialists. Headlam, Pease and others beside myself are doing all we can to induce them to keep *quiet, as it would be fatal to arouse an antagonism between the radical and socialist parties...*

Now I want to implore your forbearance, when you are denounced as a traitor, and what not, by Socialist newspapers; and 'heckled' by Socialist questioners, or abused by Socialist orators, it will be difficult not to denounce Socialism in turn. But do not do so. They will only be the noisy fringe of the Socialist Party who will do this, and it will be better for the cause which we both serve, if you can avoid accentuating your differences with Socialists.[21]

Thus Shaw in 1889 relegated George to a minor role in social democratic economics, while at the same time Sidney Webb found a limited use for him in consonance with Fabian strategy – a strategy of gradualism, and infiltration of specific proposals across class boundaries and culminating in parliamentary approval. This was the unhappy position Henry George found himself in at the final stage of his association with the Fabians.

What about the other branch of British Socialism – the Social Democrats of Hyndman's and Morris' persuasion? Here we find even less of an ideological convergence, and yet there was the same spiritual stimulus – especially in the case of William Morris – and the same attempt to capitalize on George's wide popular appeal. George's relationship with Hyndman – the friend of Karl Marx – is particularly illuminating:

About this time [1880–1881] Henry George's *Progress and Poverty* began to produce a great effect upon the public mind, partly in consequence of the land question in Ireland, and even in Great Britain, being more to the front then it has been before or since our day; partly because of the active manner in which it was pushed first in the *Radical* by William Webster and afterwards in the Liberal press; and partly on account of the bright journalistic merit of the book itself. Marx looked through it and spoke of it with a sort of friendly contempt: "The capitalist's last ditch", he said. This view I scarcely shared. I saw the really extraordinary gaps in the work and its egregious blunderings in economics, but I also recognized to an extent that Marx either could not or would not admit, the seductiveness for the sympathetic, half-educated mob of its brilliant high-class journalese. I understood, as I thought, that it would induce people to think about economic problems who never could have been brought to read economic books pure and simple; and although I saw quite as clearly then as I do now that taxation of land values can be no solution whatever of the social question, I felt that agitation against any form of private property was better than the stereotyped apathy which prevailed all around us...

[Hyndman took the position that] George will teach more by inculcating error than other men can impart by complete exposition of the truth, Marx would not hear of this as a sound contention. "To leave error unrefuted is to encourage intellectual immorality. For ten who go further, a hundred may very easily stop with George, and

[21] Barker, *op. cit.*, pp. 516–517.

the danger of this is too great to run." So far with Marx. Nevertheless, I still feel that George's temporary success with his agitatory fallacies greatly facilitated the promulgation of Marx's own theories in Great Britain, owing to the fact that the public mind had been stirred up to consider the social question, and political economy generally, by George's easily read book. But that George's fluent inconsequences should be uncongenial to Marx's scientific mind is not surprising. George was a boy with a bright farthing dip fooling around within the radius of a man using an electric searchlight.[22]

By 1889 only the Fabians saw any value in the work of Henry George (except for the Liberals of course) – as the exponent of one particular aspect of their program. (Shaw, at this time cautioned Socialists against attacking George – otherwise the public would get the impression that the socialists were opposed to to land value taxation.) Hyndman, however, debated the issue publicly with George.

In the latter part of his career, however, George seems to have despaired of his association with socialists (he called Karl Marx "the prince of the muddle-heads")[23] as he apparently felt they not only handicapped him in spreading his doctrine to wider circles, but that the Marxist socialist solution bore little resemblance to his own. American socialists, too, at first thought that he could be used to their advantage, and in 1886 the United Labor Party (including the socialists) ran George as its mayoral candidate in New York. The socialist journal *Volkszeitung* said that they supported George "not because of the single tax, but in spite of it".[24]

By 1887 the alliance was broken, George himself precipitating the cleavage by excluding socialist delegates from the U.L.P. convention. A few months later the gulf became even greater when George defended the Supreme Court decision upholding the death sentence of the Haymarket anarchists. And in 1888 he incurred the scorn of the socialists by supporting the candidacy of Grover Cleveland.

George had never been as close to American socialists as to the British, the latter having a direct heritage from Locke through Mill, while the Americans, during the post-Civil War period, were influenced more by continental socialism.

George's break with American socialists widened the gap between him and the Hyndman-Morris Social Democrats of England, and was the reason for Webb's cautionary remarks in hi, letter of 1889. William Morris, who had considered *Progress and Poverty* as "gospel" now wrote: "Henry George approves of this murder [re the Haymarket anarchists]; do not let anybody waste many words to qualify this wretch's conduct. One word will include all the rest – TRAITOR!"[25]

[22]   Henry Mayers Hyndman, *The Record of An Adventurous Life* (New York, 1911), pp. 257–258.
[23]   Barker, *op. cit.*, p. 564.
[24]   Geiger, *op. cit.*, p. 202.
[25]   Elwood P. Lawrence, "Uneasy Alliance: The Reception of Henry George by British Socialists in the Eighties", *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, II, No. 1

First in America and then in England did George's following assume the form of middle-class businessmen rather than socialist workingmen. In the end it was the liberals – in the famous Lloyd George Budget of 1909–1910 –[26] who after a twenty-year struggle with the House of Lords, finally introduced land value assessments and taxation, and heavy increment duties on landed property, and thereby brought to fruition the spirit, if not the exact letter of Henry George's program.

This was a spirit, as we have tried to show, which had long been part of British tradition, and which came to bear on a social ill that was attacked simultaneously by both the Liberal middle class and the rising tide of labor.

II. JAPAN

It was precisely at the time when *Progress and Poverty* came off the press that Japan was in the throes of her monumental effort to meet the Western powers on an equal footing. The Meiji Restoration of 1868 had inaugurated a whole series of political, military and economic changes designed to cope with Japan's new national aspirations. Feudalism was shattered and in its place a highly centralized, authoritarian regime was taking shape. While remarkable in its speed and effectiveness – measured in terms of industrialization and militarization – the transition nevertheless engendered serious social and economic problems, just as similar changes had in the West. In Japan it was the peasants who suffered as a result of the government's policy of fostering industrial and military development; it was they who paid the bill in rent and taxes and it was they who sent their sons as conscripts to the new army.[27]

While their lot had been far from idyllic in feudal Japan, the paternalism of the old system had afforded a measure of security which was absent under the new centralized bureaucracy. Probably the turning point can be dated as 1872 when the earlier ban on the alienation of land was lifted. A year later the promulgation of the Act of Land Tax Revision formalized the new position of the peasants. Formerly taxes had been based on yield and paid in kind; now land values were assessed and taxes were paid in money, while rent was still paid in kind. The ban on alienation had been lifted so that ownership could be clearly established and taxation rationalized.[28]

The result of the new taxation policy afforded the government an assured income; it also subjected the small peasant proprietor to a terrific strain. He was now at the mercy of the rice merchant to whom he had to sell his crop in order to pay the tax. If the price of rice fell – as it usually did at harvest time –

(October, 1951), p. 69. Unfortunately we have not had the opportunity to consult Professor Lawrence's recently published book, *Henry George in the British Isles* (East Lansing, 1957).

[26] See Scheftel, *op. cit.*, pp. 380 ff.

[27] See E. H. Norman, *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State* (New York, 1940), for a highly perceptive account of the socio-economic background to the Early Meiji period.

[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 136 ff.

he lost considerably. And as for the tenant, he profited less than other classes during inflation and was hurt by deflation.[29]

The best indication of the extent of agrarian unrest is the fact that there were 350 peasant uprisings during the first sixteen years of the Meiji era.[30] Tenancy, which had been estimated at 30% in 1868 was close to 40% in 1892. The decade from 1880–1890 when the new tax system was in full force, witnessed "spectacular shifts in land ownership". From 1883 to 1890, 367,744 farmers incurred foreclosures for being in arrears in tax payments.[31]

In Japan, unlike Britain during the industrial revolution, most of the dispossessed peasantry were not converted into an industrial proletariat, because the rate of industrial development did not keep pace with the rate of peasant expropriations. Instead, increasing tenancy and exorbitant rents led to atomization of holdings and the creation of a "stagnant and potential surplus population",[32] which was only partially and gradually siphoned off into industry starting in 1894, when peasant expropriation was almost completed.

By a coincidence, it was at the beginning of this highly critical period for Japanese cultivators that George published his *Progress and Poverty*, and in 1881, two years after it appeared in New York, George's work (the 1880 edition) was placed on the shelves of the Tokyo Ueno library.[33] It was at this time too, that agrarian discontent was beginning to assume the nature of a political issue among Japan's fledgling parties. Within the ranks of the Jiyuto (Liberty or Liberal Party) which had been formed in 1880 by ex-samurai intellectuals, there appeared a radical element which pressed for relief of small cultivators and tenants. This Japanese Liberal Party, unlike its 19th century British counterpart, was rural rather than urban-oriented, and was built upon the highly unstable combination of large landowners, rural entrepeneurs, peasants and tenants who shared a common antipathy toward the government's paternalistic favoritism of urban-centered industry.[34] The Jiyuto intellectual leaders, drawing upon Western liberal thought, especially that of Rousseau, agitated for constitutional government and the extension of civil rights and equality. Although the peasants and tenants did not assume a significant role in the party's membership and leadership ranks, interest in their plight was evinced by a left-wing faction in the party's higher echelon, a tiny but volatile minority which was prepared to make political capital of agrarian discontent. But the program of this radical wing was not in consonance with the interests of the party's more powerful conservative elements. By 1884 the periodic

[29]   See Robert A. Scalapino, *Democracy and the Party Movement in Pre-war Japan* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1953), p. 310.
[30]   Kada Tetsuji, *Ishin igo no shakai-keizai shiso gairon* (Tokyo, 1933), p. 80.
[31]   Norman, *op. cit.*, p. 144.
[32]   *Ibid.*, p. 157.
[33]   Hatano Zendai, "Shoki ni okeru Sun Wen no p'ing chün ti ch'üan ni tsuite", *Shakaikeizai Shigaku*, XXI, No. 5–6, (May-June, 1955), p. 487.
[34]   Norman, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

recourse to violence in the rural areas, culminating in the Chichibu Rebellion of October, 1884, led to the dissolution of the party.[35] After the promulgation of the constitution of 1889 the Jiyuto was reconstituted (1890) and eventually became the Seiyukai party, an acknowledged representative of landlord interests.

In the meantime, the former radical elements of the Jiyuto, led by people like Oi Kentaro, attempted to unite the rural tenants and newly forming urban labor classes into an independent left-wing movement. This party, the Toyo Jiyuto, was committed to governmental intervention in economic matters on behalf of the lower classes. It also organized the Greater Japan Labor Society, the League for Universal Suffrage and the Committee of Investigation on Tenancy Regulations.[36]

To return to the progress of Georgeism: it was among this same left-wing ex-Jiyuto and Christian element that the vision of the prophet of San Francisco had become a topic of discussion. In 1887 the liberal journal *Kokomin no Tomo* (*Friend of the People*) published a translation of a speech by George entitled "Human Rights" in its first and third issues. In 1888 Motora Yujiro,[37] just returned from the United States, delivered a talk on George called "A Discussion of the Nature of Property and an Appreciation of Socialism", in which he described George and his doctrine in the following terms: "The famous Henry George of the United States is a member of the Socialist Party who advocates that all land be made common property ... He contends that the reason for the disparity between the wealthy and the impoverished in society is that land is not commonly owned."[38]

In a subsequent issue of *Kokumin no Tomo* an article on "Present political and social tendencies in America" referred to George's popularity, calling him the "most powerful of reformers", and predicting that he would be a "successful presidential candidate".[39]

In 1891 excerpts from *Progress and Poverty* were translated into Japanese by Jo Sentaro under the title *Complete Abolition of Taxes, an Urgent Message for the Rescue of the World.*[40] In his preface Jo stated that Georgeism was the best solution for the land problem and poverty, and that socialism and communism "sound good to the ear" but that they required recourse to violence. In 1892, George's *Social Problems* was translated by Eguchi Sansho, and Tsunoda Koichiro translated the *Irish Land Question* under the title *The Land Question.*

That knowledge of Georgeism was not restricted to reformist-radical circles

---

[35] Scalapino, *op. cit.*, pp. 105–106.

[36] *Ibid.*, p. 316 and note 34.

[37] Motora, an American-trained psychologist, received a Ph.D. at Johns Hopkins and became acquainted with Georgeism during his stay in the United States.

[38] Ishikawa Kyokuzan and Kotoku Shuzui (editors), "Shakai mondai Zatsusan", *Meiji Bunka Zenshu* (Tokyo, 1929) p. 475. See also Hatano, *op. cit.*, p. 488.

[39] *Kokumin no Tomo*, II, No. 14 (Tokyo, 1888), pp. 106–120.

[40] Jo, a teacher by profession, was close to the Jiyuto intellectual leader Nakae Chomin. Nakae and Itagaki Taisuke, another Liberal leader wrote prefaces to this translation. See the *Nihon shakai-shugi bunken* (Tokyo, 1929), pp. 7–8.

is evidenced by the fact that an eminent right-wing liberal like Fukuzawa Yukichi, one of the most serious students of Western political science during the Meiji era, would cite George to justify his opposition to a reduction in the land tax in 1892. Fukuzawa's book, *Land Tax Theory* also refers to George's doctrine.[41]

In 1898 Abe Iso, American-educated (Hartford Theological Seminary) and Christian, spoke on "Henry George's Socialism" at the monthly meeting of a social reform group at a Tokyo Unitarian church. Abe later wrote a book on *The Interpretation of Social Problems* (1901) in which he stated that "rent is like a parasite in the stomach ... as long as the parasite remains, no matter how much nourishment the body is given, there will be no benefit". As long as the present system of private ownership prevails, "progress will further poverty".[42] Abe's solution was similar to that of George: "the common ownership of land". He also explained that George's solution was not formal nationalization, but that in calling for governmental appropriation of rent he would accomplish the very same end. Abe's program differed from George's in that he proposed issuing bonds to present landowners so that they would eventually be reimbursed.[43]

But the staunchest and most orthodox Georgeist in Japan at this time was an American missionary, the Reverend Charles E. Garst.[44] Garst, a graduate of West Point, who had abandoned an army career to become a missionary, arrived in Japan in 1883, but his conversion to Georgeism seems to have been the result of a visit back home from 1891 to 1893. It was upon his return to Japan that he became an active exponent of the single tax, so much so that he acquired the Japanese nick-name, Tanzei Taro, meaning "Son of the Single Tax". In 1893 Garst joined the "Society for the Study of Social Problems", a group which included many young Japanese social reformers and future socialists.

Garst, who spoke Japanese fluently, was able to influence intellectuals like Jo Sentaro through personal contact as well as through his writings and translations. His article, "The New Economics" appeared in the liberal journal *Rodo Sekai* (Labor World) in 1897,[45] and after his death in December, 1898, at the age of 45, his writings were translated into Japanese and published in 1899. These included the *Single Tax* and *Single Tax Economics*. *Rodo Sekai* also published several of his articles posthumously, including his study of conditions in Hokkaido, which appeared in English.

Yet, while Garst had been propagating Georgeism among Japanese leftists and Christians as well as English-speaking circles, Japanese radicals were rapidly assimilating other doctrinal varieties of social reform. By the turn of the century, due to their awareness of the potentialities of the growing industrial

[41] Kada Tetsuji, *op. cit.*, p. 192.
[42] *Meiji Bunka Zenshu*, XXI, p. 308.
[43] *Ibid.*, p. 391–392.
[44] See Garst's obituary in the *Japan Weekly Mail* (Yokohama, December 31, 1898), p. 674.
[45] This article appears under the title "Tanzei Taro" in *Nihon shakai-shugi bunken, op. cit.*, p. 120.

labor force as an army for social revolution, the intellectuals became more interested in problems of labor and industry than those of land. Thus Marxism and not Georgeism came to dominate the thinking of the Japanese left at this time. The growth of Japanese industry after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95 had been accompanied by a relative increase in the urban-industrial population thus giving to Marxism more relevance and meaning. Socialism rather than Georgeism seemed to offer more promise to the intellectuals as an agitational weapon.

As in Britain, therefore, the chief influence of Georgeism was to focus attention on the progress and poverty paradox rather than provide the doctrinal core for a major reformist movement. As in Britain, too, individuals who ultimately identified themselves with other segments of the radical movement, freely acknowledged their debt to Georgeism as a stimulus to radical thinking. For example, Kotoku Denjiro, who in 1901 was one of the founders of the Social Democratic Party ("Shakai Minshuto") later cited the influence of *Progress and Poverty* and *Social Problems* among the reasons for his becoming a socialist.[46] Kotoku had been to America and it was there that the Georgeist influence was exerted.

In a similar account of a conversion to socialism, Matsukawa Takenosuke also mentioned the influence of the single tax theory, in this case it being the Reverend Garst himself who provided the initial stimulus.[47]

Likewise Nokami Keinosuke told how his first interest in socialism had been generated in America in 1897 when he learned of the single tax theory through a fellow student, Miyazaki Tamizo, who was destined to remain one of the few radicals who persisted in sounding a Georgeist theme in spite of the clarion call of militant Marxism.[48]

In 1903 *Progress and Poverty* was still listed among the recommended sources for the study of social problems compiled by the radical journal *Heimin Shimbun*, but its role was clearly secondary; it was held to be an old left-wing classic rather than the living truth.[49]

Yet one prominent radical, Miyazaki Tamizo, continued to stress the Georgeist theme of "common property in land" rather than Marxist socialism as the solution to Japan's social ills. Impressed with the single tax doctrine during his stay in America around 1897, he rejected Marxism as an infringement upon individual rights, and like George contended that man should possess the right of ownership of the things which he produced. But land, he felt, was endowed by Heaven, and should be possessed equally.[50]

[46]   *Heimin Shimbun*, No. 10 (1904). Reprinted in *Heimin Shimbun*, I, No. 10 (Tokyo, 1953), p. 219.
[47]   *Ibid.*, III, No. 44, p. 273.
[48]   *Ibid.*, I, No. 4, p. 85.
[49]   *Ibid.*, I, No. 3, p. 59.
[50]   *Nihon shakai-shugi bunken*, *op. cit.*, p. 61; and Nakamura Yoshisaburo, "Jyuminken undo no hatten", *Shakaikagaku tokyu*, I, No. 1 (Tokyo, 1956), pp. 197–198.

Yet while his diagnosis of social problems stemmed from George, and while he shared George's "common property" solution, he rejected George's methodological device. Instead of a single tax on land values he proposed actual land redistribution, with present owners to be reimbursed for any value of the land resulting from their own labor. Miyazaki's arguments appeared in his book, *Equal Ownership of Land,* published in 1906. He also founded and led the "Society for the Restoration of Land Rights" which was the nearest thing to a Henry George party in Japan. Other land reformers like Nishikawa Kojiro[51] also made use of George's arguments as well as those of Alfred Russell Wallace, but the more rapid development of socialism and anarchism as focal points for left-wing dissidence left Georgeism far behind. In the *Single Tax Year Book* of 1917 Garst's brother-in-law and fellow missionary, Dr. Macklin of China, reported that while his own endeavors on behalf of Georgeism were not being entirely unrewarded, "there is at present no visible sign in Japan that her feet are set in the right direction".[52]

To sum up: Georgeism appeared on the Japanese scene coincident with the rise of an incipient protest movement in the wake of the transition to industrialism. As in England, its role was to dramatize the social inequality concomitant to the industrialization process, and for a few intellectuals who formed the leadership cluster of Japanese radicalism, Georgeism proved an effective spark and stimulus to action.[53] On the other hand, its programmatic substance was of negligible effect.

But England was the very fountainhead of the doctrine which taught the socialization of rent, and the introduction of Georgeism did not represent the diffusion of a new idea as much as convergence with an indigenous if dormant ideological development. At the same time, the nature of the land problem in Britain was highly dissimilar to that of Japan. In the former, the evils engendered by the vast holdings of absentee owners, especially in Ireland and Scotland, could conceivably be mitigated by the application of the land value taxation principle, while in Japan minute parcelization of holdings and the extreme pressure of population upon land called for a more direct solution.

Most important of all, in Japan would-be reformers lacked access to the democratic instrumentality which alone could give legislative sanction to a peaceful social reform doctrine of the Georgeist order. Denied an opportunity to further reformism through legislative means, Japanese radicals became increasingly oriented towards the use of force, and many embraced anarchism.[54]

---

[51] Nishikawa was a socialist who collaborated with the famous radical leader Katayama Sen in publishing *Rodo Sekai.*

[52] Joseph D. Miller, *Single Tax Year Book* (New York; 1917), p. 193.

[53] Kata Tetsuji calls attention to the analogous role of Georgeism as a transitional development in Britain and Japan; *op. cit.*, p. 194.

[54] Scalapino points out that "the legacy of military ethics, the obstacles to legal reform, the lack of understanding of democratic theory, and the absence of conditions that would allow liberal theory to be translated immediately into practice – all combined to encourage the use of force", *op. cit.*, pp. 316–317.

Furthermore, the British tradition of individualism, which was the core of its liberal movement, was absent in Japan. Georgeism in Japan therefore, lacked the appeal which it held for British liberals.

III. CHINA

In Japan then as in Britain, Georgeism had acted as a catalyst which was left behind by the rising tide of social protest which it had helped create. In China however, Georgeism followed a different course. Here it was not a mere stimulus of ephemeral importance, but the substantive basis for a program of social and economic reform to which the Chinese Nationalist Party paid lip service for at least half a century, its slogan only recently being resuscitated and to a certain extent given legislative sanction on Taiwan.

Before tracing this remarkable fate of Georgeism, let us dwell briefly upon the historical setting. The background to late 19th century China was one of internal breakdown compounded by increasing pressure from without. Unlike Japan, which was able to contrive a political, military and economic adjustment to the Western impact, China floundered between half-hearted attempts at modernization and a stubborn clinging to traditionalism. As a result the regime found itself increasingly unable to cope with either internal dissidence or external aggression. The internal agrarian crisis, endemic to Chinese demographic conditions, had been seriously aggravated by the decline of rural handicraft industries due to the influx of foreign goods. Reduction of farm incomes, atomization of holdings, exorbitant rent and taxation, periodic floods and droughts – all these contributed to agrarian instability and even full-scale insurrection on the order of the Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864).

Yet Chinese reformers at the end of the century were inclined to focus on the more dramatic threat of foreign aggression. Especially after the ignominious defeat at the hands of Japan in 1894–1895 were they concerned with problems dealing with national security rather than internal social reform.

Western education, Western political forms and Western industrialization were valued as means of survival in a world dominated by mechanized gun-boat diplomacy.

As for the consideration of discrete ideas, at a time when Japanese intellectuals were being subjected to a plethora of Western ideological stimuli, including Georgeism, their Chinese counterparts were still groping for a viable formula for the synthesis of traditional values and European techniques. In a word, their receptivity to specific doctrinal impulses was much lower than that of Japanese intellectuals.

Georgeism, then, like other Western ideologies, came to China at a much later period than it did to Japan. In China, as in Japan, the early history of George's doctrine centered around the activities of a foreign clergyman, in this case, Dr. W. E. Macklin, a Canadian medical missionary. Macklin and his wife Daisy, also a physician, ran a hospital in Nanking. It is significant too that

these foreign exponents of Georgeism in China and Japan were related, Dr. Daisy Macklin being the sister of Mrs. Garst. Although Garst's translations appeared earlier than those of his brother-in-law, it is difficult to determine which of the two takes precedence as a Georgeist missionary. Macklin at any rate, lived longer, and because of his influential position with the Society for the Diffusion of Knowledge, was able to translate several single-tax classics which otherwise probably would not have found their way into Chinese. With the help of a Chinese collaborator, Macklin translated an adaptation of *Progress and Poverty* in 1899, followed by Spencer's *Social Statics*, Patrick Edward Dove's *Theory of Human Progression* and George's *Protection or Free Trade*.

Yet unlike Garst, Macklin had little opportunity to disseminate Georgeist ideas among native intellectuals. Even the weak but indigenous forum of social protest that had been available to Garst in Japan was lacking in China. It is questionable too whether Macklin's various translations of single tax classics made any impression upon the literati who were capable of understanding them. In reading Macklin's reports to American single-taxers one gets the impression that his pre-republican activities were restricted to the small circle of fellow missionaries and traders which comprised the European community. In 1902 he would report to the *American Single Tax Review* that he and his "single-tax missionary friends" had put Georgeism into practice in a tiny Yangtze valley health resort catering to Westerners, and he also mentioned that "Our Shanghai evening paper [the English-language *North China Herald*] publishes all I can write on the single tax".[55]

Macklin wrote of his attempt to influence a local Chinese official, but for the most part his audience was Western, and it was apparently that part of the Western business community which suffered from rising rents in commercial centers like Shanghai which took his arguments to heart when he protested that "200 landlords rule Shanghai".[56]

It is interesting to note that another and more tangible Georgeist impulse was being generated at this time from the German leased (read: seized) territory of Kiaochow. Under German control since 1898, Kiaochow practiced a modified version of Georgeism based upon the ideas of the German Bodenreformers. In fact Kiaochow was the first place in the world where a future, unearned increment tax was enacted.[57] According to Macklin, it was through his initiative that the German officials in charge took cognizance of *Progress and Poverty* and applied its principles in the territory. Other sources would dispute this claim.[58]

Yet even Kiaochow was a foreign and not native application of the land value taxation principle, and the reason why Macklin was so restricted in his pro-

---

[55]   *The Single Tax Review*, I, No. 3 (New York, January 15, 1902), p. 47.
[56]   *Ibid.*
[57]   Scheftel, *op. cit.*, pp. 184 ff.
[58]   For Macklin's version see the *Single Tax Year Book*, *op. cit.*, p. 192, and the *Single Tax Review*, I, No. 3 (January 15, 1902), p. 47. Contrary views are held in Scheftel, *op. cit.*, p. 184, and the *Single Tax Review*, I, No. 1 (July, 1901), p. 24.

paganda efforts was that those very intellectuals who were receptive toward Western institutions and ideas – and especially anything that smacked of social reform – were for the most part in exile. Either abroad as students or political refugees, there was little chance of their being influenced directly by Macklin. When we search for the original indigenous reception of Georgeism therefore we must focus our attention upon the exiled revolutionaries and overseas students.

In modern China the name of Henry George is known chiefly or even solely through his influence upon Sun Yat-sen. The exact circumstances under which Sun was exposed to Georgeism are still unclear.[59] Sun himself traces his awareness of Western social problems to the period of his European sojourn from 1896 to the end of 1897. It would seem reasonable to assume that the wide journalistic coverage of George's death during his 1897 mayoralty campaign should have impressed Sun who was in England at the time.

Some Japanese sources would place greater emphasis upon the influence of Miyazaki Tamizo, the leading Japanese interpreter of George.[60] Miyazaki's brother Torazo belonged to that fantastic band of Japanese idealist-adventurers who were intimate collaborators of Sun Yat-sen since 1899. At any rate, Tamizo's views certainly reinforced Sun's favorable disposition toward the land value taxation scheme, and by 1903 Sun had incorporated a Chinese version of the "common property in land" slogan into his own political platform. Whether he translated this directly from the English or took it from Miyazaki's Japanese version cannot be ascertained.

What is important, however, is the use of this slogan, *p'ing-chün ti-ch'üan*, literally "equalization of land rights", and Sun's reasons for making it the cornerstone of his social reform program. In the first place, Sun, like George, did not mean that "equalization of land rights" would disturb present land tenure conditions. In this respect his solution was different from that of Miyazaki since the latter was definitely concerned with inequality of holdings in Japan and proposed actual redistribution. Sun's method was simply to assess all land values, tax them at a one per cent rate and at the same time, appropriate for social use all future increments in value subsequent to the original assessment. Note that Sun, unlike George, would not socialize rent in its entirety but only the future unearned increment. In this respect, his "equalization of land rights" technique was identical with John Stuart Mill's proposal.[61]

Furthermore, Sun's explanation for adopting this modified version of Georgeism indicates that he did not visualize it as a remedy for China's rising agrarian distress. Rather did he choose it as a preventive for future social ills, such as those which plagued the West in its march of progress. Sun was taking the West as his model and the evils of Western industrialized societies as his target.

---

[59] See Harold Schiffrin, "Sun Yat-sen's Early Land Policy", *The Journal of Asian Studies*, XVI, No. 4 (August, 1957), for a fuller discussion of the Georgeist influence upon Sun.

[60] See Hatano, *op. cit.*

[61] Schiffrin, *op. cit.*, pp. 558, 560.

Sun's motivation and reasoning can be clarified by referring to some of the arguments he adduced on behalf of his People's Livelihood *(Min sheng)* principle – one of his famous Three Principles of the People. Until the latter part of his career, *Min sheng* was based chiefly upon the "equalization of land rights" technique. In 1906, when he first began elaborating on this principle, he said that China would achieve socialism in a faster and simpler process than the West because "social problems are caused by the progress of civilization, and when the attainments of civilization are not high, social problems are correspondingly few". [62] Note that on the basis of his experience in the West, Sun felt that socialism was an inevitable result of capitalism. Socialism, he felt, was inevitable because the "progress of civilization is a natural process – you cannot escape it by running away". And "Civilization has good fruit and it also has evil fruit. We must choose the good fruit and avoid the evil fruit. On the occasion of our revolution, we not only want to create a democratic state, but we want to make a socialist state – certainly this is what the West has not yet attained." [63]

Here we have one of the most consistent themes in the doctrines of Sun Yat-sen – the theme that China, precisely because she is last on the scene (with regard to industrialization) will quickly become the first, and outstrip the West in the solution of social problems by nipping them in the bud. Sun's "three-in-one revolution" – nationalist, political and social – could be telescoped into one, short comparatively bloodless stroke. Sun would repeatedly assure his audience of students and overseas merchants that their country's backwardness *vis-à-vis* Japan and the West was only a temporary disablement, and that in fact she could now quickly overtake them by applying beforehand that remedy which the West had discovered only through hindsight.

Why did he choose the land value taxation method as an antidote to the social problems which would be generated by China's industrialization? We believe that there are several reasons. Firstly, the Georgeist-type formula was non-violent and seemed easy to apply. In China's case it would be aimed at *potential* land speculators rather than any tangible segment of society. Thus while social revolution would wrack the West with violence, in China it would proceed smoothly as a planned concomitant to the industrialization process itself. Secondly, Sun was impressed with the tremendous increase in urban land values as a result of industrialization. By appropriating these increments for social purposes, he saw an unusual opportunity for financing China's further industrialization. In a word, socialization of the future unearned increment would allow China to pull itself up by its bootstraps. Sun of course realized that something else was needed to give land situation value in the first place and cause it to increase in value – something had to create the unearned increment. He saw railroad development in this catalyst role, for had not George shown that

[62]   *Ibid.*, p. 554.
[63]   *Ibid.*

the building of railroads increased the value of adjoining land? Therefore by 1912 Sun was planning on foreign assistance to inaugurate vast railroad projects in China, railroads being considered the key to industrial and commercial development as well.

Yet in spite of Sun's tireless campaign on behalf of "equalization of land rights" the doctrine was only reluctantly accepted by his following. Time and again they would balk and suspect it of harboring radical, wealth-dividing implications. It was incorporated into the program of the "T'ung Meng Hui", Sun's first large-scale political movement, organized in Tokyo in 1905, only because of the leader's personal prestige, and even before the 1911 revolution, opposition to this plank led to the formation of a splinter group within the nationalist camp.[64] And after the revolution, amalgamation with other groups and the formation of the Kuomintang necessitated temporary de-emphasis of the "equalization of land rights" theme.

There seem to have been two sources of opposition to Sun's application of Georgeism. During the 1905–1912 period it was the conservative, land-owning elements which were repelled by the agrarian reform connotation of the doctrine, and the burden of Sun's arguments at this time was directed toward placating this source of aggravation. After 1919 however, when the impact of the Russian revolution generated increased interest in Marxism, leftist dissatisfaction with the unearned increment concept as the mainstay of a socio-economic policy became evident. At this time, Sun's reorganized Kuomintang incorporated an additional economic plank calling for the control of capital. And the second reorganization of the party in 1924, under Comintern tutelage, led to the enunciation of definite agrarian land reform tenets, such as rent control and land redistribution. This was popularized by Sun in his "To the Tiller Belongs the Soil" slogan.

Thus in China as in Britain and Japan, an initial preference for Georgeism as the basis for social reform gradually became attenuated and modified to include other principles as well. But in China the Georgeist influence was more persistent. Whenever the opportunity arose Sun and his lieutenants would affirm their loyalty to the spirit of Georgeism. In 1912 after surrendering the reins of the newly-formed republican government to the military strong man, Yuan Shih-k'ai, Sun told American journalists that "I intend to devote my future to the promotion of the welfare of the Chinese people as a whole. The teachings of your single-taxer, Henry George, will be the basis of our program of reform".[65]

It was at this time too that the other band of Georgeists in China, that led by Dr. Macklin, joined hands with Sun's group. And for a brief period Macklin

---

[64]   In 1907 a T'ung Meng Hui faction opposing the "Equalization of land rights" slogan formed a new organization, the Kung-chin Hui, which cooperated with Sun in all other respects. Landowning supporters of the revolution in the Yangtze valley apparently led this faction. See Feng Tzu-yu, *Ko-ming i-shih*, rev. ed., I (Shanghai, 1947), pp. 248–252.
[65]   *The Public*, XV, No. 732 (Chicago, April 12, 1912), p. 349.

had access to various government officials, including President Yuan, and gained their interest in land reclamation schemes. A Socialist Party, rising independently of Sun's movement, but close to it in ideology, also advocated the single tax at this time. By 1913 however, the republic had been betrayed, the socialists outlawed and Sun sent into exile once more. With Sun out of the way, Georgeism became dormant on the mainland and Macklin's influence waned as well.

In 1920 when Sun returned to head a south China government in Canton for a brief period, his lieutenant, Liao Chung-k'ai, who fifteen years previously had translated the introduction to *Progress and Poverty* for Sun's magazine, *Min Pao*, in Tokyo, assumed the office of Kwangtung Commissioner of Finance, and announced that "we are going to try, as far as possible, to put into practice the principles of Henry George".[66] Previously, Dr. Schrameier, the former land commissioner of Kiaochow had been invited to Canton by Sun in order to carry out these principles. This latter gesture was typical of Sun: regardless of his distaste for imperialist incursions into Chinese territory, his respect for Western ideas such as Georgeism moved him to welcome a former imperialist official as an adviser.

Nevertheless in the hectic, almost semi-anarchic conditions of a disunited China, even orthodox American single taxers recognized the impracticability, if not impossibility of carrying out a single tax program. Commenting upon the Canton government's decision to violate single tax doctrine and collect excise taxes on wine and tobacco, an American Georgeist organ commented, "Possibly this is due to bad local conditions, the old [anti-Sun] governor having collected three years taxes in advance and taken the treasury with him when he was ejected".[67] The difficulty in relying upon the single tax principles as a basis for fiscal policy would be apparent to Sun and his followers during the brief periods when they assumed governmental control.[68]

In his "Three Principles of the People" lectures of 1924 Sun would still retain the "equalization of land rights" formula along with other economic planks. After Sun's death in 1925 and the break with the Communists in 1927, the Kuomintang would emphasize the non-Marxist aspects of Sun's program, thus the left-wing leader Wang Ching-wei would assure an American newsman, "We are not Communists... Sun Yat-sen ... was greatly influenced by your American radical, Henry George, but he was never a Communist".[69] Subsequently Sun was apotheosized by the Kuomintang and his Three Principles

[66]   *Bulletin of the National Single Tax League*, V, No. 5 (May, 1921), p. 6.
[67]   *Ibid.*, p. 6.
[68]   In an interview in December, 1922, Sun would declare that Chinese conditions at that time would not allow for a strict adherence to single tax doctrine, and that other forms of revenue were necessary in addition to land value taxation. See *Kuo-fu ch'uan-chi*, IV (Taipei, 1957), p. 521.
[69]   Quoted by Geiger, *op. cit.*, pp. 461–462, from the *New York Times* (September 11, 1927), p. 5 of the Sunday feature section.

canonized. Thus the arguments of Henry George and the future unearned increment tax of John Stuart Mill became permanent features of Kuomintang ideology. While finding it highly difficult to realize these principles the Kuomintang always kept them alive as an integral part of its program.

In the end, it was only on the island fortress of Taiwan that deference to the memory of Sun Yat-sen kept this slogan alive, and in February, 1956, some fifty years after it was first enunciated, the government of Chiang K'ai-shek passed an urban land reform statute based upon the unearned increment concept of "equalization of land rights".[70]

On the Communist-controlled mainland, of course, Sun's infatuation with Georgeism is only of mild historical interest, being considered typical of the rising bourgeosie's protest against the shackles of feudalism during an intermediate phase of modern Chinese history.[71]

CONCLUSIONS

In comparing the fate of Georgeism in Japan and China, several observations can be made concerning the reception of ideas and the responses which they evoked during East Asia's modernization phase. In both countries, for example, the role of key individuals was much more crucial in the propagation of this particular idea than in Britain or other Western societies. Particularly striking is the double example of ideological cross-fertilization represented by the Miyazaki-Sun duo on one hand, and on the other, the two missionaries and brothers-in-law, Garst and Macklin. These two pairs of individuals, representing native intellectuals and foreigners, comprised the hard-core of Georgeism in East Asia. But while the natives, Miyazaki and Sun, imposed serious modifications upon George's solution, it was the foreign pair which preached the gospel precisely as it was written in *Progress and Poverty*.

The cases of China and Japan also highlight the limitations imposed upon foreign missionaries attempting to introduce new economic and political ideas: without the support of either a native charismatic leader or an indigenous political party, the imported doctrine is doomed to oblivion. Macklin's various translations of single tax classics had little meaning for Sun, and when he undertook the dissemination of Georgeism in 1905 he had one of his own men attempt a new, literal translation of *Progress and Poverty* rather than use Macklin's adaptation which he may not have known about in Japan at that time. Garst was less restricted than Macklin, and through the medium of the church was able to come into contact with young Japanese radicals, many of whom were Christian converts. But Garst too failed to create a lasting Georgeist influence.

China, of course, offers the best evidence of the crucial importance of indivi-

[70] *Free China Weekly* (Chinese News Service, New York, February 7, 1956).
[71] For the Chinese Communist interpretation of Sun's use of Georgeist concepts, see "Sun Chung-shan 'p'ing-chün ti-ch'üan cheng-kang ti ch'an-sheng ho fa-chan", *Kuang-ming jih-pao* (Peking, October 27, 1955).

duals. Here the charismatic leadership of Sun Yat-sen sustained a George-inspired slogan in the face of ignorance, unenthusiasm and even antipathy on the part of his followers. The slogan was actually a handicap rather than a boon during the formation of the Kuomintang. Yet if charisma could keep the slogan and idea alive it could not counteract the inapplicability of the doctrine – either assumed or real – once the revolutionary movement had become centered on the mainland and sensitized to the tangible realities of the socio-economic situation.

Here we come to another difference between China and Japan: when Chinese reformers drew up their formulae they were in exile, cut off from contact with homeland developments. Under these circumstances, an abstract idea remained unchallenged and untested by the actual needs of the society they wished to reform. On the other hand, Japanese reformers, like their British counterparts, were less inclined to settle for Georgeism as a panacea for social ills because they soon became aware of industrial capitalism, in addition to private ownership of land as a source of social inequality. Thus both Japan and Britain offer numerous instances of social reformers being stimulated by George's eloquence and then pursuing other or additional reformist doctrines which they believed to be of greater pertinence. Yet in both China and Japan intellectuals exhibited a strong disposition toward some form of social reform: in both countries, there was a strong disenchantment with unplanned laissez-faire capitalism as they found it in the West.

A contrast can also be made of the different motivations which led to the initial acceptance of Georgeism. In Japan and Britain, liberals and radical social reformers related the theme of *Progress and Poverty* with the live issue of agrarian distress as well as the paradoxical relationship between material progress and social poverty. While in Japan intellectual ferment on these issues never reached the pitch which prevailed in 19th-century Britain (the authoritarian nature of the society served to stifle such a ferment in Japan), still, in both countries intellectuals were searching for solutions to live and present problems.

In China the motivation was entirely different. A charismatic leader, primarily a nationalist and secondly a social reformer, highly sensitive to the backward role assigned his nation by both Japanese and Europeans, found in George's analysis a unique but simple device to escape the evil which seemed destined to rip the Western social fabric. Thus it was for the purpose of preventing social problems before they arose and thereby getting ahead of the West that Sun welcomed the spirit of Georgeism and stubbornly clung to it. An additional seductive feature of Georgeism was that in dramatizing the tremendous wealth accruing to land merely because of its situation value in an industrializing society it led Sun to believe that he could make the industrial revolution practically pay for itself.

Finally, as a nationalist, Sun Yat-sen was bent upon avoiding open class-conflict within Chinese society. It was one of the great appeals of the land value

taxation method that it obviated the need for such a conflict. In England and to a lesser extent in Japan, this was probably one of the chief reasons for its popularity among Christian reformist circles. It will be noted that in all three countries there was a high concentration of Christian or Christian-influenced reformers among exponents of Georgeism.

HAROLD SCHIFFRIN   POW-KEY SOHN
Hebrew University, Jerusalem   *Seoul National University, Korea*

IBN KHALDÛN IN WORLD PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY
(Review Article*)

It is a distinguishing feature of modern Western historical thought that it has striven self-consciously to free itself from the use of non-historical categories of explanation in order to consitute itself as an autonomous, self-explanatory and self-justifying form of thought. Croce believed this movement to be a late phase of humanism and identified it as the main ingredient in the Western intellectual tradition.[1] In his view, the history of historiography in the West has been one long struggle to expel the category of transcendence from historical analysis, that is, a struggle of history against philosophy of history.[2]

Unlike modern historical thought with its value free orientation, most previous historiography has been informed, either consciously or unconsciously, by a specific set of social values and has used historical materials as either a mine of examples for support of the position pre-chosen (like Cicero) or as evidence for the study of phenomena the noumena of which lie just outside the range of history proper (like Marx).[3] The former approach never really arrives at history, the latter passes through it too rapidly to the goal which it believes lies beyond it. In so far as most previous historiography has been governed by these two tendencies, it has always been philosophy of history rather than history proper. However, if philosophy of history is less enlightening in a scientific

---

* Ibn Khaldûn, *The Muqaddimah, An Introduction to History*. Translated from the Arabic by Franz Rosenthal. 3 vols. *Bollingen Series*, XLIII (New York, 1958).

The Editor of this quarterly, assuming no doubt that Professor Rosenthal's translation would be reviewed by a number of Islamists as a monument of Islamic civilization, requested the present review from a non-Islamist who would approach it in terms of its place in philosophy of history. In advancing into a field in which the content of the work is alien to him, the reviewer has sought aid and counsel on a number of special problems which arose. He therefore wishes to thank Professors Willson H. Coates and R. James Kaufmann, of the University of Rochester, and Professor Isaac Rabinowitz, of the Department of Classics, Cornell University, for aid given in analyzing and presenting this evaluation of Ibn Khaldûn's work.

[1] Benedetto Croce, *History as the Story of Liberty*, trans. Sylvia Sprigge (New York, 1955), pp. 312–17; R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History* (New York, 1956), pp. 245 ff.

[2] Croce, *op. cit.*, pp. 132–38.

[3] On Cicero's conception of history, see C. N. Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture; a Study of Thought and Action from Augustus to Augustine* (New York, 1944), pp. 149 ff.; on Marx, see Karl Löwith, *Meaning in History; the Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History* (Chicago, 1949), pp. 33–51.

sense than history proper, it has always been able to address itself more directly, and therefore more profitably, to the problems of the time in which it is conceived. As for the psychological orientation of historians and philosophers of history, the former seem to derive satisfaction from a serene, Goethean contemplation of life, whereas the latter seem to be motivated by a desire to study the world in order to change it.

However, philosophy of history is frequently written, not as a call to positive action, but as a justification of *ataraxia*. As such, it is a product of *ennui* or fatigue with that very multiplicity of life forms the contemplation of which the Goethean mentality finds so intoxicating. This sort of philosophy of history is not optimistic but pessimistic. It would sever the nerve of human effort and, instead of calling humanity to active participation in the revealed metahistorical process, invites Stoical repose. The historical philosophies of Voltaire and Comte are of the former, optimistic sort; those of Spengler and Burckhardt of the latter.[4]

The intellectual fecundity of the great philosophies of history, such as those of St. Augustine and Marx, derives from the incorporation of both traditions in their work. While calling for the rejection of the historically given world as a value in itself, they point to the existence of a higher ideal which will serve as an inspiration to the conquest of that world through self-transcending social action.[5] The truly great philosophies of history in the Western tradition have been those which, opting neither for an unqualifiedly optimistic nor an openly pessimistic vision of the world, leave open a number of possibilities for creative response while freely admitting the possibility of and human responsibility for historical disaster. This ambivalent, tragic attitude, which asserts at once the necessity of human aspiration, the inevitability of human failure on an individual plane, and the advance of human self-awareness on a universal plane through suffering, is essentially humanistic in its orientation. It is always driven, by the very logic of its presuppositions and no matter how greatly mediated it may be by metaphysical and religious considerations, to return to history's true object, man as a social creature burdened with ultimate responsibility for his own fate.

[4] On Voltaire and Comte: Löwith, *op. cit.*, pp. 67–91, 104–114; on Comte specifically: Alfred Weber, *Einführung in die Soziologie* (München, 1955), pp. 81–102; on Burckhardt: Croce, *op. cit.*, pp. 93–103; James Hastings Nichols' introduction to Burckhardt, *Force and Freedom; an Interpretation of History* (New York, 1955), pp. 19 ff.; Löwith, *op. cit.*, pp. 20–32; Eric Heller, *The Disinherited Mind* (New York, 1959), pp. 68–88; and on Spengler: H. Stuart Hughes, *Oswald Spengler; a Critical Estimate* (New York, 1952); Heller, *op. cit.*, pp. 181–196; and the work of a brilliant young Italian historian, Pietro Rossi, *Lo Storicismo tedesco contempraneo* (Milano, 1956), pp. 389 ff.

[5] Cochrane, *op. cit.*, pp. 474 ff. My conception of St. Augustine's philosophy of history is not shared by Christopher Dawson, in M. C. D'Arcy and others, *St. Augustine* (New York, 1957), p. 71. According to Dawson, for St. Augustine secular history "was the spectacle of humanity perpetually engaged in chasing its own tail". I feel that Cochrane's view does more justice to the complexity of Augustine's historical speculation. See the analysis of Theodore Mommsen, "St. Augustine and the Christian Idea of Progress", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XII (1951), pp. 346–74, who incorporates both views into a synthesis.

This is the central idea which has, to a greater or lesser degree, informed philosophy of history in the West since Herodotus and has given it an eternal appeal in the dynamic society created there.

With the appearance of Franz Rosenthal's translation of Ibn Khaldûn's *Muqaddimah*, the student of philosophy of history is permitted to encounter directly the attempt of a fourteenth-century Muslim historian to dominate, with Arab and Muslim presuppositions, this most challenging of speculative enterprises. Professor Rosenthal's translation is a masterpiece of the editor-translator's peculiar art. Rosenthal is not only a linguist and philologist of the highest order, a fact attested by the splendid *apparatus criticus* which attends this translation,[6] he is also a subtle and sophisticated student of the problems which have engendered the universal quest for meaning in history.[7] He has been able, therefore, to enter into the world of Ibn Khaldûn's mind with marvelous tact and has translated, not only the language of the historian, but also the thought forms of the philosopher of history into faultless English. This is one of those works likely to remain as much a classic in translation as the original was in formulation.

And the original *is* impressive.

Readers of Toynbee's *Study* will know that Ibn Khaldûn has been acclaimed as the producer of "the greatest work of its kind that has ever been created by any mind in any time or place".[8] Toynbee enshrines Ibn Khaldûn in a pantheon which houses Herodotus, Thucydides, Polybius, Josephus, St. Augustine, Gibbon and Turgot; and of that group, Ibn Khaldûn seems, at least at first glance, the most modern of all. Evidence of his modernity is reflected in the dispute between historians and sociologists for the honor of claiming him as their own.[9]

In a sense, this dispute over which of the two disciplines may rightly claim him reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of Ibn Khaldûn's work, one which, it is hoped, Rosenthal's translation will do much to dissolve. It reflects as well the misunderstanding which today separates the two disciplines, a misunderstanding which stems from an unwillingness or inability of each to define its proper scope and limits. And while Professor Rosenthal has warned us that any comparison of Ibn Khaldûn with ancient or modern thinkers can contribute little to an understanding of his mind,[10] it would seem in the best interests of

---

[6]   In Rosenthal's introduction are also included a résumé of Ibn Khaldûn's career and a perceptive analysis of his thought, which I have drawn upon as guides to my reading of the *Muqaddimah*. See especially, *Muqaddimah*, I, pp. xxix-lxxxvii.

[7]   Readers of Rosenthal's *A History of Muslim Historiography* (Leiden, 1952), pp. 1–16, will not need to be told this.

[8]   A. J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, 2nd ed. (London, 1935), III, p. 322.

[9]   See the introduction to *An Arab Philosphy of History; Selections from the Prolegomena of Ibn Khaldûn of Tunis (1332–1406)*. Translated and Arranged by Charles Issawi (London, 1950), pp. 6–14, and the works on Ibn Khaldûn as sociologist listed in the twenty-seven page bibliography by Walter J. Fischel at the end of Vol. III of Rosenthal's *Muqaddimah*.

[10]   Rosenthal, *Muqaddimah*, p. lxvii, n. 86.

this journal to concentrate precisely upon such a comparison, in the hope of placing Ibn Khaldûn, however tentatively, in the great stream of world historical speculation and, by delineating the thought forms which provided him with his categories of interpretation, to establish his affinities with history and sociology.

The reviewer does not wish to seem either contentious or niggling when he argues that, in so far as the *Muqaddimah* is concerned, Ibn Khaldûn cannot be classified as either historian or sociologist with any sort of terminological accuracy. He can appear to belong to both disciplines only to the eye unwilling to look beyond the obvious use of historical materials and the seemingly prescient use of sociological analytical techniques to the basic assumptions underlying both.

The appearance of modernity which would seem to distinguish him from the openly avowed metaphysician or theologian of history is the result of an *accidental* similarity between Ibn Khaldûn's conception of the world and that which underlies much of modern social science. But modern social science is nothing if it is not secular and inductive. And we must look for the roots of Ibn Khaldûn's system, not in a nascent secular science of society, but in the tenets of Asharite theology, Muslim jurisprudence and the Muslim adaptation of Greek philosophy.[11] These three traditions, as they were distilled in the alembic of Ibn Khaldûn's genius, forced him to see history as a series of discrete, atomic events on the one hand and provided him with the impulse to discover similarities between them and synthesize them in "sociological" laws on the other. But the resultant sociology is no more inductive than Plato's *Republic*, and the resultant history is no more humanistic than Spengler's *Decline of the West*. Thus, Ibn Khaldûn's work is differentiated from the main stream of Western historical thought by the absence of those ideas which have always informed the work of its greatest representatives: the humanistic notion of variety within the continuity of social development and the sense of human responsibility for the great changes of history.

In his introduction, Professor Rosenthal assures us that, "The center of Ibn Khaldûn's world is man, in the same sense that for most Muslim historians and philosophers he is the center of speculation", and that Ibn Khaldûn considers "everything as a function of man and human social organization".[12] And yet, if Ibn Khaldûn directs his attention to man, it is to man writ large, man as an abstraction, man as the slave and servant of a mechanism,[13] not man as a

---

[11] *Ibid.*, p. lxviii.

[12] *Ibid.*, pp. lxi, lxxxvi.

[13] One example of the constrictive character of Ibn Khaldûn's typological thinking must suffice here. In his discussion of the downfall of the Barmekids, he recounts al-Mas'ûdî's ascription of drunkenness and adultery to ar-Rashid's sister, al-'Abbâsah. He rejects the story as being "irreconcilable with her position, her religiousness, her parentage and her exalted rank". *Muqaddimah*, I, 28–29. Al-'Abbâsah could not be associated with such sins because, "She was close in time to the desert attitude of true Arabism, to that simple state of Islam still far from the habits of luxury and lush pastures of sin. Where should one look for chastity and modesty, if she did not possess them? Where could cleanliness and purity be

rational, willing and responsible creature moving against the background of a
nature informed by ordered process from which is wrenched the secret of human
progress, the triumph of individual self-enlightenment and the lesson of
overweening pride. Man may occupy the center of Ibn Khaldûn's world, but
he draws small solace from that fact. His philosophy of history is an extended
commentary on the futility of human aspiration, and his main interest is
justifying this idea. As a result, his peculiar brand of anthropocentrism could
never yield a call to creative social action in the masses or instill a feeling of
social responsibility into the political élite.

What, then, of his theology? Does this yield the inspirational and interpre-
tative principle usually associated with those philosophies of history occupying
the central place in the history of the form? Ibn Khaldûn does not, like St.
Augustine, appeal to God as an explanatory principle underlying the whole of
history, except in the vaguest sense, because his God was conceived in such
a way as to preclude any investigation on rational grounds of cause emanating
from Him.[14] Therefore, Ibn Khaldûn shifts his interest from a God he cannot
know and from a humanity for which he has no feeling to the abstract mecha-
nism which he pretends to find in historical materials. This mechanism is Ibn
Khaldûn's real object of study, and it is of this mechanism that he has written a
history – if this is not a contradiction in terms.

To be sure, much of Greek historical thought was informed by the same sort
of tendency to abstraction, especially in so far as it attempted to apply the
precepts of Ionian science to the problem of historical analysis, as was Christian
historical thought, with its eschatological orientation.[15] But both the Greek
and Christian traditions retained a leaven of true humanism which forced the
historian to the discovery and description of concrete, individual personalities
as active, if not totally free, forces in the historical process. This feeling for the
individual and the unique in history is lacking in Ibn Khaldûn. This is not to
say that there is not a wealth of historical facts presented in the *Muqaddimah*,
but it is one thing to enumerate and describe a group of atomic facts, another
thing to find their similarities in abstract laws, and still another to synthesize
the two in the form of a narrative which shows that continuity in change which
it is the function of history to describe.[16] Ibn Khaldûn is concerned only with
the second task.

---

found, if they no longer existed in her house?" *Ibid.*, I, p. 29. In this case, Ibn Khaldûn's
critical spirit, which proceeds on the basis of his comprehension of "the nature of things" to a
criticism of historical traditions, is strikingly similar, formally if not in spirit, to Bradley's
acute *The Presuppositions of Critical History* (London, 1874). Unfortunately, Ibn Khaldûn
was unable to heed his own warnings as to the dangers of "analogical reasoning and com-
parison", which are, as he asserts, "not safe from error". *Ibid.*, p. 58.

[14]   *Ibid.*, III, p. 49. Cfr. G. F. Moore, *History of Religions* (New York, 1924), II, 423–30.
[15]   Cochrane, *op. cit.*, pp. 456–74.
[16]   See the remarks of Professor Von Grunebaum, who has, I believe, hit the mark in noting:
"The weakness of Arabic historiography is its concentration on personalities and on military
incidents and court cabals." He goes on to say that the lesson learned from traditional

As a result of his inability to come to grips with the individual human personality in history, Ibn Khaldûn's work reads like nothing so much as one of those laborious German *Einleitungen* of the late nineteenth century, many of which abounded in profound and fruitful insights but most of which floundered in an intellectual morass created by an inability to synthesize fact and value in the same system and a fear of facing the reality of a society in crisis. The fragmentary, truncated and inconclusive character of much of the work of Dilthey, Weber and Troeltsch was a result of an attempt to find a way out of that morass by the construction of a science of society.[17] Their inability to construct such a science was, in turn, a result of their inability to reconcile their intellectual committment to the new, secular and scientific *Geisteswissenschaften* with their older humanistic values. The Goethean, humanistic leaven was too strong for them. It still existed but no longer as a joy so much as a burden. What had once been wonder in the face of the multiplicity of the world had become mere complexity when viewed by a mind uncertain of man's uniqueness but fearful of drawing the consequences of that doubt. In a sense, philosophy of history in late nineteenth century Germany was the attempt of the German intellectual to intrude sheer ratiocination between the world and the student of its processes. It is so much easier to analyze the world than to try to change it.

There is a similar sense of fatigue with the burdensome multiplicity of life in Ibn Khaldûn's history. He sought refuge, like his late German counterparts, in the security of an abstract system constructed in such a way as to relieve man of his responsibliity for the tragedies (and therefore for the triumphs) which he suffered. As a result, as in the works of Weber and Troeltsch, the *Muqaddimah* fails to provide, afer the first brilliant formulation of hypothesis, that variety and articulation of individual ideas and personalities which the hope of bridging the gap between ideal and reality provided for Western historical thought in its pre-crisis period. After the general principles are stated, Ibn Khaldûn places before our eyes, like slide projections, literally hundreds of "types" all bearing the same physiognomy in support of his thesis. The result is an enervating monotony which makes the reader cry for release. But there is no release, for the sun which illumined Ibn Khaldûn's world shone upon little that was new or unique to man's vision. Only in the account of the Caliphate and the sectarian

Arabic historiography "was merely one of morality, insight into human character, and the vagaries of fate", and adds: "Perhaps with the lone exception of Ibn Haldûn, who, in addition to outlining principles of source criticism, essayed to grasp the underlying regularities, both social and psychological, the historians and their audiences watched the pageant of events with rapture, ... but remained satisfied with accepting them at their face value and did not bother about their economic, social or cultural significance." *Medieval Islam; a Study in Cultural Orientation* (Chicago, 1946), pp. 282–83. But, as Rosenthal notes in his preface, Ibn Khaldûn's results "often seem superficial and arbitrary to modern scholarship. They are, however, deceptively convincing, ... and thus testify to the insight, vigor and skill of Ibn Khaldûn." *Muqaddimah*, I, lxx.

[17] Cfr. Carlo Antoni, *From History to Sociology; the Transition in German Historical Thinking*, trans. by Hayden V. White (Detroit, 1959), chaps. I, II, IV.

disputes which followed upon the death of the Prophet does the historical imagination catch fire and allow for the reconstruction of the color, variety and passion of the events narrated. Why here especially? Because, for Ibn Khaldûn, the life of the Prophet and the careers of the successors constituted the only truly unique events in human history.[18] All the rest is ceaseless repetition of the basic natural-historical mechanism.

At the center of this mechanism stands man, to be sure, but man conceived in a way which both unites Ibn Khaldûn with the tradition of Pico and Ficino and separates him from it. For Ibn Khaldûn, as for Pico and Ficino, man occupies a stage in the chain of being which represents the pinnacle of the material order, and he occupies it by virtue of a distinguishing characteristic, the capacity for rational thought.[19] It is thought which constitutes the basis of civilizational growth, because it makes possible human cooperation, the mark of civilized life.[20] But this cooperation is not so much a function of rational understanding of and agreement upon certain norms of conduct as a tool which establishes the relation of subordination-domination that alone can insure "cooperation". Thus envisaged, thought is not a producer of normative values but a weapon in the service of an irrational will. Thought may allow an individual to turn his attention away from the brute world of matter and thus escape for a moment all contact with it, but as a force which operates in the world, it exists as a means of establishing hierarchies of power.[21] Thus, for Ibn Khaldûn, the goal of reason is not, as it was for Pico and Ficino, self-realization and self-knowledge but power over other men, and the fruit of civilization is not progress in human understanding but the extension of political power as represented by the *Machtstaat*.[22]

This interest in the vagaries of power may well have been a product of Ibn Khaldûn's own checkered public career (as it was for Thucydides and Machiavelli).[23] Whatever its origins, it occupied a central place in his thought and tinged, when it did not dominate, the formulation of his basic concepts regarding civilizations, the nature of their growth and decay, and the moral to be derived from the contemplation of that process.

Nowhere is this more evident than in his discussion of civilizational growth. For him, civilization is cooperation, and an increase in cooperation is equivalent to an increase in civilization. This would seem to be a sound generalization, but Ibn Khaldûn failed to realize the distinction between the sort of civilization which is built on the basis of commonly assumed values and one which is based upon outright domination of the weak by the strong. Lacking any truly qualitative criterion of discrimination that would allow him to compare, let us

[18] *Muqaddimah*, I, pp. 385 ff.
[19] *Ibid.*, II, pp. 411 ff.
[20] *Ibid.*, II, pp. 416–19.
[21] *Ibid.*, II, pp. 419–33; III, pp. 308 ff.
[22] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 89 ff.
[23] *Ibid.*, I, p. liii.

say, Greek with Assyrian civilization, Ibn Khaldûn was driven to consider mere quantitative growth as equivalent to civilizational growth. Therefore, for him, the growth of *population* and the growth of *civilization* are ultimately the same thing. A civilization grows in numbers and extends in space, and these are the real indices of its development, not participation in common values or a higher style of life.[24] For Ibn Khaldûn, the higher style of life which is traditionally associated with urban culture is at once the *telos* of civilization and the cause of its decline. Participation in a common fund of values is characteristic of only one half of the cultural cycle – the pre-civilizational or "desert" half.

The movement of rise and fall, as seen by Ibn Khaldûn, takes place between two poles, or types, of social organization. After having assigned primitive peoples to the limbo of enforced animality, he goes on to show that civilizations not so much develop as oscillate between "desert, desert life (*badâwah*)" and "town, sedentary environment (*haḍârah*)".[25]

At first glance, this generalization would seem to imply a highly original distinction between the style of life of the nomad and that of the city dweller. But the originality is partially blemished by the fact that, by "desert life" Ibn Khaldûn intended, not nomadism, but a grouping of people that included both nomads and backward village dwellers who earned their living by animal husbandry and basic agriculture. By "town" he meant to indicate people living in urban centers who make their living by agriculture, industry, and trade; but he sees industry and trade, not as a cause of the urban life, but as its consequence. The urban style of life is not regarded as the product of new perceptions occasioned by the more complex forms of social organization demanded in city living, but as an overflow, the fruit of excess population – luxury pure and simple.[26] For Ibn Khaldûn, such human creations as science, philosophy, learning and the arts have the most tenuous character (and perhaps here he perceived better than he knew); they are, in fact, a burden, and, ultimately, the cause of cultural decline.[27] In truth, as Rosenthal notes, the distinction between "desert" and "town" is not a qualitative one but a "sociological distinction which amounts to no more than a quantitative distinction as to the size and density of human settlements".[28] But if this is a quantitative, sociological distinction and not an historical, qualitative one, it also serves to mask a moral judgement which is revealed in the explication of the idea. "Desert" and "town" are not only differentiated, they stand in opposition. The former is equivalent to growth, the latter to decline.

Precisely because his criteria were ostensibly quantitative, Ibn Khaldûn was

[24] Cfr. Rosenthal's discussion of the term *umrân*, with its double meaning of "civilization" and "population", in *ibid.*, p. lxxvi, and 313–330.

[25] *Ibid.*, I, p. lxvii.

[26] "Sedentary culture is merely a diversification of luxury and a refined knowledge of the crafts employed for the diverse aspects and ways of (luxury)." *Ibid.*, I, p. 347.

[27] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 258, 286–90, 336–46.

[28] *Ibid.*, I, p. lxvii.

driven to profound originality in his quest for the explanatory principle that
would account for the differences between the various peoples of the world.
In part he found that principle in environment. The first part of the *Muqaddimah*
is devoted to the most thorough examination of the relation between environ-
ment and society in historical literature between Herodotus and Montesquieu.[29]
The conclusion is that civilization can exist only in the central zones of the
world, where a proper or harmonious mixture of heat and cold allow for the
growth of nature and humanity under optimum conditions. And yet, it is
within this central zone that the distinction between "desert" and "town" is to
be found: how account for that? In part this too can be explained by environ-
mental variation, in part it is the result of cultural contact and conflict, but the
fundamental cause is found to reside in a social phenomenon which Ibn Khaldûn
calls *'aṣabîyah* (group feeling).[30] It is the possession of group feeling in concen-
trated degree which gives to a people the strength to impose its will on others,
thus inaugurating the civilizational cycle which leads from "desert" to "seden-
tary life" to decline.

This psychic unity may be based solely upon tribal loyalty, but it is found
quintessentially in a unity of religious conviction.[31] If it is strong enough and is
sustained long enough, it provides that "extra push" (Rosenthal's term) which
allows for conquest and the foundation of a dynasty. For Ibn Khaldûn,
'aṣabîyah is a throbbing potential within every people living in the proper natural
environment, endowing them with the chance of creating higher civilizational
forms at any given moment in their history, without any contact with other
civilizations.[32] Thus conceived, civilization is not a world historical movement
uniting all peoples in the definition of a common humanity, but an infinite series
of acts by diverse groups the central aspect of whose individual histories is the
growth and decay of political forms. The only continuity in the process is that
provided, not by self-conscious mind or spirit, but by "habit".[33] A conquering
people may unconsciously adopt the crafts and thought forms of a conquered
people or *vice versa*, but on the whole human achievement is not developmental
and progressive so much as cyclical and repetitive. It is the product, not of
human reason and will, but of cosmic chance and animal necessity.

It is obvious that, when we have reached this point in Ibn Khaldûn's system,
we have come upon that metaphysical element which well nigh inevitably
informs the work of the philosopher of history. *'Aṣabîyah* is at once the motive
power of the historical process and the principle which, when discovered,

---

[29]   *Ibid.*, I, pp. 94 ff.
[30]   According to Lane, the primary root meaning is "to twist, wind around", then "to fold
tightly, bind, tie". (This was pointed out to me by Professor Rabinowitz.) See *Muqaddimah*,
I, pp. 260–65 *passim*, 414, and Rosenthal's discussion, pp. lxxviii–lxxx.
[31]   *Ibid.*, I, pp. 305, 319–27.
[32]   *Ibid.*, I, 282–310, 347 ff.
[33]   *Ibid.*, I, p. 299. Cfr. Rosenthal's discussion of the Arabic word *malakah*, "habit". *Ibid.*, I
pp. lxxxiii–lxxxiv.

explains the process. In Toynbee, by way of contrast, a similar principle is revealed in the later volumes of the *Study* as "a progressive process of revelation of always deeper religious insight".[34] Like Hegel's *Geist*, Dilthey's *Erlebnis* and Bergson's *élan vital*, Ibn Khaldûn's *'aṣabîyah* is an abstraction which, derived from a sympathetic examination of tribal life, is generalized and applied as an explanatory principle to the whole of history. Such abstractions are not errors; they are only half truths, serving to illumine with particular sharpness that part of the phenomena from which they are abstracted. They are useful analytical tools when considered as hypotheses for the organization of the investigation, but when they are hypostatized as governing principles, they serve to mask an inadequacy or confusion in the historian, usually an unwillingness or inability to admit the tentative character of every historical investigation. Generally they serve to blind the historian to the true nature of the rest of the phenomena under investigation. In Ibn Khaldûn the hypostatization of *'aṣabîyah* blinded him to the true nature of urban life and, hence, to the true nature of civilization.

To have expected of Ibn Khaldûn a restraint which is lacking even in the most sophisticated of modern philosophers of history (for example, in Cassirer),[35] would be folly. We can only point to his difficulty in support of the contention that all philosophy of history, whatever its provenance, tends to try to freeze history at a given point in order to find the eternally valid principle which underlies it. Thus envisaged, *'aṣabîyah* must take its place beside *Geist*, *élan vital* and *Erlebnis* as concepts which, instead of explaining all historical phenomena, really rename them with an abstraction derived from a partial examination. Frequently, such constructs have their origin in an inability to live with the multiplicity of the historical life. That this is so of Ibn Khaldûn is shown by the fact that, in the face of undeniably unique historical phenomena, such as the organization of the Arabs by the Prophet and the conquest of the Mediterranean by his successors, *'aṣabîyah* is frankly resolved into "miracle", which, in Asharite theology, is conceived as a direct intervention of God into time in a way which, being unfamiliar to our experience, defies our comprehension.[36]

This sense of fatigue, of *fin de siècle* mood, must lie at the base of Ibn Khaldûn's enervating, almost perversely minute and prolix description of hundreds of events which, by his lights, have an identical inner physiognomy. Through nearly fifteen hundred pages of what is, after all, an introduction to a more comprehensive history, Ibn Khaldûn tests his reader's interest with what seems at times to be a calculated boorishness. For the reader who is not a specialist there will be (as in all such works) an unbearable desire to skip around in the volumes for specific information about the history of the Maghrib or to see how Ibn Khaldûn interprets a given historical problem. But to yield to this desire is

---

[34] Toynbee, *Study*, VII, 500–501.
[35] See K. B. Price, "Ernst Cassirer and the Enlightenment", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XVIII (1957), pp. 107–112.
[36] Moore, *op. cit.*, p. 427; Ibn Khaldûn in *Muqaddimah*, I, pp. 190 ff.

to lose contact with both the intellectual vigor and the psychological burden which compelled him to carry through his plan to the construction of a master-piece. Out of the monotony of these pages emerges a *Weltanschauung* of which the monotony is an integral function. Here is revealed a mind which has much in common with Comte and Buckle, but whose work is unrelieved by the optimism which informs theirs.[37] It is as if Ibn Khaldûn wished to overwhelm his reader with his erudition in order to force upon him an admission of the fruitlessness of all human endeavor. Again and again, we witness the inevitable doom which follows upon the attempts of man to find rest and security in the world, yet there is none of the drama and catharsis that attend similar portrayals in Herodotus.

The pattern is always the same. A simple desert folk, impelled by its *'aṣabîyah*, emerges from the desert to conquer another people, forcing the conquered to cooperate with them and thus beginning the civilizational cycle. The leader of the desert folk founds a state, considered by Ibn Khaldûn as equivalent to a dynasty – and here Ibn Khaldûn presents us with a consideration of charismatic leadership.[38] The newly constituted state then begins the systematic extension of its borders, bringing more and more people under its sway and increasing thereby its "civilization". With the increase in total labor potential, some of it can be diverted into the production of luxury items, the crafts, arts, sciences and formal learning. But with them comes the separation from the hardening conditions of desert life, and the originally lean desert people becomes fat and decadent to the point where what had formerly been luxuries become necessities, sedatives, it might be said, for the ruling group especially. Soon (and dynasties, like individuals, rise and fall in a given time span) the ruling group becomes a burden upon its subjects, taxation increases, civic and business spirit diminishes and rebellion is fomented. The suppression of rebellion, impossible to the now decadent dynasty, necessitates the employment of alien mercenary troops, the presence of which, if it does not make for their seizure of power, leads to revolt among the subjects. Thus, sedentary life, the basis of higher civilization, is at once the culmination of the cycle and the cause of decline. The only possible end is conquest by another and tougher desert folk, one as yet uncorrupted by city ways. Ibn Khaldûn does entertain the possibility of prolonging the civili-zational cycle through moral and religious reform, but the doom of dynasties, cultures and civilizations can never be averted in any final sense. Thus, Ibn Khaldûn reveals that for him "desert" and "town" are not merely categories of analysis differentiated by a quantitative distinction alone. But they are not qualitatively differentiated in historical terms either. The criterion of distinction is provided by a value judgement grown out of Ibn Khaldûn's own feeling of

---

[37] On Buckle, see Giles St. Aubyn, *A Victorian Eminence; the Life and Works of Henry Thomas Buckle* (London, 1958), chaps. V–VI.
[38] *Muqaddimah*, I, pp. 291 ff., 314 ff.

senescens saeculum. *ʿAṣabîyah*, the cohesive principle, is reserved only for the uncorrupted desert folk; for civilizations Ibn Khaldûn reserves decline.

There is in this conclusion an implied idealization of the desert life, with its rude honesty and simple morality, which reveals Ibn Khaldûn as akin in spirit to those overly sophisticated thinkers of the Enlightenment who invoked an idealized "nature" as the teacher of true morality and as an antidote to the debilitating stylization of life in a *civilisation* based upon *raison* and *esprit*.[39] But again, the fundamental optimism which informed thinkers such as Rousseau, Haller, Möser, and Herder is lacking in Ibn Khaldûn, because, for him, in essence, nature was a teacher who revealed her secrets in a manner as fickle and incomprehensible to human reason as God Himself. In the end, nature and civilizations are chained to "the law of God for His creation, which changes not" – but which is also unknown to man by any of his own efforts.

And if the law of God changes not, neither, in essence, does man. How can there be progress if human nature is everywhere and always basically the same, if differences are caused by chance, not by the will to self-realization of individual human beings? Here again is an essential factor distinguishing Ibn Khaldûn from his Western counterparts who, no matter how often they were able to delude themselves into believing that at last they had discovered man's true nature, continually had to admit that "human nature" was less of a datum than a problem the answer to which was history.

Why could not Ibn Khaldûn see and enjoy the infinite complexity of human nature? Because of his essentially religous conception of the world? Although he writes ostensibly from the viewpoint of the secularist, in reality the whole of his work is dominated by the psychology of the theologian, the distinguishing characteristic of which is not the quest for solution to problems through an examination of man's actions but the articulation and explanation of answers for which human history provides examples, not the central interest. In Asharite theology, and the God adumbrated therein, a God who existed in imperious seclusion, who not only created men but also their acts, whose nature precluded the notion of "a law in nature, not to say a law *of* nature",[40] and whose essence was revealed in a series of sheer will acts, Ibn Khaldûn had at his disposal an ultimate principle which, if appealed to, could offer only solace, not inspire a quest for intellectual enlightenment.

And formal philosophy offered little better. In Book III of the *Muqaddimah* there is a "refutation of philosophy". Here he equates philosophy with logic and allows it a single function: "...it sharpens the mind in the orderly presentation of proofs and arguments.... Whoever studies it should do so (only) after he is saturated with the religious law and has studied the interpretation of the

---

[39]   Cfr. Carlo Antoni, *La Lotta contra la ragione* (Firenze, 1942), chaps. I–II. Compare *Muqaddimah*, I, 253 ff.

[40]   Moore, *op. cit.*, p. 427.

Qur'an and jurisprudence."[41] Thus conceived, the study of philosophy is not the extraction of a purely human knowledge from the study of man and his actions upon the basis of which man may understand history and himself. Its content is given from time eternal and revealed to man only in God's own time. It is given in religion.

It is this position which separates Ibn Khaldûn from the main stream of Greek historical thought and, by extension, from Western historical thought in general. For if Greek historians used typologies in historical analysis, they always constructed them on the assumption of the incompleteness of the inquiry, as tentative hypotheses necessary for action. To an historian such as Thucydides, the type was a conscious mental construct fashioned out of historical materials, but one which, once articulated, served as a factor in future historical calculation to aid in the avoidance of precisely the type of situation which the analysis had probed.[42] Once constructed, a given type (such as a war or the individuals brought to the fore by the war) became a device which illumined at least one more factor in the sum total of cosmic phenomena hitherto obscured to the human actors in the historical drama. When and if a similar set of circumstances appeared again, there would be a difference: in the new situation the actors would be informed by a greater awareness of causal sequences than the actors in the old. The experiencing of a given causal chain, like the suffering of the tragic hero, was not without potential positive issue, even for the person who experienced it only vicariously, that is to say, by contact with the historical account of it. It represented at least possible gain in insight into the total nature of things and made possible thereby the avoidance of at least one road to human disaster. At the same time, the tragic sequence furnished a rigorous critique of too limited, or too traditionally oriented type-thinking by forcing the viewer to break the habit of thought passed on to him by previous generations.[43]

The existence of this element of possible gain in insight into the nature of things which characterizes Thucydides' thought should make us wary of facile generalizations about Greek historical thought as being purely "cyclical" in character.[44] A truly cyclical view of history presupposes knowledge of the world process *in toto*, and if, in the Greek religious view, the gods were supposed to possess that knowledge, man never could. In the pre-critical period of Greek historical thinking, in Hesiod for example, and in the post-critical period, particularly among the Stoics, a cyclical conception of history predominated. And it is to the Hesiodic and Stoic traditions that Ibn Khaldûn belongs, not to that of Herodotus and Thucydides. Both of the latter realized, if only implicitly,

[41] *Muqaddimah*, III, p. 257.
[42] See Thucydides, *Pelop. War* (Crawley trans.), i. 22–24.
[43] I owe this insight to Professor Kauffmann.
[44] A typical case: Reinhold Niebuhr, *Faith and History; a Comparison of Christian and Modern Views of History* (New York, 1949), pp. 14–18.

the essentially cumulative character of the historical experience. For them, history did not necessarily result in either progress or decline. Every situation presented the possibility of both, but historical experience, if saved to consciousness in the objective historical narrative, strengthened the possibilities of survival and advance in so far as it entered into human calculation as a factor which mediated between animal passion or traditional human responses and the exigencies of the new situation.

It was this Greek humanistic idea which passed into early Christian thought about history and, merging with the Judaic strain, endowed Christian theory with that modicum of this-worldliness that could allow for a justification of man's attempts to create an order in the here and now. St. Augustine eulogized the City of God and pointed the attention of humanity to the *eschaton* which it had sought hitherto only unconsciously, but at the same time Augustine admitted (though less than his Christian predecessors and successors) the value of a view of nature and history that was Greek in character and of a human reason capable of knowing its processes, even if nature, history and reason did exist on a plane below supernature and revelation.[45]   ʃ

In Ibn Khaldûn's philosophy of history there is no progress that is not temporary, no enlightenment that is not revelation, no human accomplishment which does not have at its base mechanical chance; there is only the enervating Lucretian rise and fall out of the void and back again, only brute habit making for what seems to be historical continuity. Such pessimism was either born of, or gave birth to, the seeming Hobbesianism of Ibn Khaldûn's conception of natural man. For him, the natural tendency of man is to devour his fellows. Cooperation or civilization is possible only when sustained by force.[46] Thus, all cultures are at base merely functions of *Machtstaaten*, sustained by no informing values, but by force alone.

We can understand, therefore, Ibn Khaldûn's cultivated disdain for the cultivated man and his insistence that the true sustainer of civilizations is the crude and simple politician who seeks his own power interests. For Ibn Khaldûn, as for Max Weber, *Politik* is one *Beruf*, *Wissenschaft* another. Rewards come, not to the subtle, the sensitive and the learned, who see the complexities of life, but to the simplicist who reduces all human relations to power relations.[47]

One is again reminded of Thucydides who, in his portraits of Themistocles and Pericles, defined the true politician as one who proceeded, not on the basis of formal book learning, but upon an intuitive grasp of every human situation, a conception of rule which Plato, with the rightful indignation of the professional scholar, submitted to attack in his political dialogues.[48] But there is a difference

[45] Cochrane, *op. cit.*, pp. 410 ff.; Mommsen, *op. cit.*, p. 374.

[46] *Muqaddimah*, I, pp. 89, 262, 28 330–32, 380–82.

[47] *Ibid.*, III, pp. 308 ff.

[48] Thucydides, *Pelop. War*, iv. 136–37; Plato, *Gorgias* (Jowett trans.), 480 ff. Cfr. also Werner Jaeger, *Paideia: the Ideals of Greek Culture*, trans. Gilbert Highet (Oxford, 1946), I, pp. 382 ff.

separating Thucydides and Plato from Ibn Khaldûn: for Thucydides, the politician was one who acted intuitively in the interests of the community as a whole; for Plato, he was one who acted self-consciously and scientifically for the same end. For Ibn Khaldûn, the politician may be informed by religious piety, but he must always act as a law unto himself in accordance with the demands of power. And not even that instinct can save him if he is unfortunate enough to be born into the late stages of a dynasty's natural life cycle.[49] The mechanism works without exception and thus obviates any call to self-transcending social action by the ruler in the interests of piety.

It is this very one-sidedness and consistent pessimism, however, which allow to Ibn Khaldûn insights prohibited to his more idealistically informed Western counterparts. These insights are to be found particularly in his observations on the nature of social and economic decay. His analysis of the phenomena of decline are worthy of comparison with Rostovtzeff (the necessary changes being made), whose general position and career bear a striking resemblance to Ibn Khaldûn's.[50] Like Rostovtzeff, his concentration upon the phenomena of *kratos* gave him profound insights into the stultifying effects of total power, but it blinded him to the transforming power of *ethos*, with the result that when he turns to a consideration of products of the latter, he is able to see them only in terms of the former. His analysis of architecture and art are characteristically those of a sensitive mind chained to a system which cannot admit the intrinsic worth of the products of high civilization.[51] The only art form to which he admits real worth is poetry, the great achievement of the nomadic peoples, but, like Vico and Herder, he saw that less as a product of men than of a given stage in the civilizational cycle.[52]

The three volumes of the *Muqaddimah* constitute the introduction proper and the first volume of Ibn Khaldûn's more extensive history of the world, *Kitâb al-'Ibar*. The perusal of those remaining volumes would no doubt yield much more information about the historian, but of the philosopher of history they can tell us little more. Ibn Khaldûn's philosophy of history has been made abundantly, and masterfully, clear in the *Muqaddimah*. The moral to be derived from the study of that position is equally clear: when the historian has no genuine respect for men, he will look everywhere but to men for the cause of historical change, and, failing to center upon man as the agent responsible for human triumph and disaster, he will find it impossible to share, through his history, in

---

[49]   *Muqaddimah*, I, pp. 278, 279–8, 343.
[50]   See Arnoldo Momigliano, "M. I. Rostovtzeff", *The Cambridge Journal*, VII (1954), pp. 334–346, reprinted in Momigliano, *Contributo alla storia degli studi classici* (Roma, 1955), pp. 341–54.
[51]   Ibn Khaldûn makes no real distinction between art, craft and science, so far as I can see. Cfr. his discussion of architecture in *Muqaddimah*, I, pp. 356 ff., II, 241 ff., and literary criticism, *ibid.*, III, pp. 336 ff.
[52]   *Ibid.*, III, pp. 367 ff., 410–15. On the eighteenth-century idealization of nature and its influence upon poetry and poetic theory, see Antoni, *La Lotta contra la ragione*, pp. 28 ff.

the achievement of the former and the avoidance of the latter. Finally, the lesson to be learned from the perusal of philosophy of history, whatever its origin, is confirmed by examination of Ibn Khaldûn's thought on the subject: the distinction between "inner meaning" and external appearance of historical events is not in itself vicious; it only becomes so when it is used to justify escape from the burden of human freedom and its responsibilities.

HAYDEN V. WHITE
University of Rochester

HIERARCHY, ILLUSION AND SOCIAL MOBILITY

(A comment on Ping-ti Ho, "Aspects of Social Mobility in China, 1368–1911",
CSSH, I, 330–359)

Historic China and pre-industrial Europe were both once typed as rigid societies with their population more or less frozen into fixed social groupings. Since in both cases the trend of research has altered this view, one cannot help wondering why it ever prevailed. The present revision in Chinese studies is the more dramatic in being a return to the view of Quesnay, namely, that Confucian ideals guaranteed a constant social circulation: men of merit could rise in the world, but their sons, if they were inept, would sink. In medieval and early modern European studies there has been a steady shift away from emphasis on hereditary fixity to recognition that very considerable currents of social mobility may exist within a stable social structure.

In both fields writers had begun by relying on ideals of order, rather incautiously, as a clue to actual custom. Confucian philosophy and ethical doctrine, it is true, gave rise to Quesnay's happy guess, but when this was discarded as doubtful, scholars fell back on legal texts. Here they found ideals of order expressed in an array of distinctions of juridical status. Instead of still postulating that these were mere lines of demarcation between groups, lines that a man could cross, they chose to regard them as effective barriers to mobility. The same kind of over-interpretation and misinterpretation of juridical distinctions occurred in European studies. In the use of medieval philosophical and ethical writing, too, references to ranked orders and estates were taken as implying that the lines of demarcation between these hemmed people in for life.

How did this presumption against social mobility arise? In European studies one might say that it came through a too liberal extension of the principle of heredity which was present at the top of the scale, in the nobility, and at the bottom, in medieval serfdom; but for China, where the hereditary nobility were known to be insignificant in number, this is hardly a reasonable explanation. It is more likely that Western writers in both fields developed the presumption by drifting into a certain mechanical way of using the concept of class. In historical work on a remote scene over a broad sweep of time, without attention to the tedious detail of family histories, it is particularly easy to assume that the members of any group were in it for life. As Schumpeter remarked, the circumstance of a class being fairly stable in character, changing only slowly, may

create a false impression that the membership is equally stable. He likened this to the illusion of supposing that the people in a hotel were always the same people.

The inferences that were drawn from Western traditions of hierarchical thought about the nature of medieval society certainly require some such explanation. Even the cult of ancestry among the nobles themselves, put together from legends and the lore of stable and mews, had to recognize the ennoblement of new men and the rise of their families. The emphasis of social philosophy on the structural order of medieval society, on its ranked estates, gives no ground for inferring disapproval of the existing institutional means to social mobility, in the towns, in the service of nobles and monarchs, and within the hierarchy of the Church. Although organic social theory, stressing the value of every function in society, from the humblest to the highest, carried overtones of the lesson of contentment with a given task or lot in life, it never implied that a man should not avail himself of legitimate means of improving his lot or of securing a better lot than his father's.

In the second main form of Western hierarchical tradition, derived from the fifth century writings of the pseudo-Dionysius, the scheme of the downward diffusion of power through the nine grades of celestial beings and through the government of the Church is clearly theological, juridical, and political. Yet the scheme is so extraordinarily impressive, it dwells so on the splendor of the celestial hierarchy, as to create an emotional presumption that its intent went further, that it was designed to inculcate a spirit of respect, not only for government but for all social superiors, and would thus militate against social mobility.

Essayists could the more readily pass on this impression because medieval commentators rarely said anything about the application of the scheme to society except in the government of the Church and in the duty of civil obedience. William of Auvergne turned it into a theoretical model of monarchy, with a rather flat-footed comparison of the work of royal officials to the functions of the angels in the service of God. In his effort to glorify the officials in this way he did not stop to note that they were likely to be men risen through education and looking for promotion in the royal service. Bonaventura saw the principle of hierarchy as upholding the separation of the three estates of Church, nobles and commoners but there it is simply a matter of juridical separation. One of Berthold of Regensburg's popular sermons draws an arbitrary grouping of the non-noble lay population by occupations into the scheme; he censures upward movement into the knights and nobles, but not at lower levels. A fifteenth century English writer who drew out nine distinctions of rank among gentlemen, by analogy with the celestial orders, allowed upward movement both into the lower ranks from outside, and for the descendants of the new men, into the higher ranks.

It is not only for emotional reasons that the scheme lent itself to over-inter-

pretation, but through the principle of functional separation of grades. This held throughout the celestial hierarchy. Celestial beings were fixed in one or other of the nine grades because they were incapable by nature of performing any other functions but those attached to the grade to which they belonged. They could rise a little within that grade by striving to shine more brightly, but they could not be promoted. They were like aristocrats serving at court by virtue of ancient titles. In a slightly different form, to the effect that a lower function could not be combined with a higher, the principle is applied again in the ecclesiastical hierarchy, to drive home the lesson that monks are not to interfere with the work of the secular clergy. The eighth appendix to the pseudo-Dionysian treatise on the ecclesiastical hierarchy is a scathing letter to the monk Demophilos, who had turned a priest out of his church and taken over his function of preaching to the people. He is told that he is a wolf in sheep's clothing, too ignorant to preach, that he should not have leapt out of his proper grade, he should have been content with his station. The same principle is applied again to the laity but only as they attain a measurable status in the hierarchy, that is, as they strive to draw nearer to God, by devotion to holiness. Fixity in such status was however not so much a fact as an ideal, to be achieved only by steadfast devotion, in the higher grades, to virginity. Jonas of Orleans points out that one cannot leap in and out of such a state. Thus the principle of functional separation within the hierarchy carried no clear opposition to social mobility in the ordinary sense of the term. Medieval towns were applying the principle in their ruling that a citizen should belong to only one gild.

Nor did the ideal of the individual's fixity in one function run throughout the whole scheme of hierarchy. Pseudo-Dionysius makes a point of the fact that priests can be promoted and become bishops. He mentions also that the higher officials of the Church have more knowledge. One might infer that study would help in obtaining promotion, but there is no suggestion of urging study in the spirit of Confucius. The picture of the secular clergy as they form the upper part of the ecclesiastical hierarchy is more like that of a bureaucracy in which knowledge comes with seniority and promotion by mysterious favor.

The presumption against social mobility in Chinese and European studies thus came in both cases by misinterpretation of the historic emphasis on juridical order through too mechanical a concept of class. In the first case this encouraged doubts as to the influence of philosophy, and in the second it ascribed a kind of conservatism to philosophy which is now hard to conceive as part of its intent. Meanwhile it is to be hoped that the advance of quantitative research will serve the end of more than incidental qualification of the old generalizations about rigidity, the end of better theoretical understanding of the so-called traditional civilizations.

SYLVIA L. THRUPP
University of Chicago

SHORT NOTICES

COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF MANKIND

A Committee for the Study of Mankind has been organized in Chicago. Its program is based on the assumption that an awareness of mankind as a whole must precede the solution of man's major problems. Therefore, the Committee proposes to study the relations between the parts into which mankind is divided, and the whole, and the relations of the parts to one another.

The Committee has held a number of group discussions, both in this country and abroad, and plans are under way for an international seminar on the concept of mankind. A series of preparatory conferences is planned at different universities. The first of these, on "Philosophy and Mankind", was held on April 4 and 5, 1959, at the University of Chicago. Subsequent conferences will deal with economics, education, history, law and government, science – all seen in relation to mankind as a whole.

The Committee publishes a bulletin *Views and Ideas on Mankind* several times a year; it has a circulation of about 400. The Director is Gerhard Hirschfeld, who can be addressed at: Committee for the Study of Mankind, 5461 South Cornell Avenue, Chicago 15, Illinois.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Beardsley, Richard K., Hall, John W., and Ward, Robert E. *Village Japan.* University of Chicago Press. 1959. Pp. 489. $8.75.

Cochran, Thomas C. *Basic History of American Business.* Princeton: Van Nostrand Company. 1959. Pp. 191. $1.25.

Lindgren, Raymond E. *Norway-Sweden: Union, Disunion, and Scandinavian Integration.* Princeton University Press. 1959. Pp. 289. $5.00.

des Longrais, F. Joüon. *L'Est et L'Ouest.* Paris: Institut de Recherches d'Histoire Étrangère. 1958. Pp. 496.

Robbins, Caroline. *The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1959. Pp. 462. $10.00.

Smith, Donald E. *Nehru and Democracy; the Political Thought of an Asian Democrat.* New York: Longmans, Green, and Co. 1958. Pp. 194. $5.25.

Thiry, Jean. *L'Avènement de Napoléon.* Paris: Éditions Berger-Levrault. 1959. Pp. 302.

Van Aken, Mark J. *Pan-Hispanism: Its Origin and Development to 1866.* University of California Press. 1959. Pp. 166. $3.50.

Richard C. Wade. *The Urban Frontier.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1959. Pp. 362.

THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

An American Quarterly Devoted to Russia Past and Present

Articles

Book Reviews